Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, East Asia-Pacific Region; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XVI

116. Telegram From the Embassy in Cambodia to the Department of State¹

Phnom Penh, May 20, 1959—5 p.m.

1500. Reference: Seoul’s 588 to Department, Saigon 6, Bangkok 6, Phnom Penh 2.²

1. Seems to me we confronted two major problems here (A) leftist trend in execution Cambodia’s neutrality policy during past year coupled with growing Communist influence, and (B) Cambodia’s relations with GVN.

2. There are of course number of related problems of direct concern to us such as Sihanouk’s mercurial temperament and instability; deterioration Cambodian attitude toward US; narrow, self-seeking posture of French Ambassador, coupled with ingrained suspicion French colonials that US seeking supplant French influence; and Cambodia’s relations with Thailand. However, these of lesser magnitude at present from standpoint our policy objectives.

3. Would also appear that solution first of these two major problems in large measure dependent upon prior solution to second. Don’t mean suggest we devote our attention exclusively RKG–GVN relations before undertaking Communist issue, but seriously doubt latter can be dealt with effectively until there is distinct turn for better Cambodian relations with VN.

4. Present poisoned atmosphere works solely advantage Communists and longer it continues more pronounced will, I fear, be RKG’s drift to left. Cambodians’ fear of GVN is so intense and engrossing that it tends blind them Communist danger, and this fear being fed by backing GVN still giving Cambodian dissidents.

5. All evidence available to us here indicates that Diem’s contention to contrary, Sihanouk enjoys support great majority Cambodian people and opposition scattered and virtually powerless. He is strong man of Cambodia and likely continue to be so for foreseeable future and feel essential that Diem be convinced this fact.

6. Seems to me therefore that tactics GVN have been following run counter very objective it seeking, namely, elimination Communist danger here, and can conceivably lead to point where Sihanouk will become so deeply enmeshed Communist toils that he will be unable extract himself.

7. In view these considerations, thoroughly agree Parsons reference telegram that we should do everything we can check and if possible reverse present disastrous course Cambodian-VN relations. Realize that it would be unrealistic to expect we could dissipate in short time suspicion, distrust, and, indeed, hostility Cambodians have harbored for centuries toward Annamites and which, I gather, is reciprocated by contempt with which VN regard Khmers. Rather, best we could hope for is creation some sort of modus vivendi which with passage time may gradually lead change basic attitudes.

8. In pursuing this objective, believe we should seek to obtain cooperation, or at least moral support, free Asian states such as Japan, Thailand, Laos, India, Philippines, Malaya and Burma, on grounds to their advantage there be improvement RKG–GVN relations. Suggest we also endeavor obtain cooperation French whose influence so far RKG concerned far greater than that any other country. UK and Australia might likewise be requested play supporting role. Recognize however that while others may be willing provide interference, US in final analysis must carry ball.

9. Fully share Durbrow’s view (Saigon’s 2402 to Department, Bangkok 448, CINCPAC POLAD 231, Phnom Penh 512)³ that we should proceed slowly and cautiously. Nevertheless, if our efforts are to have any effect, believe essential it be made clear both RKG and GVN that it USG’s policy work toward their rapprochement and hence such measures as Durbrow and I may propose done with full knowledge and approval USG.

10. As seen from Phnom Penh, following list actions which could advantageously be taken pursuance objective:

a. Encourage RKG and GVN continue press truce.

b. Continue press GVN cease support Cambodian dissidents.

c. Seek convince Sihanouk legitimacy GVN concern that VN Communists using Cambodian territory base operations against GVN. Intelligence reports, other than those GVN origin, would be particularly helpful this regard. Agree Durbrow that French preferably take lead in this and consider good chance Gorce will do so if given strong and specific instructions that effect by Quai d’Orsay.

d. Encourage GVN and RKG exchange information re movement VN Communist bands and seek induce Sihanouk take active measures against such bands. This again matter which might preferably be raised with him by French.

e. Press for resumption discussions re execution currency provisions Paris Accords.

f. Urge re-establishment payment agreement and resumption trade between two countries.

g. As Durbrow suggests, urge RKG and GVN arrange secret meeting emissaries to work out preliminary arrangements re (d), (e) and (f).

h. Seek induce RKG and GVN strengthen their diplomatic missions Saigon and Phnom Penh by assignment competent and trusted representatives.

Should Department agree advisability action along above lines, will, should it so desire, outline in greater detail our ideas re procedure and timing steps to be taken this end of line.

Trimble

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 651G.51H/5–2059. Secret; Limited Distribution. Repeated to Saigon, Bangkok, and CINCPAC for POLAD. Another copy of this telegram with handwritten marginal notes, apparently by Askew, is included in the microfiche supplement.
2. Document 112.
3. Dated May 14. (Department of State, Central Files, 651G.51H/5–1459; included in the microfiche supplement)