240. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos 1

187. Vientiane’s 272 and 277, August 9.2

[Page 557]
1.
Department appreciates validity RLG analysis British proposal but hopes RLG and UK can develop mutually agreeable procedure whereby (a) Lao would retain initiative in making direct approach to SYG for appointment observer or investigator and (b) British as Co-chairman could support such approach with USSR and SYG as well as GOI.
2.
Perhaps this might be achieved if RLG were to reply to British along following lines: RLG welcomes UK interest and appreciates merits British proposal. However as British know, RLG has already formulated a three-step approach to SYG of which first two already implemented. RLG must retain sovereign right to decide whether and when third step, i.e., request for observer should be taken. This will depend to large extent on RLG assessment of military situation,
3.
If and when RLG decides to make such approach, RLG would like terms of reference limited at first to inspection situation on frontiers with DRV. Later, depending on findings of observer and situation in Laos, RLG might request broadening terms of reference to include recommendations to relieve tensions.
4.
RLG would of course wish to reserve right to receive persona grata observer and would expect his report to be addressed not only to SYG (and if SYG wished to Geneva co-chairmen) but also to RLG, principal party concerned.
5.
RLG would welcome British support for RLG request to appoint observer when time comes and would appreciate value of having such request supported by both UK and USSR as co-chairmen. However RLG would have to insist that whatever is done must not imply resumption by RLG of any responsibilities under Geneva Accords (which RLG regards as completed) and would not wish observer’s terms of reference broadened as result use of force to include mediation with DRV.
6.
At your discretion you may tell RLG we consider most important they retain sympathetic British support in present situation and that RLG, UK and US maintain unified position in face any Communist efforts to split us. This not to imply we believe RLG should accept any British proposal they find objectionable.4
7.
FYI. Despite uncoordinated and perhaps premature British initiative we anxious to consult closely in working out solution which all concerned can support. Department believes any successful UN initiative would require substantial agreement between US, UK, and RLG.
Dillon .
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/8–959. Secret; Niact. Drafted by Usher; cleared with SEA, FE, and UNP; and approved by Parsons. Repeated priority to London, Moscow, New Delhi, Bangkok, Paris, Ottawa, Saigon, Phnom Penh, and CINCPAC for POLAD.
  2. In telegram 272, Smith reported that British Ambassador Lincoln had raised with the Lao Government the idea of a U.N. factfinder/mediator. In a subsequent conversation with Phoui, Smith reported that Phoui was receptive to the idea of a factfinder, but not a mediator. (ibid.) The British had raised the idea of a factfinder/mediator with U.S. officials in London and Washington on August 6 and 7. (Telegram 684 from London, August 6; memorandum of conversation, August 7; ibid., Central Files, 751J.00/8–659 and 751J.00/8–759)

    Telegram 277 reported that Phoui now opposed the U.N. observer idea and thought that with U.S. assistance the situation in the north could be controlled. (Ibid., 751J.00/ 8-959) All these documents are included in the microfiche supplement.

  3. On August 11, Smith presented Phoui with the views set forth in this telegram. Phoui stated that Crown Prince Savang wanted a U.N. observer, but not a mediator. Phoui was therefore recommending to Foreign Minister Khamphan Panya that he meet with British Ambassador Lincoln on the morning of August 12 to inform him of the Lao decision to seek a U.N. observer. (Telegram 301 from Vientiane, August 12; Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/8–1259; included in the microfiche supplement)