Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, East Asia-Pacific Region; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XVI

175. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State¹

Vientiane, May 19, 1958—5 p.m.

1965. CINCPAC for POLAD. Reference: Embtel 1960.²

A. Requirements to accomplish US objectives of keeping Laos from Communist domination.

Conservatives must win general elections in eighteen months. To do so Embassy convinced they will have to:

(1) Form Government excluding NLHZ while obtaining support of all other parties and most if not all unaffiliated deputies;

(2) Create single strong national Conservative party grouping all non-NLHZ elements which is organized fully at village level and can effectively counter NLHZ organization at all levels;

(3) Include in Cabinet personalities who are honest, forceful and determined to carry through reform program;

(4) Bring benefits Western aid effectively to even most distant villages to satisfy insofar as possible basic needs of population;

(5) Develop administrative infrastructure of nation so that central government, through its civil servants and officials reaches into most remote villages. Failure of government to “administer” nation effectively has created vacuum which NLHZ has been working hard to try to fill.

(6) Promptly carry through monetary reform to eliminate source of corruption and ensure, without unnecessary inflationary pressure, availability of kip required to provide framework for sound economic development. Such a measure now more essential than ever to “purify” morals of governing class.

B. Embassy recommendations.

1. Broadly based Conservative cabinet—without NLHZ participation—combination of Independent-Nationalists, Independent-Nationalists-Democrats, or Independents-Nationalists-Democrats-Bong—would satisfy our first requirement. Embassy believes broadest base, i.e. inclusion Bong, would be most stable combination, because it would give cabinet widest margin of support in Assembly and because inclusion of Bong and Democrats would prevent them from joining opposition.

2. Immediate creation broadest Conservative front in Assembly to support Conservative cabinet and early merger of all Conservative parties—while Embassy recognizes that Conservative leadership is tainted and offers small hope for dynamic government, nevertheless fact is that system is parliamentarian, that parties do exist, that certain well-known politicians who may be unpalatable to US do control majority of votes in Assembly, and that to weld these parties their leaders must first be reconciled and cannot be by-passed under present circumstances. Therefore, immediate objective appears to be creation broadest Conservative front in Assembly to support Conservative cabinet. As a practical matter, achievement this objective requires first a Phoui–Katay rapprochement. Eventually, however, Embassy considers that Conservative front can only be maintained through complete merger of all Conservative parties and that such merger should become primary objective US policy, toward attainment of which maximum influence should be brought to bear. Less than that can only lead to weakness and division in Conservative ranks.

3. Inclusion of new men as secretaries of state in certain key ministries—practically, it should be expected that Conservative parties will not be able to merge before they are confronted by necessity of forming new cabinet and that therefore choice of ministers will be matter of haggling between parties. This haggling will result in most ministers being chosen for their political positions rather than for their effectiveness and/or honesty.

Once principle of unified Conservative cabinet agreed to, however, Embassy believes we might seek to have younger, more energetic new men included as secretaries state in certain key ministries.

4. As explained in detail in paragraph 6 Embtel 1901,³ inclusion one or more NLHZ ministers in cabinet would offer NLHZ great opportunities: Ministers in government could claim credit for work accomplished by their ministries (i.e., Phoumi heading Ministry of Cult) and even by government, while party in Assembly could assume role of righteous opposition on popular issues to block work other ministries. Furthermore, presence NLHZ ministries within cabinet would very probably hinder government assuming energetic role necessary to counter NLHZ action in villages. Therefore, such cabinet would lead to spread party’s influence in country and to probable NLHZ victory at next elections.

5. Most desirable avoid premature dissolution Assembly—dissolution of Assembly (reference telegram IV-G) would lead to early general elections and such elections at this time, when conservatives simply not organized against efficient NLHZ party, would most probably mean NLHZ sweep. Therefore, this alternative among least acceptable.

6. Petsarath alternative highly questionable—at present, Petsarath “solution” does not yet seem in offing as conservative leadership has apparently not considered this alternative. Petsarath, while popular in the countryside, has little backing among politicians. A call to him should be held as an outside possibility at this time. However, in event of being called to head government, Petsarath might well include his half-brother Souphanouvong in cabinet of technicians. Again, Souphanouvong’s participation in such government—supported and publicized by NLHZ organization could only increase influence and prestige NLHZ.

7. If, however, creation unified conservative cabinet proves not feasible, and only solutions those of dissolution of Assembly or inclusion NLHZ minister, decision must be made whether US prefers buy 18 months’ time by continuing support regardless composition cabinet or precipitate situation in immediate future by refusing support Laos in event NLHZ represented in cabinet. This problem very real since there are indications some conservatives consider Souphanouvong should be included in any cabinet because he is leader of victorious NLHZ and because of his outstanding ability.

8. If US decides it worthwhile buy time, then US may have to agree to inclusion of at least Souphanouvong in cabinet. However, Embassy believes maintenance present cabinet is worst alternative within this possibility, and it would be preferable in any case to have this cabinet resign and a new one formed with a different Prime Minister.

9. At same time Embassy believes that in order to obtain unified Western position with French, participation of Souvanna in government in some capacity, maybe even Prime Minister (unless Souphanouvong also included) likely necessary price to pay. Local British agree with this evaluation.

10. Possibility of military solution was discussed and excluded in paragraph 9 Embtel 1901. In summary, Embassy recommends:

(1) While attempting introduce some new faces, US must continue to work with existing leadership.

(2) We make every effort bring about broadly supported conservative cabinet.

(3) Creation of single strong Conservative party be determined as US objective.

(4) In event Souphanouvong included in cabinet, our position must depend on:

(A) Whether gain of eighteen months’ time is preferable to new crisis and probable dissolution of Assembly and general elections,

(B) Whether Souphanouvong would be neutralized by strong Prime Minister and strong ministers.

Conclusion: In reference telegram Embassy forwarded tentative analysis of May 4 election results. In this cable Embassy has tried to set forth its recommendations re future US policies in Laos. In a third cable Embassy,⁴ in collaboration with Country Team, will discuss tangible action which should be taken by RLG and US in political, economic, military, social and information fields to achieve US objective of keeping Laos from Communist domination. As an example of my thinking I intend recommend that we push for the adoption by the RLG of a sound but modest long-range economic development plan including the scheduled completion before elections on at least a minimum serviceable basis of certain public communications facilities such as (a) Highway 13 extended north to Nam Tha with connecting roads to Thailand, South Vietnamese and Burmese road systems and all provincial capitals, (b) extension and development of key airstrips to at least C–47 size, (c) extension and improvement of civilian and military telecommunications net to ensure minimum adequate contact with all financial capitals and key airfields, (d) bulldozed dry weather access roads to all important village areas. I also expect to suggest that we insist on redefinition existing concepts of the missions of the ANL and the various civil government departments so that servicing and protection of the welfare of the mass of citizenry become obviously paramount.

Smith

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/5–1958. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Paris, London, Saigon, Bangkok, Phnom Penh, and CINCPAC.
2. See footnote 2, supra.
3. See footnote 3, Document 172.
4. Not further identified.