140. Memorandum From the Officer in Charge of Vietnam Affairs (Wood) to the Director of the Office of Southeast Asian Affairs (Anderson)1
SUBJECT
- Jets for Cambodia
Since there is no military need, this appears to be one question which can be approached on its diplomatic merits.
While Cambodia may, in some ways, be a backward country, we should realize that in dealing with it diplomatically we face perhaps the world’s most advanced and successful exponent of the art of Neutral Brinksmanship. No matter how excited and unpleasant he may be, we should treat him as though he knew just what he wanted and how to go about upsetting our Anglo-Saxon phlegm in order to get it. Like some wives who feel their husbands should let them get a new hat, he hits the emotional keyboard with unfailing accuracy. HRH Prince Norodom Sihanouk’s record in obtaining aid from countries of every shade is proof. Yielding to vituperative blackmail may not be the best medicine. This time we should let him teeter over his brink at a time and place of his own choosing without losing our nerve.
While we will never know everything he wants, we do know that he wants jets which he evidently feels will somewhat repair his prestige and reinflate his ego after the embarrassing confusion of the succession and in the afterlight of some risky commitment which Chou may well have obtained.
If we give him jets after what he has said about us, he and the other leaders of SEA countries will think we must be soft fools indeed and it will be harder to deal seriously with all of them. The difficulties of resolving the several vitally important problems between ourselves and Viet-Nam will be dangerously increased.
Our policy should be not to give jets to Cambodia until we can give them to Viet-Nam. We should not explain this policy to Sihanouk, but we should explain it to Viet-Nam.
Sihanouk will respect us more (he cannot like us less) if we don’t give him jets. If he asks us for jets, we should say we cannot supply them. We should ask if he intends to obtain them from the Soviet Bloc. If he indicates that he may, we should tell him that he has no military need for jets and that he should, as the peaceloving leader of a neutral nation, think carefully of the fact that if he accepts jets from the [Page 371] Communists he will be personally responsible for increasing tensions in the area without, in any real sense, increasing his ability to defend himself. We should emphasize that without our influence his position vis-à-vis his neighbors would be far more dangerous than it is and that if he accepts Communist jets, we will find it difficult to continue to exert a moderating influence on his neighbors. This message should be delivered in writing with the full realization that he will want to publish it abroad in distorted form and with the understanding, conveyed to him orally, that if he does publicize it, we will reply publicly.
If we bend too far to assuage Sihanouk, our posture will be undignified and he will only be tempted to take further advantage of us.
Since he may accept Soviet jets, we should make a greater effort than we have to coordinate our military program with that of the French in order to strengthen the allied position and to make a better demonstration of Free World effectiveness in military training. We should not withdraw our military program if he does accept Bloc jets, but should demonstrate that our military aid is less dangerous to his sovereignty than that from the Soviets. We have had considerable success in this in Indonesia. We should not assume that the acceptance of Soviet jets means the loss of Cambodia.
- Source: Department of State, FE/SEA (Cambodia) Files: Lot 63 D 73, 16.8 South Vietnam–Cambodia May–Dec 1960. Secret. Drafted by Wood.↩