Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, East Asia-Pacific Region; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XVI

107. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Southeast Asian Affairs (Kocher) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson)¹

Washington, March 12, 1959.

SUBJECT

• Phnom Penh’s despatch 289, “Year End Review of American Policy toward Cambodia”, February 13, 1959²

In its despatch 289, the Embassy at Phnom Penh has summarized developments in Cambodia during 1958 in the context of United States objectives and has made recommendations for an adjustment of United States policy to stem Cambodia’s drift toward the Sino-Soviet bloc. The despatch is clearly written and competently focussed on the major problem in U.S.-Cambodian relations; however, I have some definite reservations on the Embassy’s recommendations.

Embassy Recommendations

The Embassy presents the following recommendations for the Department’s consideration:

1) The United States must decide to become more fully involved and more directly committed to the goal of better relations among the countries of Southeast Asia.

2) Such involvement preferably should be on a multilateral basis with the aid and support of other Free World nations for a common policy toward Cambodia. It is inferred that the support of several countries for such a common standard of behaviour toward Cambodia would bring more pressure to bear on Thailand and Viet-Nam to conform.

3) A common multilateral policy, publicly stated, should preclude improper interference in Cambodian affairs by Thailand and Viet-Nam and should be concerned primarily with preventing the development of friction between Cambodia and its neighbors. The announcement of such a policy could be made through SEATO, followed by a unilateral proclamation of adherence by Viet-Nam.

4) Should a multilateral policy not be feasible, it is suggested that the Department consider a unilateral approach to the problem which should be directed at the actual solution of disputes between Cambodia and its neighbors. For this purpose the United States would have to become more directly involved than in the past. For example, in the case of another Stung Treng-type of incident the United States would immediately offer to send observers to the scene as long as they stayed on the Cambodian side of the border. Another example cited would be a case such as that involving the return of Thai prisoners during the suspension of relations with Thailand. In an instance of this nature, the United States would agree (rather than refuse) to provide an escort officer.

The Embassy believes such involvement on the part of the United States is necessary to pre-empt the field from the Communists, thereby encouraging Cambodia to seek remedies for its problems from the Free World rather than from the Sino-Soviet bloc.

Finally, the Embassy acknowledges the risk of damaging our relations with Thailand and Viet-Nam by such a policy of deliberate United States involvement but implies that the prospect of losing Cambodia to the Communists warrants bold action on the part of the United States.

SEA Comments

I believe the Embassy has correctly analyzed the significance of developments during 1958 and that it has identified the most critical problem in our relations with Cambodia, namely disputes between that country and neighboring Free World states. However, I have some reservations on the new approach recommended by the Embassy.

In a general sense, I believe that the Embassy places disproportionate emphasis on the need for a change in Free World policy toward Cambodia and does not take fully into account the other side of the coin, namely the need for a more rational attitude on the part of Sihanouk toward Cambodian relations with its neighbors. Admittedly, the United States has more apparent leverage to influence Thai and Vietnamese policy than it has to exert on Sihanouk. However, it is not part of United States policy to impose our concepts on any sovereign government and I believe the substance of the Embassy’s recommendations is contrary to this principle. Furthermore, I believe other subsidiary dangers would be involved in the course proposed by the Embassy. For example, a United States policy of forcing Thailand and Viet-Nam into an accommodating posture toward Cambodia without requiring corresponding assurances of cooperation from Sihanouk would carry the grave risk of confirming the opinion held by Cambodians (and other neutrals) that the acceptance of United States aid and the adoption of a strong, public anti-Communist policy by a nation automatically convert it into a pliant satellite of the United States. Quite aside from the broader implications of this impression, it may well encourage Sihanouk to adopt an even more intransigent attitude toward Thailand and Viet-Nam, confident of United States willingness and ability to pressure the latter into compliance. It may also encourage Sihanouk to wield the threat of seeking more Communist support with greater impunity.

With respect to specific steps suggested by the Embassy as means of implementing a new approach, I perceive additional dangers. For example, a public announcement by SEATO of a common multilateral policy toward Cambodia would, I believe, compound the risks involved in such a common approach without materially advancing its prospects of success. Similarly, I believe that with regard to the alternative unilateral policy proposed for the United States, active involvement on our part in the various issues in dispute would inevitably entail for us the role of mediator on questions which are not susceptible to solution on the basis of technical, objective decisions. Again in this instance, United States readiness to become involved carries the risk of prompting Sihanouk to magnify minor incidents with the assurance of attracting attention and using them as leverage against Thailand and Viet-Nam.

The Embassy’s selection of the Thai prisoner transfer does not appear to advance the thesis proposed, since the United States refusal to provide escorts in this instance took into account that it was not the United States but rather Burma—another Free World country—which had been designated by Bangkok to represent Thai in Cambodia during the period when relations were suspended.

The foregoing reservations notwithstanding, I believe Phnom Penh’s despatch represents a thought-provoking contribution to current thinking on the most vexing problem in our relations with Cambodia.

As you know, the Department already is preparing to take positive steps to improve relations between Cambodia and its neighbors:

a) A responsive reply to Sihanouk’s letter incorporating assurances from Thailand and Viet-Nam.

b) Your projected trip to the area,³ in the course of which you may take the opportunity to emphasize to Sihanouk, as well as to leaders in Thailand and Viet-Nam, the importance of their own responsibility for an improvement in relations with their neighbors.

In a sense, these steps, while not constituting United States involvement in Cambodian disputes, should demonstrate active United States interest in the problems of the area. Furthermore, they are intended to restrain the type of irresponsible and ill-advised action by the three countries concerned which constitute a major irritant to relations among them. I believe we should be alert to other opportunities to take similar action which promises to have a balanced effect on all parties concerned, and I hope to make specific recommendations on this subject in the near future.

For the moment, however, I recommend that you may wish to talk to Ambassador Strom along the lines mentioned above.

1. Source: Department of State, FE/SEA (Cambodia) Files: Lot 63 D 73, 16.6 U.S. Cambodian Relations. Secret. Drafted by Askew and sent through Parsons.
2. included in the microfiche supplement. (Ibid., Central Files, 611.51H/2–1359)
3. Parsons, not Robertson, went to Southeast Asia and Cambodia; see Documents 111 and 112.