22. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, November 17, 1958, 4 p.m.1

SUBJECT

  • US–UK Talks on Far Eastern Policy2

PARTICIPANTS

  • Sir Robert Scott, Commissioner General for Southeast Asia
  • The Secretary
  • Sir Harold Caccia, British Ambassador
  • Walter S. Robertson, Assistant Secretary
  • J. Graham Parsons, Deputy Assistant Secretary

The conversation recorded below included two major lines of thought:

(1)
The Secretary alluded several times to the essential need somehow to tie together the Far Eastern area, an area so disparate as compared with Western Europe. Sir Robert Scott agreed but to date the only mechanism available seemed to be the Colombo Plan which had not by reason of its very nature been able to go far in this direction.
(2)
Sir Robert said that in accordance with his responsibility for considering and recommending longer term basic policy in the area, he had explored every possible alternate policy towards Communist China, including such proposals as a two China policy, a UN solution, et cetera. He said all of these involved serious limitations and, therefore, he had concluded that under present circumstances the U.S. was pursuing the only possible course of action. There was no alternative to hanging on as best we could in the non-Communist countries, meeting situations as they arose and slowly gathering support and strength.

Opening the discussion, Sir Robert said he had no recommendations or proposals to make but would like to try to look ahead into the future of the Far East over the next five or ten years. He would greatly appreciate the Secretary’s views in this respect. As regards the recent Anglo-U.S. intelligence exercise,3 he thought that there had been a fair measure of agreement and he acknowledged Mr. Robertson’s comment that where there was not agreement, we had come to a clearer understanding of the divergences of opinion. It had emerged clearly that continuation of the military deterrent was essential while we continue to work on the political and economic side to bolster the area. On the subject of the off-shore islands, he thought our intelligence people were agreed that the Chinese Communists believe that they could in the end take the islands by a mixture of political and military measures without becoming involved in a war with the United States. Sir Robert then ventured the general observation that perhaps we had best let the situation drift on more or less as at present but that this was in some respects a dangerous and humiliating attitude and it left the initiative to the Communists.

The Secretary commented that the situation on the mainland was ominous. He called attention to the terrific current effort to build military and economic strength. The Chinese Communists might, of course, overdo it and stumble but as of the present he thought we had no evidence which indicated the likelihood of a revolt. Nevertheless we seldom did get advance notice of an outbreak in Communist countries. Sir Robert believed that there was undoubtedly great unhappiness and human hardship on the mainland but he doubted that there was any organized movement against the regime. He and the Secretary agreed that the military, the police and political commissars were indeed strong and in charge. The Secretary observed, however, if the Army became discontented it could conceivably turn against the regime [Page 63] as in Hungary. Actually the Chinese people could do nothing against modern arms unless elements of the military defected. Sir Robert found no evidence to suggest any serious threat to the regime, to which the Secretary remarked it could of course exist without our knowledge. There was, for instance, no advance notice in Hungary. Despite the lack of evidence it was at least theoretically possible. Nevertheless, as a working assumption in the absence of evidence, we had to assume that the Communists are creating a very strong military police state. It was reasonable to think that they would run into difficulties but one could not go much further.

Mr. Robertson observed that there was a good deal of evidence of discontent in connection with the communes and the civilian militia to whom the regime was afraid to give guns. These steps were recent, however, and it was too soon for the opposition to have developed far. There was, however, frightful hardship and the evidence suggested that at least 350,000 people had been liquidated since the 100 flowers experiment was tried. This experiment revealed much intellectual restiveness. The Secretary agreed but noted that we do not have any evidence of restiveness in regard to adverse attitudes in the army and police. Mr. Robertson pointed out that what happens to the Army is of crucial importance. When they had a free choice after the Korean armistice, 75% of the Chinese Communist prisoners, even after several months of brain-washing, elected not to return to the North. Sir Robert said that if the bars were down, the Chinese would flood into Hong Kong. He inquired as to how the Secretary saw the immediate problem of Formosa and the off-shore islands.

The Secretary said that according to some evidence it would not appear that the Chinese Communists really wanted to take the off-shore islands now. Both from the talks in Warsaw and from other indications it looked as though they see some advantage in maintaining the islands as an irritant. Doubtless the original bombardment had been intended to take the islands by interdiction. However, bombardment had had little effect on the islands and we had circumvented the interdiction by our efforts. He ventured to think that perhaps the shelling would lapse into a rather sporadic affair. He had in fact predicted quite early that if we could succeed in resupplying the islands, the Chinese Communists would gradually taper off in their efforts. All the recent foolishness, such as the announcement of shooting on odd but not even days, was apparently for face saving purposes to make it appear that it was the Chinese Communists themselves who were permitting the islands to survive by unhampered supply on even days. This was perhaps a clever move psychologically. At the moment the Chinese Communists continue their military build-up in [Page 64] adjacent areas. The Chinese Communist air force had been humiliated by their lack of success against the Chinese Nationalists and so there might possibly be air battles later in order to regain face.

Sir Harold Caccia observed that if the Chinese Communists had decided to let the islands remain as they are and to keep the Chinese Nationalists on them, we should consider if that was in our interest and in that of the Chinese Nationalists also. The Secretary then made it clear that we in this country had always wanted to have these islands out of the way and no one would be unhappy if they could just disappear. The trouble was, however, that if we forced the Chinese Nationalists off the islands it would have a very bad effect on Taiwan, perhaps a fatal effect. We did hope that the Chinese Nationalists would cut down their forces on the islands somewhat when they were not being fired at. He had had a long talk with Chiang on just this point and urged him not to commit his prestige too far on these small islands. He had suggested to Chiang that the Chinese Nationalist cause was too great a cause to relate it to specific bits of territory. Churchill, when Britain itself was threatened, had never tied the British cause even to the British Isles but had made it clear that if these were lost, they would fight on elsewhere. The Chinese Nationalists also had never committed themselves to the holding of specific points against the Japanese but had continued to fight on when they lost Peiping, Nanking and other key cities. The Secretary said he thought he had made some impression on Chiang but not to the point of bringing Chiang to the more desirable course of holding the islands very lightly and withdrawing if there were major attacks. Chiang had not reached that point in his thinking. If we on the other hand forced him to it, it could well break morale on Formosa. If we could handle this matter as we had the Tachens it would be better but nobody could say how you could bring this about. In the Secretary’s view, if you forced Chiang by terminating aid, he would probably say that he would fight on with what he had until he was finished. In any event the risk was too great. The Secretary doubted that general war would come out of the off-shore island crisis or even that the islands would necessarily be lost. He noted that they are not now being used for any provocative purposes. Perhaps we could educate the Chinese Nationalists over a period of time but if we forced the issue now too much it would be bad.

Sir Robert observed that if we forced the Chinese Nationalists off the islands there could be a kind of earthquake shock wave which would spread out over the area of Southeast Asia. It would be bad for American prestige to have it appear that we had let our friends down.

Broadening the discussion somewhat, the Secretary remarked that the U.S. was trying to do a very difficult job indeed, the outcome of which could not be foreseen. We were trying to hold the Asian island [Page 65] and peninsula chain which was of such vital importance. However, between the elements of this chain there were geographic, political, cultural, psychological—in fact many barriers. Then there was the adjacent dynamic mass of Communist China. This regime clearly wanted U.S. power out of the Western Pacific. In the face of this there ought to be some way to tie the whole area together for greater strength but this was a tough problem, as was indicated, for example, by the problem of Japanese-Korean relations where Rhee’s animosity prevented a rapprochement. Rhee was even more anti-Japanese than he was anti-Communist, and he distrusted us because of our attitude toward Japan. He thought Teddy Roosevelt had sold Korea out to the Japanese once and he was afraid we would do it again. Then there was the Japanese desire, moderate at present, for the reversion of Okinawa, where in fact the U.S. had a difficult time to keep the local people content. We were tempted to make much of the Chinese Communists plowing up the graves of ancestors but many Okinawan graves had been bulldozed into airplane runways on Okinawa and, if we were not careful, we could have a Cyprus-type situation there on our hands.

The Secretary then passed on to brief consideration of various country situations such as Formosa and then the Philippines where the situation was not as good as we would like to see. Magsaysay’s loss had been a tragic one and the present government was corrupt with the result that the situation had deteriorated a lot since Garcia’s advent. In Southeast Asia, Thailand was in the throes of an upheaval which seemed, however, to be in the framework of a pro-Western policy. Sarit’s position, however, was not stable and, as Mr. Robertson stated, he was an ill man. As for Cambodia and Laos, the situation was somewhat better in the latter country with the pro-Western element having survived with less initial damage than we had feared when they made their too soft deal with the Pathet Lao a year ago. In Cambodia, there was the erratic ex-King who dominated things and who talked one way one day and another way the next. His visit here had apparently worked to our advantage for the present. In Viet-Nam the situation looked rather good, although we hear rumblings over Diem’s somewhat autocratic rule. In Indonesia, it looked at the moment as though our policy had been a wise one. We had played along rather carefully and now the Government and the Army have perhaps realized the magnitude of the possible catastrophe they faced there. We had been careful to leave a choice open to them and they appear to have taken it. Going on to the South, it was not necessary to say anything of Australia and New Zealand. That left Malaya and Singapore, in regard to the latter of which Sir Robert said he was not taking any bets just now.

[Page 66]

The Secretary said that in the face of the many difficulties it sometimes seemed to him a miracle we had been able to play along and that the various crises had been survived.

Sir Robert felt that there was no alternative to meeting these with patience and working slowly towards our objectives. He then expressed the view that the communiqué issued following the Secretary’s Taipei visit was a big step forward and of major significance.4 The Secretary said that no one should think it had been easy to obtain agreement on the communiqué. It had taken a fair amount of persuasion. However, the concept of free China as a symbol of the culture and tradition of China had seemed important. Sir Robert agreed, commenting that if differences should build up inside Communist China, it was preferable that a spontaneous internal movement to overthrow the Communists should take place rather than have it come from outside intervention. The Secretary thought that a revolt would have to originate internally. In fact, it might well develop new leadership (rather than taking the Taipei leaders). In fact, he had been tempted to express publicly views on new leadership. In any event this concept of the role for Taiwan was useful. If only there were some way to tie in the whole area, it would be most valuable, but there was none in sight.

Mr. Robertson said that Ambassador George Yeh had always been offended by the idea that free China was tied to the leadership of one man, Chiang Kai-shek. The present President will be followed by others. The Vice President today is a good man and a strong leader, and furthermore does not suffer from association with a past reputation. The Secretary remarked that essentially what you have to operate on is faith. Despotism had always come a cropper. In response to Sir Robert’s comment that the time schedule for coming a cropper was difficult to foresee, the Secretary went on to note that the Axis had almost all of Europe at one time, confining the free world to the fringes, and yet they were overcome. He too did not know what the time element would be in this situation.

Turning to Japan, the Secretary remarked on the industrial power of Japan in the area and said the Chinese Communists could not match Japan’s productivity for a considerable time. However, at present Japan was not altogether solid. Kishi had just run into trouble—there was a good deal of Communist penetration in the labor and education fields and Chinese Communist trade competition could hurt Japan very much. A trade war could be most damaging. There are, therefore, influences which could possibly cause Japan to seek an accommodation with the Chinese Communists. However, Japan has always wanted to play a role as a power. She could do so with the United [Page 67] States; if she broke with us, she could only play a minor role behind that of the USSR and the Chinese Communists. He therefore thought the chances were that the Japanese will want to play with us and be a factor in the balance of power. There are elements of strength in Japan, somewhat scattered to be sure and not very cohesive.

Sir Robert replied that in his opinion the Japanese were not doing too badly. Their system of government had not yet reached real maturity with disorders in the Diet and elsewhere still occurring. Present day Japan also seemed basically anti-military. However, the most fundamental factor influencing the Japanese was that of their economic survival. He thought the best chance of Japanese survival was in rivalry with China—not subordination. He pointed out that the Chinese were already engaging in something of a trade war, dumping rice and other products. The Secretary said that this had now broadened to include various industrial products which in turn led Sir Robert to remark that Chinese Communist built trucks will be imported into Malaya next month. This represented an almost incredible degree of progress. The Secretary again adverted to the question of finding some way to tie the Far Eastern area together. He contrasted the area to Europe and pointed out that each country tended to be alone except as the United States was there as a common element. Sir Robert said that there was only the mechanism of the Colombo Plan which was basically political in its effects but the Plan could not bear too great a weight. The Secretary alluded to his speech in Seattle to the Chamber of Commerce which he thought might have been a bit too strong for some of the Asians, to which Mr. Robertson said that all reports indicated that the Asians had indeed liked the speech very much. Sir Robert remarked that the Japanese wished to play a greater role in Indonesia from the economic point of view and he thought that there was some chance for them to do so if they took things slowly.

The Secretary raised the question as to whether, as the Chinese Communist menace loomed greater, it would bring the different countries of the area closer together. Sir Robert said that the Burmese are already scared and acting more neutral. The Indonesians were taking steps to control their Chinese minority and he did not see them as likely to abandon their peculiar brand of neutralism and neutrality. A good deal depends on what faith they might have in the United States. Mr. Robertson interjected that Subandrio5 had remarked the other day that the Chinese Communists were their greatest long-term problem and that it was China they feared.

Sir Harold Caccia referred to Walter Lippmann’s recent article in which he expressed the view that the Russians might make a real pitch to Indonesia. This, of course, was just before the recent Khrushchev [Page 68] threat to Berlin and at a time when the Indonesians were looking toward the East for friends. This reminded the Secretary of Lippmann’s report of his talk with Khrushchev in which the latter made a distinction between Korea and Germany where the civil war was stabilized and China and Viet-Nam where the civil war was not stabilized. The Secretary found it strange that Khrushchev should have put Viet-Nam in the latter category, particularly with the Chinese Communists having made a commitment at the government level in regard to Viet-Nam.

The Secretary invited Sir Robert to express any ideas about the future in the area. Sir Robert replied that it was his job to try to think ahead and advise his government on policy for the years ahead. In this context he had examined every possible course of action with regard to the China problem and had studied all the various solutions which had been put forth, such as the two China solution, withdrawal from the off-shore islands, a UN solution, and others and had found real limitations and dangers in each. Each one seemed to open up the possibility of even greater dangers. He therefore had drawn the conclusion that there was no practicable alternative to the course which the United States was following at the present time. The Secretary said that we would never be able to get any agreement from the Chinese Communists. Sir Robert said that looking at the non-Communist countries of the area he saw no option but to hang on, to meet the problems as they arose, and to try bit by bit to influence the situation. Much time would be needed. In this connection he said that, of course, the other side might make serious mistakes. The Secretary added that dictatorships often look well from the outside but often something seems to happen to them. Time does not always work for the other side. Sir Robert agreed and said that one of the efforts which his office was making was to try to give the other countries more of a vested interest in their own freedom. It had helped to institute modest police training and educational programs for this purpose. He then alluded to the Colombo Plan and the conversation concluded with a remark by the Secretary that he had thought the meeting in Seattle had been worthwhile. The United States had sought to make a major effort to show its support and to that end the President had gone out to open the Conference and he himself had remained for the full four days.6

  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 790.00/11–1758. Secret. Drafted by Parsons.
  2. During a discussion of the Taiwan Straits crisis in New York on September 26, Dulles and Lloyd agreed on a joint examination of long-term aspects of the situation in East Asia. Dulles suggested that the process should begin with an intelligence assessment, and agreed that Caccia “might approach Allen Dulles to get this started,” after which Scott would visit Washington “to advance the assessment.” (Memorandum of conversation; ibid., Conference Files: Lot 63 D 123, CF 1123)
  3. In a memorandum for the files dated October 14, Parsons wrote that on October 10 he had informed Allen Dulles by telephone that the Secretary desired him to coordinate the proposed exchange of intelligence estimates on East Asia with the British. (ibid., PPS Files: Lot 67 D 548, Asia 1956–1968) The exchanges took place October 29–November 1.
  4. Dulles was in Taipei October 21–23. For text of the communiqué, see Department of State Bulletin, November 10, 1958, p. 721.
  5. Indonesian Minister of Foreign Affairs.
  6. In a memorandum to Dulles dated November 24, Robertson described follow-up talks held by Scott with Department officials November 17–20, emphasizing that recent events in the Taiwan Straits crisis had brought the United Kingdom closer to U.S. views on the issue. (Department of State, PPS Files; Lot 67 D 548, Asia 1956–1958; included in the microfiche supplement)