Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, East Asia-Pacific Region; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XVI

239. Telegram from the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State¹

Vientiane, August 9, 1959—3 p.m.

270. Re Embassy telegram 269.² Reference: Subject: Verbatim text assessment by military attachés France, Britain and U.S.

In conformance with instructions received from their government, the military attachés of the United States, Great Britain, and France have studied together the various aspects of the situation in Laos created by the armed insurrection in the province of Sam Neua.

A copy of the reports made by each of the three officers will be sent to you without delay,³ but it is possible to say now that their conclusions are identical as follows:

1. Most of the information furnished by the responsible Lao authorities has been manifestly exaggerated.

2. Even though the Lao authorities have claimed the active participation of regular units of the PAVN with guerrilla actions this has not been proven.

3. The Lao civil and military authorities now actually limit themselves to speaking of small groups or of individual VM.

4. The number of armed rebels in the province of Sam Neua probably does not exceed a few hundred, but it is possible that substantial reinforcements may come to back up the insurrection; however, they have not been able to furnish any concrete proof.

5. Nothing permits the exclusion a priority [priori?] subsequent intervention by the PAVN, but neither does anything serve to confirm this hypothesis.

6. The majority of the Thai, Meo and Kha ethnic minorities are hostile to the Royal Government which explains the active or passive aid which the rebels secure or may secure from the countryside.

7. From the information received it seems that a certain disturbing unrest exists in other provinces of the Kingdom and that some local form of insurrection may develop.

8. The ANL troops at the disposal of the Royal Government in the province of Sam Neua are now numerically very superior, and should easily be able to overcome the insurrection except in the case of substantial reinforcements or intervention from without which is still to be feared.

9. If the disturbances spread, which is very possible, it is to be feared that the ANL will not be capable of countering them effectively.

Smith

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/8–959. Secret; Niact. Repeated priority to Paris, London, New Delhi, Saigon, Bangkok, Phnom Penh, and CINCPAC for POLAD.
2. In telegram 269, August 9, the Embassy reported that the U.S. Army Attaché in Vientiane was “very unhappy” over the wording in point 1 of the joint assessment reported in this telegram. The language was modified to its present form at the Attaché’s strong insistence. (ibid., 751J.00/8–959; included in the microfiche supplement)
3. The U.S. Attaché sent his own assessment and that of the French Attaché in telegram 271 from Vientiane, August 10. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/8–1059) The assessment of the U.K. Attaché is in telegram 298 from Vientiane, August 12. (ibid., 751J00./8–1259) Both telegrams are included in the microfiche supplement.