Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, East Asia-Pacific Region; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XVI

177. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos¹

Washington, May 27, 1958—8:15 p.m.

1420. Vientiane’s 1965,² 1991,³ and 2000.⁴ Department approves Embassy’s recommendations Embtel 1965 as basis US position next RLG Government. That is, we favor:

1. Broadly based conservative cabinet excluding NLHX but including Independents, Nationalists, Democrats and, if necessary, Bong elements.

2. Immediate creation broadest conservative front in Assembly to support conservative cabinet and early merger all conservative parties into single strong party.

3. Inclusion younger, more energetic new men as Secretaries State in certain key ministries, or as Ministers if feasible.

We agree with Vietnamese (Saigon’s 2342 rptd Vientiane 381)⁵ that Souvanna should if possible be eliminated as candidate Prime Minister. Having presided over severe conservative defeat at hands his half brother he is discredited if not suspect and no longer merits confidence non-Communist elements at home or abroad.

You authorized call on selected Lao leaders and make clear US views as set forth para 5 Embtel 1991 exercising caution ensure discussion subpara (B) does not lead RLG believe commitments being made future aid level.

In discussion with Lao you may draw freely on following frank assessment difficulty we now face in continuing support RLG:

Congressional and public reaction election results and allegations waste aid program⁶ make it difficult continue justify aid to Laos. Unless various conservative elements can unite without delay and form non-Communist government prepared undertake reforms necessary win wide popular support we may find reduction funds and higher priorities elsewhere in the world will make it impossible continue support RLG. Pertinent to note House Appropriations Committee Chairman Passman has taken unusual step of letting it be known that special inquiry will be made into Laos situation during MSP hearing.

Difficulty experienced obtaining release June funds is also case in point. Souvanna and ministers who accompanied him here in January will remember assurances they gave re determination prepare unified conservative slate and win election. Failure these assurances materialize has discredited Souvanna and colleagues and greatly increased difficulty obtaining support for government in which they participate. Katay should understand his opposition to unified Nationalist-Independent slate and defeat of Conservative candidates in his home province of Pakse also make it difficult generate confidence in his leadership.

We understand conservatives badly shocked election results but unless their shock translated into active conservative unity there is no sound basis on which we can argue that continued aid will produce different result from heretofore.

If conservatives do in fact profit by experience and promptly develop unified conservative front and non-Communist government we shall be ready to discuss with them possibilities readjustment our present programs and providing maximum help in implementation dynamic aid program such as described para 5(B) Embtel 1991.

You may discuss foregoing with your British colleague. Department will do likewise British Embassy here.

Herter

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/5–2358. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Corcoran, cleared by Kocher and Parsons, and approved by Robertson. Repeated to Saigon, Paris, CINCPAC for POLAD, Bangkok, Phnom Penh, and London.
2. Document 175.
3. Supra.
4. Telegram 2000 from Vientiane, May 23, reads as follows: “If given authorization requested reftel would plan for time being to approach only Souvanna, Phoui, Katay and Leuam and to then inform Crown Prince of reactions during conversation already planned for later date with him.” (Department of State, Central Files, 75 1J.00/5–2358)
5. In this telegram, May 21, the Embassy in Saigon reported a conversation with South Vietnamese Foreign Minister Mau, who believed that Souvanna Phouma had to be eliminated politically as a potential candidate for prime minister in any new Lao government. Mau stated that his government was attempting to do this and suggested that the United States encourage the French to withdraw their support from Souvanna Phouma. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/5–2158; included in the microfiche supplement)
6. See, for example, Hearings Before the Subcommittee on the Far East and the Pacific of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Mutual Security Program in Laos, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., May 7 and 8, 1958.