Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, East Asia-Pacific Region; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XVI

23. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, February 5, 1959¹

Washington, February 5, 1959

SUBJECT

• Far East: China, Indonesia, Laos

PARTICIPANTS

• United States
  • Mr. Robt. Murphy
  • Admiral Dennison²
  • Mr. J. Graham Parsons
  • Mr. Robt. McBride
  • Mr. Dean Brown
  • Mr. Marshall Green
  • Mr. Eric Kocher
  • Mr. James O’Sullivan
  • Mr. Frank T. Underhill
  • Mr. Thomas J. Corcoran
• France
  • Mr. Jean Daridan³
  • Mr. Herve Alphand
  • Mr. Charles Lucet
  • Mr. Pierre Landy
• United Kingdom
  • Sir Harold Caccia
  • Admiral Denny
  • Mr. Arthur de la Mare
  • Mr. E. Youde

[Here follows discussion of the China area and of Korea; included in the microfiche supplement.]

Mr. Alphand said that he would now like to take up Indonesia and Laos from the point of view of the nature of the threat, the attitudes of the three powers, and international consequences of any actions taken.

At Mr. Murphy’s request Admiral Dennison outlined the military situation in which he described the DRV military capacity to overrun all of Southeast Asia. He said the question was not really one of DRV capacity to aggress but of DRV intentions to do so.

Mr. Daridan asked how the powers might react to meet the threat to Laos in the absence of the ICC. He considered and rejected the possible use of UN observers, direct RLG–DRV negotiations and reactivation of the ICC but suggested Indian good offices might be useful. Mr. Murphy suggested that the latter proposal might stimulate the Indian desire to reactivate the ICC/Laos. Mr. Parsons said we agreed that a UN observer at this time would merely raise the question of the reactivation of the ICC and direct negotiations were undesirable in the light of the 1957 experience, and because the validity of the results would be questionable in the light of the RLG recognition of the GVN which is not likely to accept them. He added that we were reluctant to accept the Indian good offices idea because it would be tantamount to reactivation of the ICC and because certain Indian personnel would be likely to become involved in internal Lao political problems of interest to the Vietnamese Communists. We understood the desire to avoid rejecting all Indian suggestions but wondered whether any new initiative was really desirable at this time.

Mr. Parsons mentioned the suggestion that Khamphan Panya⁴ attempt to allay Indian concern while avoiding reactivation of the ICC by writing M.J. Desai⁵ giving details of the border incidents and inviting Desai’s reactions. Alphand and Caccia agreed to refer the suggestion to their governments.

Mr. Alphand said that, although the French did not feel a DRV attack on Laos was building up, they wondered what US policy would be in the event of such aggression and suggested the desirability of joint US-UK-French planning for such an eventuality. Mr. Murphy replied that we saw the Lao problem as more political than military, with the effort being along classical Communist subversive lines. He said he felt that SEATO obligations required planning within that alliance and that tripartite planning on this subject would cause us embarrassment vis-à-vis other SEATO members. It was also his feeling that military planning of this type was beyond the scope of the current discussions and could do the three powers much harm politically in Southeast Asia. Admiral Dennison fully supported this view, adding that SEATO is criticized in Asia and the UK, US and France are too, because of non-Far East countries trying to mastermind their affairs. Sir Harold and Mr. Murphy both said they could not discuss such planning without further instructions.

Sir Harold suggested if the French are desirous of pursuing this point they should put forward political bases and assumptions for the type of military planning they had in mind. The French agreed to consider this.

Mr. Daridan stated that in Indonesia the French have been in a dilemma. The Dutch complain to the French that they are being squeezed by the Indonesians and they request the French to take strong measures and reprisals against the Indonesians. In addition the Dutch and the Australians are concerned about the possibility of an Indonesian attack on West New Guinea. On the other hand the supply of weapons and military equipment from the Communist Bloc increases the Communist influence in Indonesia.

Mr. Daridan continued that representations to Indonesia about these problems have steadily dwindled to nothing. The NATO members’ commitment to consult before making deliveries of arms to Indonesia has also dwindled as was shown by the UK in its recent delivery of six Fairey–Gannett planes. He said that the French were under pressure from French businessmen who wanted to make deliveries on Indonesian orders. He continued that the French are afraid that the NATO resolution regarding consultation has been turned around but that the French Government continues to believe it would be impossible to lift its embargo on arms deliveries to Indonesia. He added that the French want to be informed of British and U.S. plans for delivery of arms and said that he wanted to stress that the Indonesian internal situation indicated that the minimum possible amount of arms should be delivered.

Mr. Murphy noted that Mr. Daridan had said the French Government was under pressure from French businessmen and wondered if it was not also under some strain from Mr. Luns’⁶ blood pressure.

Mr. Parsons said that over the past several months the Netherlands has expressed to us concern that the Indonesians might attack West New Guinea and at the amount of arms the Indonesians were receiving. From time to time the Dutch have made us privy to intelligence reports, many of which relate to second or third-hand statements from Indonesian leaders indicating that some military action might take place against West New Guinea. Mr. Parsons continued that we have been in constant touch with Indonesian leaders, both military and political, and that we have received assurances that the Indonesian Government has no intention of using force regarding West New Guinea. Only recently the Foreign Minister himself, Dr. Subandrio, said that even if the Indonesians were considering the use of force in West New Guinea, which he denied that they were doing, they would not resort to such a course because world opinion would be against them. Mr. Parsons pointed out that we have also heard from both the Dutch and the Australians that these governments have been given Indonesian assurances regarding the use of force in connection with West New Guinea.

Mr. Parsons added that we have made it clear to the Indonesians that if there were resort to force, we would be against it. The Secretary had minced no words when he saw Subandrio here in Washington after the Colombo Plan meeting in early November. At that time the Secretary said that there were many territorial disputes around the world where force might be used and we were opposed to the principle of the use of force in settling these matters as much as we are against the use of force in settling differences in the Taiwan Straits area. Mr. Parsons believed the Secretary had mentioned his conversations with Subandrio at the NATO meeting in December. He further pointed out that the Secretary had authorized Luns to make a public statement in this connection last October. All this does not eliminate the possibility of an Indonesian attack but we had received no indications that such an attack is being mounted and for the present we are inclined to accept the Indonesian assurances at face value. We cannot, of course, dismiss the possibility of an attack, particularly as our loyal Dutch allies take indications regarding such attacks so seriously.

In response to an inquiry from Mr. Murphy, Mr. Parsons said that we have received no direct evidence of Indonesian intentions from the Dutch but rather a series of second and third-hand reports of conversations involving Indonesian leaders.

Ambassador Caccia pointed out that the Australians also were worried about an Indonesian attack on West New Guinea which might take the form of a direct attack or infiltration. He said there was no present evidence of an Indonesian intention to mount an attack and he supposed that any infiltration which the Indonesians might mount would be brought to the UN. He pointed out that UN action against an Indonesian infiltration would tend to throw the Indonesians into the Communist arms, as undoubtedly the Communist and fellow-traveling nations would support the Indonesians while the West would have to oppose them. He added that he did not know what to do in these circumstances save to warn the Indonesians and he pointed out that Foreign Minister Subandrio is going to Australia in the next few days where he thought the Australians would speak to him as a “Dutch uncle.”

Mr. Murphy pointed out that an Indonesian attack on West New Guinea would be financially disastrous for the Indonesians. Mr. Parsons said the Indonesians were already in serious financial difficulties. Mr. Murphy then mentioned that West New Guinea is becoming an increasing financial strain on the Dutch.

Ambassador Caccia continued that there was every possible argument for not supplying the Indonesians with anything in the way of military equipment, but pointed out that if this policy were followed, the Indonesians would simply obtain arms from elsewhere. He said that we must try to give the Indonesians an alternative to complete Communist domination by supplying the Indonesians with some weapons which should be in the form of light arms rather than those which are clearly of an aggressive nature. The choice of what to supply the Indonesians is a difficult balance to strike as we want to give enough to keep Indonesia free of Communist domination but not enough to encourage ventures in West New Guinea.

Mr. Parsons said that Indonesian opinion regarding the Communist Bloc is evolving in most, although not all, Indonesian leaders. He said that in the Quemoy crisis last summer a highly placed Indonesian leader told Ambassador Jones that the threat to Indonesia comes not from the US but in the long run from Communist China. Mr. Parsons pointed out the fact that Indonesian leaders had waited for so long to obtain so little from the West indicated their desire to keep out of Communist hands.

Ambassador Alphand said that the French wanted two things: to keep a full flow of information regarding arms deliveries to Indonesia and they were also concerned as to what would happen if there is a full-scale aggression against West New Guinea.

Mr. Murphy replied that we have indicated to the party directly concerned that we would be opposed to the use of force in connection with West New Guinea and he supposed that if force were used, it would be taken to the appropriate bodies of the UN.

Ambassador Alphand then summarized by stating that what we really contemplated was a political solution in the event of a full-scale aggression, to which Mr. Murphy agreed.

Mr. Parsons then referred to an earlier statement made by Mr. Daridan in which Mr. Daridan had said there was a NATO commitment to consult regarding arms deliveries to Indonesia. Mr. Parsons said that we consider we have no commitment to consult NATO but that we agree that we should keep NATO informed. He asked Mr. McBride if this were not true. Mr. McBride said that there was a difference in interpretation. Mr. Daridan interjected that the French interpretation was that there is a commitment on the part of the NATO partners to consult regarding arms deliveries to Indonesia. Ambassador Caccia said that the British interpretation of the NATO commitment is the same as the American although the British would of course give very careful consideration to any views put forth by its NATO partners. He went on to say that the British believe that it is more important to keep the partners directly concerned informed than it is to keep the NAC informed.

1. Source: Department of State, FE Files: Lot 61 D 6, Tripartite Talks. Secret. Background information on tripartite talks between the United States, France, and Great Britain is contained in a memorandum from Green to Robertson dated January 15. (ibid., AF/AFI Files: Lot 62 D 406, Tripartite I; included in the microfiche supplement)
2. Admiral Robert L. Dennison, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Plans and Policy).
3. Director General of the French Foreign Ministry.
4. Foreign Minister of Laos.
5. Indian member of the International Control Commission.
6. Joseph M.A.H. Luns, Foreign Minister of the Netherlands.