Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, East Asia-Pacific Region; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XVI

118. Airgram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Cambodia¹

G–65

Washington, June 5, 1959—11:40 p.m.

Saigon’s 2447;² Phnom Penh’s 1500³ and 1510.⁴

A. Department welcomes various recommendations submitted by Phnom Penh and Saigon and believes it perhaps helpful summarize current Department views of problems facing US in Cambodia. Summary follows:

1. Agree Phnom Penh’s 1500 major problems are (a) leftist trend execution Cambodia’s neutrality policy coupled with growing Communist influence and (b) RKG–GVN relations.

2. View past experience foregoing problems unlikely to be resolved by RKG and GVN of own accord and in fact apt become more acute unless Free World influence exerted persistently on both countries.

3. Also agree Phnom Penh’s 1500 some amelioration second listed problem essential precondition for advance on first problem.

4. US and France at present possess greatest potential for influencing situation to benefit Free World with US potential greater in Viet-Nam and French in Cambodia.

5. Prospects for effective US-French cooperation and coordination these problems still dimmed by probability French in Cambodia concerned primarily with maintenance French position including retention Sihanouk’s favor and in view other past divergencies US and French views on SEA problems (particularly effect of Cambodian neutrality) which probably not resolved despite recent more favorable indications (Paris’ 4301 and Phnom Penh’s 1511 and 1534).⁵

6. Despite considerations foregoing subpara believe it essential maintain close contact and coordinate major US actions with French in order minimize French resentment and possibility further French unilateral actions harming US and Free World interests such as Gorce activities at time Cambodian coup plots.

7. In line Phnom Penh’s 1500 believe it desirable GVN, RKG, and GOF be fully aware it US policy encourage improvement relations between GVN and RKG. GOF considered fully informed (Deptel 4466 to Paris).⁶ Also believe RKG aware (para 7 Phnom Penh’s 1441).⁷ In fact, may be necessary exercise care avoid allowing RKG presume US taking full responsibility for RKG–GVN relations (Deptel 999 to Phnom Penh)⁸ since Cambodians all too inclined renounce own responsibility and place onus for their relations with Free World on latter, mainly on US. Nevertheless, we should continue to impress RKG with friendly US interest this problem and readiness be helpful when feasible. Although GVN undoubtedly recognizes US making effort to improve GVN–RKG relations, it believed desirable reiterate formally on appropriate occasion that this US policy reemphasizing reasons therefor and again stressing great importance US attaches to it.

8. Department as yet perceives no purpose to be served by formal direct US involvement this time and considers background role comprising primarily cautious exertion influence on both parties to take initiative (or desist from certain actions) most useful for present. Thus we should continue urge both parties avoid inflaming atmosphere specifically maintaining press truce and moderation in public statements. Nevertheless should two countries again lock horns over some specific incident or reach impasse in negotiations which threatens another serious explosion in relations US may find it necessary take more active role, e.g. as channel of communication or possibly use of good offices if requested provided such action holds reasonable prospects of reducing tensions rather than serving merely incur resentment against US. Each case must be judged on ad hoc basis.

9. With regard specific lines of action believe we should continue press for establishment efficient and trustworthy channel of contact between GVN and RKG. Both should be urged to reinforce their existing normal missions (Phnom Penh’s 1500 subpara 10 h) and to carry forward meanwhile current proposals for meeting of high level secret emissaries. On latter it appears next step up to RKG (Saigon’s 2472)⁹ and Embassy Phnom Penh in coordination with French should be prepared urge RKG take action upon return Sihanouk.

10. Cessation of GVN support for Cambodian dissidents obviously must be sought on priority basis. RKG understandably sensitive to this action and unlikely move closer to Free World much less make concessions to GVN while latter supporting opposition. Insructions for representations to GVN on this score being prepared. However, problem undoubtedly will require persistent US efforts. Can expect French support be of little effect this field but support of other countries such as UK and Australia worth consideration.

11. View recent RKG acknowledgement illegal border activities also harmful to Cambodia and assurances it ready to cooperate on this problem with GVN, and bearing in mind reported French approach to Sihanouk on this subject (Paris 4302 to Dept),¹⁰ prospects now reasonably favorable for some advance in this field. This may well be major subject for discussion by secret emissaries. However, problem obviously very complex and complete elimination of illegal border activities probably far beyond capacity of forces available to both countries. Therefore, believe it desirable Saigon at appropriate opportunity warn GVN not to expect unrealistic results, noting that even with best of will and exertion all-out effort RKG probably capable of improving situation only moderately. Basis information available it appears we can realistically expect little more in near future than better exchange information and occasional coordination of action in specific sectors. Department would appreciate further Phnom Penh and Saigon appraisals of practical operational aspects this border control problem.

12. Reestablishment payments agreement (Phnom Penh’s 1500) may have some psychological advantages but practical effects appear doubtful (Phnom Penh’s despatch 93, September 15, 1958).¹¹ Entirely new trade agreement responsive to current economic conditions may be worthwhile but presumably would involve considerable technical negotiation. Request Phnom Penh and Saigon comments on this subject.

13. Settlement Paris financial accords, of interest primarily to RKG, evidently requires extensive technical negotiations and constitutes bargaining point GVN probably unwilling concede in absence progress on border control. RKG evidently again pressing matter (Phnom Penh’s 1521).¹² For time being, believe Embassies Saigon and Phnom Penh might best restrict action on this problem to encouraging French, if and when considered appropriate, to continue attempts reach agreement with GVN and RKG on French role in negotiations. Meanwhile Department assembling data on accords to clarify issues involved and assist in establishing possible US line of action should such action later appear desirable.

14. Respecting growth Communist influence Cambodia, Department concerned over Son Sann insistence Communists had no hand recent poster incident and unwillingness admit Communist influence in Ministry Information (Deptel 986 to Phnom Penh).¹³ Would appreciate Embassy Phnom Penh evaluation this matter as well as comment on Son Sann’s suggestion that Ambassador Trimble establish contact with Secretary State Information Tim Dong (Phnom Penh’s 1483).¹⁴

B. Foregoing not intended constitute instructions for immediate representations or other actions by addressees except for comments requested subparas A 11, 12 and 14. However, it may be used as guidance for dealing with problems as opportunity arises and in absence further instructions. View complexity of basic problems complicated by need deal with at least three foreign governments at four points contact (Phnom Penh, Paris, Saigon, Washington) believe it highly desirable not allow preoccupation with individual phases obscure outline overall situation and it necessary exert care not cross wires. Foregoing paras intended assist in determining framework for action on individual phases as opportunities develop. Any comments and recommendations you may care make would be welcome.

Dillon

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 651G.51H/5–2359. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Askew and cleared by Mendenhall, Swezy, Kocher, Parsons, and Looram. Also sent to Saigon as G–113 and repeated to Bangkok, Paris, and CINCPAC for POLAD.
2. In telegram 2447, May 20, the Embassy in Saigon predicted that the United States might have some success in ameliorating South Vietnamese-Cambodian relations if Nhu could be induced to desist from covert operations, if the French could convince Sihanouk of the danger, and if pressure could be brought on Diem to try a rapprochement. The Embassy recommended pressing the two governments to nominate trusted emissaries to meet secretly and work out the details of a solution. The Embassy suggested Nhiek Tioulong as a Cambodian emissary. (Ibid., 651G.51H/5–2059)
3. Document 116.
4. In telegram 1510, May 22, the Embassy in Phnom Penh agreed with the suggestions outlined by the Embassy in Saigon in telegram 2447. (Department of State, Central Files, 651G.51H/5–2259)
5. In these telegrams, May 23, 22, and 29, the Embassies in Paris and Phnom Penh reported conversations with French officials who promised cooperation in attempting to improve relations between Cambodia and South Vietnam and Cambodia and the United States. (Ibid., 751H.11/5–2359, 601.5151H/5–2259, and 601.5151H/5–2959, respectively)
6. In telegram 4466, May 19, the Department instructed the Embassy to stress to the French that in an approach to Sihanouk about border problems they should also include advice for a general improvement in South Vietnamese-Cambodian relations. (Ibid., 751H.11/5–1959)
7. In paragraph 7 of telegram 1441, May 7, Trimble reported that although Son Sann was bitter toward South Vietnam, he promised his full support for the U.S. rapprochement and indicated Sihanouk would also cooperate. (Ibid., 751H.00/5–759)
8. In telegram 999, May 19, the Department suggested that the Embassy emphasize to Son Sann that the ultimate responsibility for improvement in relations rested with South Vietnam and Cambodia. (Ibid., 651G.51H/5–1659)
9. In telegram 2472, May 23, Durbrow reported that South Vietnam had proposed a secret meeting between Cambodian Vice Premier Nhiek Tioulong and Vietnamese Vice President Tho. (Ibid., 651G,51H/5–2359)
10. Dated May 23. (Ibid., 751H.11/5–2359)
11. Not printed. (Ibid., 451G.51H/9–1559)
12. In telegram 1521, May 26, Trimble reported that Son Sann had raised the issue of settlement of the Paris financial accords as part of the overall settlement of Cambodian-South Vietnamese relations. (Ibid., 751H.00/5–2659)
13. The Department received this information from Ambassador Nong Kimny and passed it to the Embassy in Phnom Penh in telegram 986, May 14. (Ibid., 751H.00/5–1460)
14. Dated May 18. (Ibid., 611.51H/5–1859)