Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, East Asia-Pacific Region; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XVI

176. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State¹

Vientiane, May 22, 1958—8 p.m.

1991. Department pass information CINCPAC for POLAD.

1. Conversation with Katay May 22 (reference Embtel 1988)² reinforced opinion I had been forming as result my conversations with nearly all Lao Conservative leaders that almost all are indecisive about excluding NLHX from Cabinet and even less enthusiastic about suggestions advanced informally by British and ourselves and some French advisors re wisdom of merging their parties into monolithic Conservative bloc [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. Despite lip service rendered by most politicians and army officers, thinking is still to do “business as usual.” Most Conservative leaders are still more concerned about blaming each other for defeat at polls than about future developments. Most Conservatives—Phoui, Souvanna and especially Katay—seem at least as much interested in their own welfare and in preparing “retreat on Riviera” as in safety of nation. There is now no discernible definitive trend among Lao to exclude NLHX from Cabinet nor real effort to forget past squabbles and confront NLHX as one single party. Unless US takes unequivocal stand at this time, preferably backed by Britain and France, present trend most unlikely to be reversed and NLHX may be expected to work itself easily into position by 1960 to take over country by legal means.

2. I am convinced we should not decide quietly to throw in sponge here before having tried at least one last time to forge Lao good elements together to face NLHX threat. I believe we must without delay attempt persuade leaders Conservative Majority eliminate NLHX from government so that by 1960 Lao voters will have clear-cut issue: they will be confronted with alien dominated party (NLHX) which had merely made empty promises, versus united Conservative party which will have had opportunity to carry out effective program aimed at satisfying legitimate needs and meeting justified grievances of Lao population. Basic to this is premise party lines be clearly drawn. NLHX must therefore be excluded from government so that the Conservative government can stand or fall on record it will have made during next 18 months.

3. Such a record must include implementation dynamic economic reform program reaching even into distant villages, marked progress in eliminating corruption and abuse of aid and the development of a feeling of security to permit voters to express themselves freely in general elections.

4. If sides are drawn clearly and NLHX excluded from government, I believe it will also be much easier for Department to sell idea of continued support for Laos at approximately present level to Congress. If however NLHX are included in government, issue between right and left (pro government versus Communism) would be completely blurred and hence it would not be a clear issue in 1960 on which voters could express themselves. If this basic cleavage is created between NLHX and non-NLHX parties, I believe Laos would also be in much better position to obtain support from other friendly neighboring countries such as South Vietnam and Thailand.

5. With election returns nearly final, next step in Assembly will be debate on validation of mandates of candidates elected in supplementary elections, which will probably be soon followed by resignation of old government and attempt at formation new government. Hence, if US considers it essential to seize this unique opportunity to bring together Lao Conservative elements around a firm anti-NLHX policy, US position must be made very clear to Lao leaders now. I would therefore appreciate Department’s authorization to call on selected Lao leaders, and quietly make clear that the US Government considers that continued US massive support to RLG will be jeopardized unless Lao Conservatives, who are now clearly holding majority Assembly votes, move without further delay into formation of broadly based Conservative Cabinet from which NLHX are clearly excluded and then proceed energetically to insure:

(A) Merger of Conservative parties or at very least their effective and continuous cooperation as a single bloc;

(B) Elaboration and implementation of dynamic economic aid program to bring benefits government to every element of people;

(C) Removal of at least most obvious sources of corruption and abuses of aid by economic reforms;

(D) Arrangements to support and integrate into harmonious effort ANL, auto-defense and police to maintain security all over country;

(E) Strengthening a Lao civilian administration so that it can govern country.

Such a program would provide hope that NLHX will not be able legally take over the government and economy of Laos in 1960.

Smith

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/5–2258. Secret; Niact. Repeated to Paris, London, Bangkok, Saigon, and Phnom Penh.
2. In telegram 1988, May 2, Smith reported on a conversation with Katay in which Katay asked for more aid for expansion of the police. Smith believed that Katay planned to use the strengthened police to expand his personal power and was looking for a visible sign of U.S. support to help him in a possible bid for the prime ministership in any new government. (Ibid., 851J.501/5–2258; included in the microfiche supplement)