Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, East Asia-Pacific Region; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XVI

139. Telegram From the Embassy in Cambodia to the Department of State¹

Phnom Penh, June 21, 1960—9 p.m.

1659. Deptel 1111.² Since Chou visit diplomatic community has been particularly sensitive to any indications or developments which might tend to confirm deep-seated suspicion that Sihanouk contemplates some early move towards further accommodation with bloc and ChiComs in particular.

Following developments may be cited in support these growing suspicions:

(1) Sihanouk then invited Australian Ambassador to accompany him on six day trip up-country just prior Chou visit reported by Ambassador as being in very relaxed frame of mind at that time and giving every evidence of his confidence his ability cope with Chou visit. Since visit, however, Sihanouk has been in very disturbed state of mind which suggests that he may be deeply troubled by something that transpired about time of visit.

(2) Known irritation of Sihanouk with neighbors, particularly GVN, heightened by latter’s reiterated claim to islands and apparent encouragement of dissident activities. This had just reached climax with Foreign Office circular note to diplomatic missions stating that any attack or incursion in force by Cambodian rebels from soil of neighbors would be considered act of aggression that country against Cambodia. (Embtel 1656)³

(3) Persistent and exaggerated nature of Sihanouk’s diatribes against free world and in particular US during past few weeks which could be interpreted as effort to create atmosphere in which some further move towards ChiComs would be justified.

(4) Intelligence reports in which [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] appear place considerable credence that some kind of military agreement between RKG and ChiComs has been prepared, only awaiting signature.

(5) Reports circulating in intelligence community re bloc offer of jet aircraft and RKG purchase of Czech arms.

(6) Recent information received through [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] indicating that unless US increases rate of military and police aid RKG will proceed implement plan to turn over arms furnished to FARK and police by US to forces vives and newly created commando units of KSRK, FARK and police sources to be rearmed with weapons including jet aircraft supplied by unnamed power.

These disquieting indicators and general subject RKG–ChiCom relations under almost daily discussion between British, French, Australian and US Embassies and somewhat less frequent discussion with Indian and Japanese Ambassadors. Embassy feels sense of uneasiness but unable satisfactorily identify motivation which would lead Sihanouk to sacrifice the limited field of maneuverability that still remains to him by a move towards the bloc of a drastic enough nature that would lead US, for example, to withdraw military assistance which they assume likely consequence of RKG–ChiCom military assistance agreement (as distinct from arms purchase from Czechs). All admit that RTG or GVN could be responsible for incident which might goad a wrought-up Sihanouk to react by concluding military agreement of some kind with ChiComs. All can appreciate that Chou may have made considerable headway in convincing Sihanouk that future of this part of the world will largely be determined by ChiComs and that engineering the withdrawal of US from Cambodia, particularly in military field, would be appealing to Chou. This does not satisfactorily explain however what Sihanouk believes he has to gain through a step that would probably eliminate principal counterpoise to bloc.

One explanation of Sihanouk’s recent behavior that is perhaps more logical but still not satisfying is possibility that Sihanouk may believe that attacking West places him in position solicit greater amounts ChiCom economic aid on occasion his visit Peiping which some circles believe may take place as early as fall. [2½ lines of source text not declassified]

With Sihanouk’s decision become Chief of State certain attitude of relief has been detected among Cambodians. In conversation June 17, Foreign Minister Tep Phan (Embtel 1640)⁴ indicated that with succession problem resolved no reason why Sihanouk should not depart on long postponed trip to France. Other Cambodians have also reflected similar attitude, which if valid, suggests that succession may have been largely to blame for Sihanouk’s recent disturbed state of mind and that he not likely to depart for France if some dramatic shift in RKG policy about to take place.

Embassy would not be surprised, however, if Nhiek Tioulong, during present visit Czechoslovakia (Embtel 1607)⁵ concludes some agreement under which RKG would purchase or would obtain from Czechs quantity of small arms for KSRK (as suggested some intelligence reports). Purchase deal (which anti-Communist Tioulong might promote if sufficient personal financial incentive present) would probably be welcomed by bloc as first step in penetration of Cambodian military forces. Moreover, Cambodians would probably calculate that in view nature of arms and precipient [sic] US would be unlikely withdraw military assistance to FARK. Jet aircraft offer by bloc should also not be ruled out (Embtel 1619).⁶

Most disturbing new development is report mentioned item (6) above. Report itself leaves considerable doubt as to whether Cambodians contemplating using threat of bloc aid to increase amount and speed up deliveries US aid to military and police, or whether they seek build up justification for accepting bloc military aid offers.

To sum up. Evidence in support some significant move toward bloc very tenuous and few hard facts available. Intelligence reports disturbing but we continually impressed with how few foreigners as well as Cambodians really know what is going on with the result that speculation in many cases takes on the appearance of reality. We tend be less pessimistic than other diplomatic missions as to near-term future. Latter, however, readily admit absence of other than circumstantial evidence in support their fears and are as baffled as we with respect motivation. Situation is one requiring very close attention and we hopeful next several weeks will provide some clues as to future course Cambodian policy. Decision of Sihanouk re trip to France, content and intensity Cambodian attacks on West and US, and particularly statements by Sihanouk, and nature of any RKG initiative re US or bloc military or economic aid will be important factors.

But even if no change in RKG policy toward bloc now contemplated, must not be overlooked that untimely or ill-advised action by RTG or GVN may set in motion forces which may goad Sihanouk into moving in that direction. In this respect Sihanouk’s conviction that Thai and Vietnamese support activities against him being stepped up is crucial element.

Moore

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751H.00/6–2160. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to Bangkok, Saigon, Vientiane, London, Paris, and CINCPAC for POLAD.
2. In telegram 1111, June 11, the Department requested the Embassy’s comments on reports that unless the United States increased military and police aid to Cambodia, the Cambodian Armed Forces and police would be armed by another power. (Ibid., 751H.5–MSP/6–1760)
3. The text of the confidential circular note from the Cambodian Foreign Ministry, June 20, with unnecessary words deleted, is in telegram 1656 from Phnom Penh, June 21. (Ibid., 751H.00/6–2160)
4. Dated June 19. (Ibid., 751H.11/6–1960)
5. Dated June 13. (Ibid., 751H.00/6–1660)
6. See footnote 2, supra.