Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, East Asia-Pacific Region; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XVI

112. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State ¹

Seoul , May 5, 1959—8 p.m.

588. From Parsons. Although I have not had opportunity to study record of talks I had in Saigon with Diem, Vice Pres. Tho, Chuan and Mau or those in Cambodia with Son Sann following preliminary observations may be of interest.

1. Concern of Vietnamese, Diem especially, with worsening internal security problem especially in southwest is evident and they genuinely believe Cambodian border area is both a refuge and a breeding ground for their Communist enemies. They further believe Cambodians are indifferent or worse in regard to this situation and they cite (rather unconvincingly) latter’s refusal of trans-border pursuit proposal as proof no purpose would be served by further proposals or negotiations. Their contempt for Sihanouk and Cambodians is undisguised and this obviously compounds difficulty. Diem’s attitude seems to stem from his Mandarin authoritarian background and his present remedies for his problem are simple. 1) Elimination of Communists wherever they may be, almost exclusively by military means. 2) No truck with present leadership of Cambodia. In fact I fear there persists a restless desire to get rid of Sihanouk, and Cambodians, fortified by ample evidence of maladroit GVN efforts to this end, are deeply suspicious of GVN and of us as friends GVN. Atmosphere on both sides is thus thoroughly poisoned and no Vietnamese whom I saw showed any responsiveness to Durbrow’s and my reiterated suggestions that they continue seek basis for negotiation. Is symptomatic of atmosphere that Diem sent Ladejinsky to intercept me at Saigon Airport April 30 when I was enroute Phnom Penh–Hong Kong to bear down once again on Cambodian perfidy theme as he was fearful he had not expressed himself with sufficient force during our three-hour talk on 27th. (His fear on that score was quite unfounded.)

2. Son Sann is just as emotional as Sihanouk on subject Vietnamese and documents his case exhaustively and impressively. At same time he is in my view anti-Communist and has lively appreciation Communist danger to Cambodia. At one time he said he had under consideration denouncing Vietnamese for failure cope with their internal Communist problem which risked endangering Cambodia. As financial man he is also preoccupied by failure implement Paris Accords which he ascribes, mistakenly to be sure, 100 percent to Vietnamese duplicity and antagonism. Frankly atmosphere is more thoroughly poisoned with emotion and suspicion than I had comprehended and attitudes on each side seem about as hostile and ingrained as those of Rhee toward Japanese. With U.S. regarded as closest friend of Vietnamese and with existing suspicions which I was unable to allay with well worn denials and arguments, it is remarkable that Cambodians were as anxious as they seemed to inaugurate with my visit new phase in our relations. I can only ascribe it to recognition of U.S. importance to them and to their realization that it would be suicidal to invite ChiComs in militarily. (Yet this is just what Son Sann said he and colleagues had told Sihanouk they would do to avenge him if Vietnamese assassinated him in course their alleged continued anti-Cambodian plotting.)

3. Apart from psychopathic attitude of each country toward other, U.S. objectives are being frustrated, I believe by a second factor of some importance in Cambodia, namely attitude and influence of French Ambassador Gorce and his number two. Neither of these officials are career diplomats but rather relics of colonial past and I heard no good of either as regards their narrow and self-serving attitudes.

4. In these circumstances I see little prospect of immediate or overall settlement between two countries. Fortunately U.S. influence and leverage is greater in Vietnam where in my view the next constructive steps must be attempted. It is proven fact that Vietnam has sought to overthrow legitimate government of its neighbor and has thereby jeopardized free world position in SEA. I think prompt consideration should therefore be given to following U.S. courses of action:

a) Warning to Diem and if need be thereafter sanctions in form of reduced aid unless Vietnam ceases interference in internal affairs of neighbor. This means added risks as aid cut would almost certainly have to be on defense side if it is to be meaningful to Diem.

b) Pressure on Quai d’Orsay to cure French representation in Phnom Penh. Lalouette in Saigon shows signs awareness short sightedness French attitudes as expressed in Phnom Penh. The French have considerable influence in Cambodia, notably with Sihanouk, and we must enlist this support in counteracting what otherwise could be a disastrous turn of events for Cambodia, France and the U.S.

c) If and as required at later stage, should both so desire, I think we should take new and hard look before declining to extend our good offices informally. We are inextricably involved already and if we later come to have greater influence in Cambodia (we have little now), it may be necessary to use it, particularly with respect to problems in southwest border area where Cambodian cooperation must be had.

5. In closing it is worth noting that emotions in Cambodia against U.S. have probably cooled since worst period in March. Sihanouk’s absence naturally takes mercury out of atmosphere but further than this rather excessive courtesies extended me were taken by many in Phnom Penh as indicating desire to let bygones be bygones. Perhaps concern was felt over how far U.S.-Cambodian relations had deteriorated in recent months. Presence new Ambassador also presents opportunity promote better spirit on both sides. Only other encouraging note I could detect was fact Son Sann apparently was shaken somewhat by my comments on Cambodian press and other mass media being neutral but pro-Communist and on consequences this would progressively have orientation people and future of monarchy if not corrected. He made no rejoinder when I described how press failed to follow neutrality policy of Prince Sihanouk but later mentioned matter to Ambassador Trimble.²

Would appreciate Saigon and Phnom Penh comments to Washington.³

Dowling

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 651G.51H3/5–559. Secret; Limit Distribution. Repeated to Saigon, Phnom Penh, Paris, Bangkok, and Vientiane.

2. A synopsis of intelligence material for May 8–9, prepared for the President by John S.D. Eisenhower, included the following information on Cambodia and Parsons’ trip:

   “Growing Sino-Soviet bloc influence in Cambodia is being abetted by the pronounced leftist influence in the Information Ministry. During his recent visit to Cambodia, Ambassador Parsons expressed his concern to top Cambodian officials that the leftist trend in the press and other information media was gradually conditioning the people to accept Communist ideology.” (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Eisenhower Diaries)

3. In telegram 2371 from Saigon, May 10, the Embassy agreed with the recommendations above, but warned that because of psychological factors they would not be easy to carry out. The Embassy gave an account of a meeting with Diem to prove this point. (Department of State, Central Files, 651G.51H/5–1059; included in the microfiche supplement)