Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, East Asia-Pacific Region; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XVI

117. National Intelligence Estimate¹

NIE 67–59

Washington, May 26, 1959.

CAMBODIA’S INTERNATIONAL ORIENTATION

The Problem

To estimate probable developments in Cambodia’s international orientation over the next year or so.

Conclusions

1. Cambodia’s orientation and political future rest essentially on Prince Norodom Sihanouk, who will almost certainly continue to be the dominant figure in the Cambodian scene. Although his government has increased its relations with the Bloc and Communist influence in Cambodia has markedly increased in the past three years, his international policy, widely supported by his compatriots, remains one of neutrality between East and West. (Paras. 6–7, 9–10, 20)

2. The increased Communist presence has been in large part both the cause and the result of Cambodia’s poor relations with Vietnam and, to a lesser extent, Thailand. These neighbors, fearing that Sihanouk’s policies may result in a Communist Cambodia, have supported dissident Cambodian plots against him and have thus increased his suspicions of them. In the process, US-Cambodian relations have become strained. (Paras. 6, 17–19)

3. The counterbalancing of Communist influence in Cambodia has suffered because the French and the US have sometimes worked at cross purposes. The achievement of better French-US cooperation will be hindered by the determination of the French to preserve their present special position in Cambodia and their suspicion that the US is attempting to encroach upon that position. (Paras. 14–15)

4. We believe that Sihanouk will seek to continue Cambodia’s neutral course. The actual nature of his course will probably depend to a large degree on his relations with Vietnam. The deep suspicions on both sides will probably continue, as will Sihanouk’s belief that the US could moderate Vietnam’s hostility toward him. A Thai or Vietnamese-sponsored move against the impulsive Sihanouk might drive him to some hasty action which could damage US interests in Southeast Asia. (Paras. 20–22)

5. Over the next year or so Sihanouk will almost certainly continue to have the power to check any increase in Communist influence. However, unless Sihanouk uses his power to this end, the time may come when he might not be strong enough to take the necessary steps to preserve Cambodia’s neutral status. (Paras. 23–24)

[Here follows the “Discussion” section, which is included in the microfiche supplement.]

1. Source: Department of State, INR–NIE Files. Secret. According to a note on the covering page, this estimate, prepared by the CIA, INR, and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and The Joint Staff, was submitted by the CIA to the U.S. Intelligence Board on May 26. All members of the USIB concurred with it with the exception of the representative of the AEC, the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Special Operations, the Director of the National Security Agency, and the representative of the FBI, all of whom abstained on the grounds that the subject was outside their jurisdiction.