120. Telegram From the Embassy in Cambodia to the Department of State1
351. 1. Trends in government and public opinion discernible since August 31 bomb incident2 point to likelihood rapid deterioration RKG–GVN relations. Increasing nervousness evident at high levels RKG due growing suspicion GVN encouraging Sam Sary–Son Ngoc Thanh dissidents. These suspicions supported by stepping up of dissident activities since Sihanouk-Diem talks. So far no evidence change in RKG’s stated determination improve relations with neighbors and free world, and situation Laos has probably added to Sihanouk’s growing concern Communist pressures. However, considering that RKG policy toward free world conditioned in large measure by its relations with neighbors, abrupt shift in opposite direction could occur.
2. Evidences of augmenting dissident activities are chiefly recently increased border crossings. Three Free Khmer armed members in uniform, bearing incriminating documents, arrested Takeo province August 29, interrogated and executed. These confessed having been trained GVN sabotage school Cantho. Also ten armed Vietnamese captured same area September 1, admitted being agents Khmer dissident movement. Additional worry to RKG is continuation clandestine radio broadcasts which known emanate from Vietnam territory.
3. So far as we aware no concrete evidence Sam Sary actually responsible bomb attempt. However, RKG convinced he is. Arrest as bomb suspect of Vietnamese known to have had close relations former [Page 331] GVN representative Hieu adds to accumulating suspicions, especially since Hieu incriminated in Dap Chhuon affair (Embassy telegram 345).3 Rumors Sam Sary may be working with Viet Minh have been largely discounted by RKG, despite arrest three armed Viet Minh agents Kampot province August 27. RKG sources have remarked Sam Sary has not denied charges he responsible for August 31 attempt; latter so far not mentioned by dissident radio.
4. Department aware manner in which Communists have capitalized on suspicion Sam Sary responsible for bombing by dragging up charges “imperialists” supporting him and similar efforts create impression US ultimately responsible (Embassy telegram 281).4 Presumably as result our protest (Embassy telegram 309),5 Sihanouk in speeches September 9 and 15 condemned pro-Communist press, also flayed these papers in September 12 editorial his new vernacular newspaper Nationalist. Communist press has now virtually dropped subject. However, this does not reduce effectiveness word-of-mouth propaganda in which Communist expert and which is gaining momentum (interesting note no mention possibility Thai support dissident activities).
5. We are no means convinced GVN still backing Sam Sary. However, if it is, feel GVN is betting on man with no popular support and that it overlooks probability that in any revolutionary situation here most likely gainers would be Communists. On other hand, possibility Sam Sary supported by Viet Minh can not be completely discounted, since effect his activities has been turn RKG attention away from Communist danger in direction Vietnam. In addition, dissident radio has followed Communist line that Cambodia gained independence only after Geneva conference. Possibility should also be considered that support GVN allegedly giving dissidents may be due Communist sympathies or even more likely anti-Diem disaffection in certain segments GVN.
6. Sihanouk’s confidential advisor Barre, presumably acting on former’s instructions, has suggested US might be able help in calling attention GVN to deteriorating situation. Told Embassy officers September 16, and again September 17 Sihanouk considering calling me in for frank discussion problem.
7. Believe it would be inadvisable reject request from Sihanouk for such assistance, which this time can be expected to be private and discreet, as contrasted Stung Treng incident public appeal and consequences. Sihanouk impressed with USG efforts make possible August Saigon talks and I believe genuinely grateful roles played American [Page 332] Embassy Saigon and Phnom Penh in bringing them about. Fortunately latent suspicion US may be involved with Sam Sary has not yet reappeared RKG top levels but might do so should we turn down anticipated call from Sihanouk. Latter may come next week.
8. We aware Diem not easy man convince but feel we should consider discussing matter candidly with him, emphasizing to GVN’s advantage take corrective measures. Could point up desirability taking such specific actions as police closing down or possibly jamming illegal dissident radio, inhibiting Sam Sary’s activities by protective custody of himself and other dissident leaders, undertaking that GVN discuss problem privately at high level with RKG. Diem might also be prevailed upon have GVN issue formal statement denying GVN supports Sary–Thanh, but this would be ineffectual unless supported by more positive acts along preceding lines.
9. Our efforts here would be concentrated on calming Sihanouk’s apprehensions, evidencing US concern these problems and willingness cooperate fullest extent possible. We would thus gain time for resolution. Would seek prevail upon Sihanouk need for rapid, discreet but not hasty action, impress upon him essential that present Cambodian doubts not be reflected in his public statements for press, underscore fact that questions need time in order obtain solutions acceptable both sides. Should thus take advantage Son Sann’s absence at UNGA in view his basic enmity towards Vietnam and highly emotional approach to GVN–RKG differences. Meanwhile suggest our intelligence sources throughout SEA redouble search for information who actually responsible for August 31 bomb attempt, since we need know in order formulate our own position. Furthermore, our overt and covert propaganda effort might concentrate on pinning blame for bombing on Communists.
10. Further suggest we again discreetly urge both here and in Saigon, appointment representatives of high caliber who have confidence own government’s top levels. Nhan liked here and impressed Sihanouk favorably at time Saigon talks, but evident to RKG he carries little weight with GVN, while Sum Hieng definitely second-rate in addition being violently anti-Vietnamese.
11. Believe these suggestions accord with considerations Embassy telegram 1500 and Department’s G–65.6 Would appreciate Department’s and Saigon’s thoughts. Meanwhile, will take advantage informal visit Saigon September 21 discuss these problems with Durbrow.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751H.11/9–1959. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Repeated priority to Saigon and to CINCPAC, Bangkok, and Paris.↩
- On August 31, a bomb exploded in the Royal Palace killing Protocol Director Prince Norodom Vakrivan and a servant and wounding other servants. The device was hidden in a lacquer box which was delivered that day to the Palace as a gift for the Queen. Just before Prince Vakrivan opened the box, the King and Queen left the room for an interview. (Telegrams 263 and 280 from Phnom Penh, August 31 and September 2; ibid., 751H.11/8–3159 and 751H.11/9–259) On September 1, President Eisenhower sent his condolences and expressed his outrage and shock at the assassination attempt. (Secto 41 from London, September 1; ibid., 751H.11/9–159)↩
- Dated September 17. (Ibid., 751H.11/9–1759)↩
- Dated September 2. (Ibid., 751H.11/9–259)↩
- Dated September 8. (Ibid., 751H.11/9–859)↩
- Documents 116 and 118.↩