187. Letter From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Sprague) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Dillon)1
Dear Mr. Dillon: The recent deterioration of the situation in Laos has caused the Department of Defense to review most carefully the Military Assistance Program in that country. This review has resulted in certain conclusions which are discussed below.
Laos, which is contiguous to every country in Southeast Asia except Malaya, and which has a long common frontier with Communist China, is considered from a strategic point of view as a vulnerable area. Its loss to Communism could initiate a psychological reaction which would threaten the entire position of the United States in that part of the world. During the recent elections the Communists scored gains of such an impressive nature as to indicate a real and imminent peril. It is quite conceivable that if the present trend continues, Laos may be within the Communist orbit within another year.
The key to the future of Laos lies in the Laotian Army, the one unifying and effective implement of government now available to the still pro-Western Laotian administration. This army is being trained by the French but is completely supported by the United States Military Assistance Program.
The Geneva Accords were interpreted in 1955 to make inadvisable the establishment of a MAAG in Laos. As a consequence the Military Assistance Program is presently being administered by a “Program Evaluation Office” made up of civilians with military backgrounds. The Ambassador to Laos, CINCPAC, the GAO inspectors, and Defense Department visitors to Laos, as well as the Operations Coordinating Board, are all of the opinion that this expedient is an unsatisfactory one. One of the primary problems faced by the PEO is the difficulty of recruiting personnel capable of performing the difficult tasks required by the Laotian situation. This problem of recruitment would be minimized by the establishment of a conventional MAAG. A thorough review of the problem indicates that a conventional MAAG of approximately the same size as the present PEO is required to support properly the Laotian Army and to make full use of the MAP funds available.
[Page 467]Allied with this problem of converting the PEO to a military organization is that of the improvement of training for which responsibility is presently in French hands. The low quality of the French Mission, plus the lack of any U.S.-French agreement on division of advisory responsibilities, are major contributing factors to the present unacceptable situation. It is the opinion of the Department of Defense that every effort should be made to have the United States assume such training responsibilities for the Laotian forces as the French are unable to carry out effectively, and to reach agreement with the French as to the responsibilities of our respective missions.
There appear to be three major political factors involved in any effort to implement the foregoing. These are first, the future of the International Control Commission (ICC); second, the reaction of the French to a proposal for our taking over any of their responsibilities; and third, the acceptability to the Laotians of a MAAG responsible both for training and supply.
U.S. policy at the present time appears to be to encourage the phase-out of the ICC, and it is hoped by the Department of Defense that this can be done within the fairly near future. Unless carefully handled, French reaction to the United States moving into what has been considered a French domain may be unpleasant but it is believed possible in the broad field of Franco-American relations that this can be managed in a politically acceptable manner. Finally, it is believed that the Royal Laotian Government would accept stronger U.S. participation were it proposed.
It is interesting to note in this connection that Brigadier General Ouane, Chief of Staff of the Laotian Army, has recently suggested to CINCPAC that a Laotian-United States-French Council, chaired by the Laotians, be convened for the purpose of coordinating all aspects of military assistance. General Ouane in discussing this proposal stated that, in his view, the United States-French relationship with respect to the military advisory effort in Laos is less of a problem than is generally considered to be the case in United States circles.
It would appear that an acceptable way to establish a MAAG in Laos would be to phase regular military personnel into the PEO on a slow and measured step by step basis starting as soon as the current effort to inactivate the ICC is concluded. The PEO would continue as the official U.S. agency until such time as agreement is completed so that the MAAG can be formally and officially established. Since the present Chief of the PEO is scheduled to finish his tour in February of next year, and has indicated that he does not desire to remain for a second tour, it would seem that this might be an excellent time to make the changeover.
[Page 468]In view of the recent Congressional hearings on the 1959 aid bill, particularly those before the Passman Committee, and of the Department of Defense opinion that the risks are greater in letting the situation in Laos drift than in taking positive action along the lines outlined above, it is strongly recommended that the Department of State favorably consider the foregoing suggested course of action and initiate the preliminary political arrangements necessary for its implementation.
Sincerely yours,
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.5–MSP/7–2258. Secret. A copy of this letter in the Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD/ISA Files: FRC 62 A 1698, 334 MAAG Laos, identifies Colonel Bingham as the drafter.↩