Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, East Asia-Pacific Region; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XVI

106. Telegram From the Embassy in Cambodia to the Department of State¹

Phnom Penh, March 3, 1959—8 p.m.

1163. Reference Saigon’s 1804 to Department.² I agree fully with Ambassador Durbrow that Sihanouk also is due for some tough talk. However, Saigon’s impression that he has never been object of forceful representation concerning danger in course he has pursued is not correct. At time of Stung Treng incident, I spoke to him firmly several times under Department’s instruction. This had no effect in view fact he got no assistance from US in connection with Vietnamese incursion into Cambodian territory and displacement border marker, which it is generally agreed involved unilateral annexation of several square kilometers of Cambodian territory by GVN.

In my conversation Sam Sary–Son Ngoc Thanh and Dap Chhuon plots, I have been at disadvantage of having to concentrate on answers to “Did you know about plot?” and “If you did, why didn’t you tell us?” [2 lines of source text not declassified] However until I am given more advantageous position from which to talk, it is going to be useless to try to impress Sihanouk with his regional responsibilities.

It is a part of “free man’s burden” that we have assumed as a nation that we are many times held responsible for actions of governments we do not control. In view of complete dependence of Vietnam on US, it has been impossible convince Sihanouk and other prominent Cambodians that we were not behind certain aggressive and menacing actions of GVN during last year and half. Sihanouk and his associates are convinced that if we wanted to, we could keep Vietnam in line. I must say that this view is reasonable to the extent that our policy objectives cannot be achieved without regional harmony and actions to which Cambodians have objected are destructive of this achievement of our objectives. Following are some of incidents of past year which Cambodians have regarded as aggressive and menacing or humiliating: Abrupt GVN withdrawal from financial talks in February 1958; political kidnapping on streets of Phnom Penh, bungled by Vietnamese agents with diplomatic passports in March 1958; arrest and imprisonment for two months of 57 Cambodian peasants, many of them women and children, in April 1958; Stung Treng incident, June 1958; Sam Sary–Son Ngoc Thanh plot January 1959; and finally Dap Chhuon attempt at coup d’etat in February 1959.

Sihanouk is not a Communist and I am convinced he will not willingly allow his country come under Communist control. I am equally certain that more incidents like those above will drive him irretrievably into Communists’ arms. This view has been presented at length in despatch 289 of February 17 entitled “Year-End Review of American Policy Toward Cambodia”.²

To stem Cambodia’s trend toward alignment with Communist China, three preliminary steps are necessary:

1. It must be made plain to Diem that we have conclusive evidence of his support of Sam Sary, Son Ngoc Thanh, and Dap Chhuon.

2. Diem must become convinced that Sihanouk is solidly entrenched in Cambodia and that he must expect to live with him.

3. He must be induced to make some positive gesture indicating reversal of policy.

US had to have showdowns with Syngman Rhee and Chiang Kaishek and I believe time has come that similar one is necessary with Diem in his own interests as well as ours. We still have a strong position in this country but we have been prevented from taking advantage of it by being constantly held responsible for threatening actions by GVN. Once these are stopped, Cambodia’s natural resistance to Communism will come into effect and we shall be in a position to take a firm stand as spokesman not only for Western position but for GVN also.

Strom

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 651G.51H/3–359. Secret; Niact; Limited Distribution.
2. In telegram 1804, March 2, Durbrow suggested that when presenting the President’s letter to Sihanouk, Strom should emphasize that unless the Sihanouk stopped his leftward movement and provocative statements, the United States would have to reassess its policy toward Cambodia. (Ibid., 651G.51H/3–259)
2. See infra.