138. Memorandum From the Director of Intelligence and Research (Cumming) to the Secretary of State1
SUBJECT
- Intelligence Note: Request for US Military Jets Reflects Cambodia’s Brand of Neutralism
The pending request by Cambodia to the United States for eight jet fighters2 has important political connotations. The recent strengthening of ties between Phnom Penh and Peiping is connected with [Page 366] Prince Sihanouk’s doubts that, in a showdown, the United States would effectively protect him against Thailand and South Vietnam. Strains have developed in Cambodia’s policy to date of relying on the United States to subsidize all pay and allowances and all imported end-items for the Cambodian military forces and to refuse military assistance from Communist China. Although Sihanouk’s actions are sometimes irrational and unpredictable, the US response to the recent approach on jet aircraft will probably be an important factor in determining Cambodia’s future policy on military aid. But aside from the question of jets, in time Cambodia may accept at least some token military support from Peiping.
The addition of jets to his air force is important to Sihanouk as a matter of prestige. (A few jets would not basically alter the balance of military power between Cambodia on one hand and the superior forces of Thailand and/or South Vietnam on the other, even though South Vietnam has no jet aircraft as a result of the Indochina armistice restrictions.) Sihanouk would also view the receipt of jets from the United States as an indication of Washington’s sincerity in its protestations of support for Sihanouk. And although Sihanouk’s doubts in this regard would probably not be permanently erased, he and his military commanders would presumably prefer to have jets from the United States rather than from Communist China because of their desire not to risk a withdrawal of US military aid as well as their recognition of the danger of Communist penetration.
On the other hand, Sihanouk might consider that he had little choice but to turn to Communist China for jets if he were turned down by the United States. ([less than 1 line of source text not declassified] reports, which are unconfirmed, state that during his visit to Phnom Penh in May 1960, Chou En-lai promised to supply jets to Cambodia.) Sihanouk might then desire to parade some tangible evidence of Peiping’s military backing in the hope it might result in the United States’ applying greater pressure on Saigon and Bangkok to desist from political as well as military adventures against Phnom Penh. If he accepted military aid from Peiping, Sihanouk would be inclined to defend his action in terms of Cambodia’s neutralist policy: Cambodia has for some time received aid for economic purposes from both East and West, and it is proper that it do the same in the military sphere. If he came to such a decision, Sihanouk would probably hope that the United States (following the example in Indonesia, for instance) would not cut off its military aid. Regardless of what happens with respect to the jets, unless Cambodia’s relations with Thailand and South Viet-Nam improve substantially Sihanouk will continue to be tempted to seek some military support from Communist China—end-items, training [Page 367] or even a mutual-support agreement. The temptation would be appreciably lessened, at least for the time being, if Cambodia obtained jets from the United States.
- Source: Department of State, FE/SEA (Cambodia) Files: Lot 63 D 73, 2–E–Bloc Military Aid, 1960. Secret. Drafted by Sober.↩
- The request was reported and analyzed in telegram 1619 from Phnom Penh, oth June 15. (Ibid., Central Files, 751H.5622/6–1560; included in the microfiche supplement)↩