Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, East Asia-Pacific Region; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XVI

186. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State¹

Vientiane, July 20, 1958—9 p.m.

134. Department pass CINCPAC for POLAD for information. For Robertson and Parsons.

1. On July 19th General Sounthone sent message to my house asking for appointment to see me next day on “important and very secret matter”. I agreed to meet him at residence on July 20 at 4 p.m.

2. At this afternoon’s meeting Sounthone appeared unusually serious. He measured his words carefully. He said that ANL wants to help give Laos kind of government which will satisfy legitimate aspirations of Lao people. Past governments have failed in this task. Government which Assembly wanted invest would be weak and ineffective, similar to governments Laos had in past. This would lead to inevitable legal take-over by NLHZ in next election. He claimed that a strong government which could fight Communist threat and satisfy legitimate demands of people by making necessary reforms has no chance of obtaining Assembly’s investiture.

3. Sounthone said that ANL cannot stand by idly seeing country slip into Communist hands. Time for action has arrived. This was reason for his coming to see me today. He said that to save country ANL and all “healthy” elements in Laos have choice between two alternatives:

A. Support formation of a strong government which is imposed on country by crown but maintains maximum aspects of legality.

B. A military coup d’etat.

4. Personally he favors first solution but he would like to obtain my advice. I said that I agreed with him that a coup d’etat, by which he meant imposing a military junta by force on nation, would not meet approval abroad. By flouting legal procedures, Laos would invite strong reaction from within and [garble] foreign countries. Internally, such a military regime would have to [garble—impose?] itself on nation and much of its time would have to be devoted to maintaining order rather than taking reform needed to wipe out source of people’s dissatisfaction. Externally, it might invite intervention by ICC and maybe even by Communist states bordering Laos. Hence it is imperative to maintain maximum legitimacy in any effort to give Laos a strong government.

5. Sounthone and I then examined practicable methods of obtaining strong government without violating traditional parliamentary and constitutional procedures. Following time-table evolved from this discussion:

A. Present government expected resign July 21 or 22.

B. Crown Prince submits resignation to King but withholds taking action until ICC has left Laos (now expected July 26).

C. In pursuance parliamentary procedure Crown Prince appoints outgoing Prime Minister (Souvanna) to try form next government. He would, however, indicate at that time that such a government must be a strong one, made up predominantly of new faces holding such key portfolios as Foreign Affairs, Defense, Interior, while including only a few elected able deputies.

D. Souvanna would consult all parties in effort to form such a government and only such a government. Once Souvanna finds necessary support for such investiture unlikely or even uncertain, he would inform Savang. (Up to this point events would follow traditional parliamentary practice.)

E. By virture Article 13 of Constitution Crown Prince would immediately “close present session of Assembly” and on basis of Article 25 he would designate, by royal decree, Souvanna to form kind of government needed to save nation.

6. Re make-up of such a strong government Sounthone and I agreed that 12 members might be a good figure, 4 of which deputies or “old faces” and remaining 8 drawn from new elements. Names of deputies or “old faces” which seemed possible to him included Ngon, Somsanith, Leuam, Nouphat, and Khoranhok. For 8 new members he did not mention others beyond the usual names—Sisouk, Leuam (Lao Ambassador to Cambodia), Col. Phoumi, Khamphan Panya—and implied others readily available. He suggested possibility larger number, I agreed but suggested no more than 6 old faces or deputies. In addition to maintaining this proportion in a new government I also urged that key portfolios such Defense, Interior, and Foreign Affairs, be given to new elements. Sounthone agreed.

7. Sounthone and I agreed that it would be very desirable for Souvanna to head such a government because:

A. He enjoys considerable prestige abroad and hence inspires confidence and his name alone would give it aura of legitimacy.

B. He is architect of recent unification nation hence enjoys considerable prestige in Laos and would probably raise less opposition from Communist countries than any other acceptable leader. I said that since Souvanna is somewhat “pliable” it seems possible he might be willing to lead such a government. Sounthone replied emphatically that in his opinion Souvanna is already willing to lead such a formation.

I suggested that including some deputies in a predominantly non-parliamentarian government would have the advantage of splitting Assembly opposition which must be expected against such an usual procedure. Ngon for instance could carry with him votes of former independents, Somsanith and Nouphat might enjoy support of some nationalists, Leuam might bring support of unaffiliated deputies, and Khoranhok might appeal to newly elected deputies. Inclusion of some of these leaders would undoubtedly help emphasize legality of such government. Furthermore, inclusion of some experienced hands might be check on young non-deputies, new to ministerial tasks, and prevent them from taking irresponsible or poorly planned action. Finally, new government would thus not break of [off?] all bridges with Assembly; and perhaps make it possible for Assembly at later date to approve retroactively such a government.

8. When I asked him whether such a solution would meet with approval of Crown Prince, Sounthone replied that Savang appears to be “greatly changed man” and according to his information the Crown Prince is already thinking along lines this formula. When in return Sounthone asked me about US attitude, I replied I should think US would support—politically, economically, and militarily—such a Lao solution if it was responsibly planned and implemented with carefully measured precision.

9. Re ANL attitude, Sounthone had no doubt that ANL would back this solution. He said, however, that it must be expected that NLHZ will cause trouble and ANL must be in a position to maintain security and support government imposed by royal decree. I urged and he agreed that in all its activities, ANL would be merely champion of legitimacy. He said that ANL is preparing to meet the emergency and that he feared trouble by NLHZ and from three different sources:

A. From PL troops stationed near Luang Prabang. Since they have no ammunition, Sounthone thinks they are not too dangerious.

B. From PL troops in Plaine des Jarres who have plenty ammunition and according to his information even have a plan to fight ANL.

C. Village people brought into Vientiane by NLHZ during last few days who would demonstrate against government. Since ANL may be short of ammunition he asked whether US could supply some if needed. I replied that he should give me a detailed list of ANL’s immediate needs and that in the event it was needed to support “such a royal solution” I would try my best to help them procure necessary items. (I asked whether he did not think supplies at French bases might be available in case of need.)

I said that if Lao undertakes this venture, it must not fail. I therefore urged him that ANL should plan very carefully every step in its task of maintaining order and security during decisive moments of formation new government.

10. If efforts successful, Sounthone asked whether US would be prepared support ANL in assisting those villages which already are pro-government in obtaining desired items such as wells, schools, access road, et cetera. Sounthone continued that villages which are against government would get no support. If anti-government villages want ANL assistance they would be told to appeal to Souphonuvong. If he cannot help, which is expected, and anti-government villages again request ANL to help, villages then would get requested assistance from ANL. This, Sounthone claims, would be simple and effective device to win over nation. He voiced hope US would be willing provide some supplies for such an operation. I replied that the time to talk about that was after the decision for a “royal solution” had been taken but that I would personally do my best to obtain Washington support for such a project and if the precision of RLG planning this time justified the hope that this type of effort would be more successful than that before the May 4 elections I was certain Washington would not be unsympathetic.

11. Before leaving, Sounthone asked whether he should inform Crown Prince of this afternoon’s conversation or would I prefer to do so myself. I replied if Crown Prince has any questions and he wants to see me, I would of course be very happy to be received by him but that I considered it important to stress that this is a Lao scheme in which Crown must make the decision and take the lead if formula is to succeed. He then said he would inform the Crown Prince tomorrow morning and promised that he would keep in close touch with me in these critical moments.²

12. When I discussed ideas expressed Deptel 84³ with French Ambassador last night, he confided that French Government is very favorably disposed to government imposed by royal decree. French now fear continuation of present inefficient regime and suggest any attempt to obtain actual Assembly investiture would only make alternate solution more difficult to achieve. Solution imposed by Crown would be supported wholeheartedly in Paris because:

A. It would be first effective barrier to Communism in Laos.

B. Crown Prince has great prestige in France and a government appointed by him would hence be acceptable.

C. French would be flattered by Lao taking “a leaf out of former colonial powers book”. Paris would conclude that success of De Gaulle has not gone unnoticed by Lao.

13. It appears to me that local French are not only approving such a solution but are actively supporting it. Indeed, French Embassy, under pressure local French military, may already be prepared to condone outright military coup with little regard to maintaining legitimacy except out of consideration for US position.

[Numbered paragraph 14 (less than 1 line of source text) not declassified]

15. ARMA requests pass DEPTAR for ACSI.

Smith

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/7–2058. Top Secret; Niact.
2. As reported in telegram 152 from Vientiane, July 22, Sounthone told Smith that because of an illness he was unable to see the Crown Prince. Instead he passed the substance of his conversation with Smith to General Ouane who saw the Prince. Prince Savang told Ouane that Souvanna should be allowed to continue with his plan to appoint a government of seven old politicians and seven new ones. (ibid., 751J.00/7–2258; included in the microfiche supplement)
3. Supra.