Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, East Asia-Pacific Region; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XVI

188. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State¹

Vientiane, July 29, 1958—10 p.m.

206. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] Reference Embassy telegram 202.² Following are my recommendations re solution cabinet crisis:

1. There now appears to be substantial agreement on inclusion following personalities in new government:

(A) Old faces: Souvanna as Prime Minister, Leuam, Ngon, Chao Nith, Somsanith, Bouasy (all selected by RPL);

(B) New faces: Sisouk, Phoumi, General Ouane, Khamphan Panya, Thao Leuam;

(C) New old face: Bong, who now seems clearly acceptable to both RPL and CDNI.

2. Souvanna and RPL leaders have taken for granted Katay and Phoui must be members new cabinet. However Katay not acceptable to CDNI and I would consider his inclusion destructive of nearly all US hopes based on new government. His presence would tarnish government’s repute in eyes of public and would have stifling effect on new elements.

3. Consider Phoui’s inclusion in cabinet would be definite asset and will so inform him. However, problem may arise in that Souvanna might consider that exclusion Katay should be balanced by exclusion Phoui. I would greatly regret such decision which in my opinion is definitely not necessary. However, I feel even this price should be paid if necessary to keep Katay out. Phoui [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] would still step down if US considered such action necessary, but that if he did so at this time it would perhaps irretrievably blacken his reputation politically and that out of respect for his own personal dignity he would find it very difficult to step down while being lumped with Katay as an element undesirable to the young and to the US. He has to our knowledge from the first suggested that new young elements be included in this cabinet and is eager to work with them and seems to be the one old leader who says he has no objection to their having a majority of portfolios.

4. I believe that, if Oudone Sananikone is added, cabinet named in paragraph 1 plus Phoui is best we can now hope see invested legally by Assembly. Phoui’s participation would give new elements a leader and mentor which some will probably need. Furthermore, he has proven himself the Lao leader with whom we can most easily and frankly discuss matters, so that his presence in cabinet would give our views weight in new government. At same time he is old politician and his participation would logically be balanced by inclusion of another “new face”. Oudone Sananikone, who is also the man most capable of carrying out the all-important village aid program, would be the logical choice. His inclusion would also give civic action cabinet status. Exclusion Katay and inclusion Oudone would therefore mean 6 new faces and 6 old politicians, plus Souvanna and Bong. In any case, CDNI has to date been unable put forward any additional names, but indicated it would participate under these conditions.

5. In summary, I recommend that Department grant me permission to state to Souvanna if I find it necessary the US would only support his presently proposed cabinet if:

(A) Katay excluded; and

(B) Oudone Sananikone included in addition to 5 young faces which Souvanna himself named.

If Souvanna indicated he cannot agree to exclusion Katay without that of Phoui, I would express our very strong regret but would not make retention Phoui an essential condition of our support. However, I would consider that Oudone must still be included.

6. I consider such government very minimum if Laos is to be saved, and Embassy [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] staffs now agree that this is best we can hope to see legally invested by Assembly. Therefore we consider use of our influence on this issue should be clear and unstinted, and if our intervention is to be effective it must be made now.

Smith

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/7–2958. Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution. Repeated to CINCPAC for POLAD.
2. In telegram 202, July 28, the Ambassador reported that recent indications pointed toward Souvanna Phouma forming a government dominated by old faces that could not be expected to take the action necessary to prevent Laos from sliding “behind Curtain” during the next 2 years. (ibid., 751J.00/7–2858; included in the microfiche supplement)