Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, East Asia-Pacific Region; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XVI

189. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos¹

Washington, July 30, 1958—10:48 a.m.

147. Reference Embtels 206 and 207.²

1. Fully concur thinking set forth Embtel 206 particularly any legitimate measures eliminate Katay, subject following:

a) No Lao in recent years has better understood nor more faithfully supported US views than Phoui. His experience (including Geneva Conference) and mature common sense make inclusion most desirable. We would, therefore, be extremely reluctant see him dropped and this would have to be Souvanna’s decision. Believe also great care should be taken avoid any impression being created that US has dropped such staunch supporter for sake expediency in current crisis. We cannot afford create impression US not dependable and that any leader with whom we worked may be lightly expended. Regardless Souvanna’s decision believe you should tell Phoui personally substance foregoing and our hope that whatever Souvanna’s decision, Phoui will continue play influential role as he did even before becoming Foreign Minister in 1957.

b) Assume you realize inclusion Oudone and retention Phoui would mean three Sananikones in cabinet, which likely be unacceptable all other Lao groups.

2. US cannot now foretell what support possible for Laos in future. Severe cut in MSP Program, mounting dissatisfaction Laos program further fanned by Readers Digest reprint Wall Street Journal article,³ and failure thus far to obtain definitive and acceptable monetary reform combine present bleak picture. In seeking force Souvanna mold cabinet accordance views reftels, US not only carrying intervention to great lengths, but also assuming heavy responsibility. Should Souvanna accept our views and then anticipated US support not be forthcoming, we would be placed in most disadvantageous, perhaps indefensible, position and adverse reaction might destroy whatever influence we had left to prevent Laos slipping under NLHX control.

3. If possible and time permits, much prefer US views be conveyed indirectly [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. However, if in your view situation requires, you may speak directly to Souvanna.⁴ He should understand, however, that in conveying such views we can give no assurance re future support which dependent on solution difficult problems here and in Laos. Our policy, of course, remains unchanged, namely support to best of our ability so long as Laos vigorously seeking retain its independence.

Dulles

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/7–3058. Secret; Niact. Drafted by Parsons, cleared by Kocher, and approved by Robertson. Repeated to CINCPAC for POLAD.
2. Telegram 206 is supra. Telegram 207, July 30, reads as follows: “Best information now available indicates Souvanna planning present his Cabinet before Assembly tomorrow 31 provided he obtains approved list RPL caucus tonight. Hence we have less than six hours to make known our views. Therefore, unless otherwise instructed and if above information confirmed, intend see Souvanna before end of day to convey thinking set forth Embassy telegram 206.” (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/7–3058)
3. Reference is to a condensation in Reader’s Digest, August 1958, pp. 41–45, of an article by Igor Oganesoff, “Living It Up in Laos,” originally printed in the Wall Street Journal, April 8, 1958.
4. As reported in telegram 212 from Vientiane, July 31, Smith saw Souvanna before receiving this telegram. Smith attempted to convince Souvanna that Katay, who was designated to be the new Minister of Justice and Religious Cults, was a bad choice. Smith advised Souvanna informally that he might be jeopardizing U.S. support by appointing Katay, but, according to Smith, the Prime Minister seemed willing to take the risk. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/7–3158; included in the microfiche supplement)