238. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos1
Washington, August 8,
1959—5:45 p.m.
173. Following is State–Defense general concept of action to meet Lao situation.
- 1.
- We believe first requirement is to strengthen morale and capability of Lao National Army. This step has first priority. If we appear reluctant or incapable of strengthening ANL, Lao morale will slump and Communists will be emboldened to press for wider objectives in Laos. Once this process starts, may be difficult if not impossible to arrest without major commitment US or SEATO resources. Clearly enemy probes must be met at outset. To this end an increase in ANL military capability is necessary to meet the situation under active consideration. However these measures should not appear unnecessarily provocative, or cause loss of international understanding and support for our moves. Response must be tailored to diplomatic and political exigencies.
- 2.
- A properly adjusted US response at this juncture would not only strengthen Lao fiber and capability but would be aimed toward (a) increasing Communist concern just enough to induce reluctance to give us further provocation and (b) providing backing for diplomatic maneuvers aimed at tranquilization situation while maintaining integrity of Laos. Our diplomatic bargaining position will be stronger if ANL in reasonable control of situation. Conversely it will be difficult to resist pressures for reconvening ICC Laos, with all that that might contribute toward disrupting Laos, if military situation has gotten out of hand.
- 3.
- Two immediate diplomatic objectives this juncture are (a) obtain hard evidence DRV and/or CPR direction, control, participation and/or assistance Communist attackers in Laos and (b) try convince Indians at least drop advocacy of reconvening ICC. Accomplishment these necessary to insure successful diplomatic efforts mentioned 2(b) above.
- 4.
- Separate message has authorized CINCPAC to take steps aimed to improve ANL air lift.2
- 5.
- Further logistic and related military support measures under consideration to be applied as required by developing situation. These should include on spot urgent consideration Franco-American cooperation in training activities tailored to fit needs of moment.
- 6.
- We will continue close consultation with UK, France, Canada, and other friendly countries.
Herter
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/8–859. Secret. Drafted by Usher; cleared by SEA, FE, IO, BNA, SOA, and UNP; and approved by Parsons. Also sent to London, Paris, New Delhi, USUN, CINCPAC, Bangkok, Saigon, and Phnom Penh.↩
- Telegram 963469 from the Department of Defense to CINCPAC, August 8, authorized a special airlift that allowed the Chief of PEO to assist the ANL in aerial supply. (Summarized in joint State–Defense telegram 175 to Vientiane, August 8; ibid.; included in the microfiche supplement)↩