21. Memorandum From Richard B. Peters to John M. Steeves, Political Adviser to CINCPAC1

SUBJECT

  • 4-Power Planning

The thoughts expressed below may be of assistance for your discussions on this subject in Washington next week.

1.

We believe that the proposal for presentation of joint, coordinated proposals within SEATO will tend to undermine SEATO and that revelation of some ANZUS planning to the British may have been a rather serious error. Admiral Felt is concerned that discussions of this type may lead to demands from our allies for discussion of possible command structure arrangements. While in these respects the United States planners may have gone too far in the discussions, I think it important to recall that the discussions were first agreed to between President Eisenhower and Prime Minister Macmillan, that U.S. officials saw the directive issued to the British planners before it was given to them and commented upon it, and that in most respects what the planners did was quite consistent with the guidance they were given.

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As a matter of fact the talks themselves, and the results, show up the serious gaps which have existed (and continue to exist) with respect to war planning in Southeast Asia. I think it important that we do nothing which would cause us to lose the benefits we have already gained from these talks and which might be gained from future talks along the same line (though preferably in SEATO).

2.
You have mentioned Admiral Felt’s rejection of the idea of establishing an air base (or other base) in North Borneo. While I appreciate the reasons underlying his views, I think it important to keep in mind the recommendations with respect to North Borneo in the Nash Report2 which also viewed our strategic interests in the Far East on a broad basis.
3.

We appear to be in a dilemma with respect to the report of the talks in September among the 4-country planners.3 The United States accepted the responsibility for issuing a “smooth” copy of the report which exists in the rough notes of the planners of each of the countries. The other 3 countries are expecting and anxiously awaiting their copies of this report; two countries have already inquired about the delay in issuance of the report.

A solution might be for Admiral Felt to forward copies of the report to each of the countries under cover of a letter stating that he has not yet reviewed it and will offer his comments in a subsequent message. This will open the way for him to come along later with reservations and comment intended to place such planning on whatever basis is in the future deemed best.

4.

The 4-power talks, and the recent discussions here which the report itself has occasioned, highlight the previous lack of planning of this kind within SEATO. Inquiry here reveals that this planning has not been conducted within SEATO because of United States military concern that their war plans would be compromised. With considerable justification, they contend that security is not to be relied upon in countries such as Thailand, Pakistan and the Philippines, and that it is not possible to conduct meaningful planning with those countries without revealing in some degree our own war plans. In short, thus far at least, the military are willing to trust the security of the “white” countries and unwilling to trust the security of our Asian allies. While [Page 61] this is understandable, and may be completely realistic and intelligent, it poses important questions with respect to the future of SEATO and our meaningful activity in that organization.

I need hardly add that this entire problem highlights an important shortcoming in United States war planning–the absence of political advice except at the very high (and therefore very generalized) NSC level. From close experience we know that the military are very jealous of their war plans and feel very strongly that “outsiders” must not be allowed to participate in their formulation in any way, or even have knowledge of them. We may wish to consider ways in which political considerations might be brought to bear without interfering with their purely military planning and problems.

  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 790.5/11–758. Top Secret. Peters was a political officer attached to CINCPAC POLAD.
  2. Entitled “United States Overseas Military Bases: Report to the President,” this report was delivered to the White House on December 24, 1957. It was prepared by a group headed by Frank C. Nash, former Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs. The report recommended careful consideration of a base in North Borneo. Copies of the report are in Department of State, EUR/RPM Files: Lot 64 D 444, Nash Report, and S/SNSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Overseas Bases.
  3. See footnote 4, Document 19. The report has not been found.