Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, South and Southeast Asia, Volume XV

89. Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State¹

Karachi, December 23, 1959—6 p.m.

1483. New Delhi eyes only for Ambassador. Eyes only for President and Secretary. Re Secretary’s 12, December 16, from Paris² (repeated to Department as Cahto 3) and Embtel 1445.³ I met yesterday in Rawalpindi with President Ayub to discuss subject of President’s message repeated Karachi in Secretary’s 12, December 16 from Paris. Ayub had just returned from long speaking tour West Pakistan.

Suggestion made by Nehru was, of course, similar to “no war declaration” originally proposed by Nehru to Liaquat Ali Khan⁴ through Pakistan High Commissioner in Delhi December 22, 1949 (see Indian white papers of 1950 on lengthy exchanges concerning this subject) and most recently by Indians in June this year as reported by Ambassador Langley in Embtel 2830, June 25.⁵ In brief, Indians have long urged that two governments join to “condemn resort to war for settlement of any existing or future disputes between them” and to state that disputes between them should always be “solved by recognized peaceful methods such as negotiation, or by resort to mediation or arbitration …⁶ or by agreed reference to some appropriate international body”. Indians urged Pakistan accept declaration at face value as means moderating tensions which Delhi alleged were being kept alive by provocative exhortations by segment Pakistan press and by some politicians, both groups stating that GOP should go to war if necessary over Kashmir and Canal waters. Pakistanis were reluctant to sign such a declaration in part because they believed relaxation of Pakistani military pressure would cause India to consolidate its position in Kashmir to detriment of Pakistanis’ legitimate interests. They therefore insisted that any such declaration spell out specific steps to be followed in negotiations, and that declaration should also permit both countries, as last resort, to refer their unsolved disputes to arbitration. India agreed to refer to arbitration so-called “justifiable” issues, such as Canal waters and evacuee property, but crux of issue was, of course, Kashmir. India contended that Kashmir was “political issue” and therefore not subject to arbitration.

While issue of “no war declaration” has cropped up periodically since 1949 and 1950, little progress has been made in obtaining mutual acceptance of proposal. Pakistan continued to be wary of signing such declaration without first insuring that declaration contained definite time table and procedures for resolution of disputes including Kashmir. In Pakistani eyes, India illegally holds vital real estate and source of Pakistani water supplies, thus India obviously satisfied with maintenance “status quo”. Pakistanis on their part have considered it necessary maintain troops in readiness and political initiative on these issues because of domestic pressures as well as for tactical considerations.

With this background, I spoke with President Ayub December 22 along lines that President Eisenhower was greatly impressed with importance continuing to develop better relations between India and Pakistan, particularly since he saw great value in creating situation in which Pakistani and Indian forces did not confront each other but could turn their attentions to matters more conducive to their own free world interests. Employment of Pakistani and Indian troops against each other obviously tended weaken their portions of free world front against Communists. President believed both Ayub and Nehru would like further, et cetera, improve relations, and he would like help in any way he properly could although he had made it clear that he could not become a mediator. In course conversations held in Delhi, question arose as to whether it might be possible at this juncture agree to issuance of joint declaration of separate statements by Ayub and Nehru to effect all questions between India and Pakistan will be settled for indefinite future by peaceful negotiations, and that resort to force between them will be excluded. This would apply all questions, present and future, including Kashmir. Such statements would serve reduce Indian concern about increases in strength and firepower Pakistani armed forces through modernization of equipment. We, of course, recognize this not entirely new idea. However, I had been instructed explore matter personally and confidentially with Ayub in light present improved situation and in light advantages which would result to Pakistanis and United States, as well as free world in general, in permitting us pursue military aid program here with far less concern about political and public reaction on Indo-US relations. Such situation would, of course, greatly simplify problems of supplying certain military items discussed by Ayub with President Eisenhower.

Ayub listened attentively to my presentation. He said he fully appreciated objectives for which we were pursuing matter with him. The suggestion was not, of course, a new one but had been put forward by Nehru from time to time for many years. Essentially, what Nehru sought at outset was assurance that he could with impunity continue to hold vital areas of Kashmir without resolution of problem in accordance UN resolution or otherwise, and with no concern that Pakistan would do anything about it. Ayub said it was certainly not his intention to resort to force with India, but if one understood that background of Nehru’s suggestion, one could understand more clearly its motivations. The effect of such a declaration without certain accompanying steps would be for Pakistani public to assume that Pakistan had handed Kashmir to India on a silver platter. There would be the strongest resentment which would be “disastrous” for his regime.

On other hand, Ayub did not object in principle to “no war declaration” but he thought correct procedure would be for Nehru, perhaps through President Eisenhower or his representative, to come to an agreement on the principles of a settlement of Kashmir problem. He felt in this connection that direct negotiations would lead nowhere without agreement in principle having been reached upon the basis for such negotiations, and might in fact be highly counterproductive since they would raise hopes that would not materialize. He therefore urged necessity of finding means to arrive at the headings of an agreement on basic principles. With this done, and in the context, India and Pakistan could then usefully undertake a “no war-no force” statement. He repeated several times that it was vital that these two matters be associated. He said parenthetically that if Pakistan should undertake a declaration along lines suggested by Nehru, it would be assumed that such declaration was undertaken by his government under strong American pressure, and that the US position in Pakistan would also greatly suffer. He repeated several times that Nehru had always tried by any means to establish some kind of cover so that he would not have to come a settlement on Kashmir.

Ayub said that he was determined to do everything feasible to arrive at an agreement with India so that relations between the countries would continue to improve, permitting their respective forces to be re-deployed from defense against each other. Nevertheless, he must take into account the fact that the people of Pakistan were extremely nervous over overtures by him toward Nehru, because they did not yet feel there was adequate basis for their trusting latter. When this basis was more fully developed, “Nehru can have the friendship of Pakistan on a platter”.

Comment: I believe it highly unlikely that Pakistanis could be persuaded to undertake declaration as suggested by Nehru or President Eisenhower, and as previously suggested by Nehru to GOP, without relating declaration to specific means of achieving Kashmir settlement. For Ayub to do so in the light of past history of strongest public opposition and refusal of previous governments, would risk his entire personal future and stability of his regime. Even with martial law, there already are evidences in press and public that there is concern over rapidity with which Ayub moving toward rapprochement with India. Ayub must be ultra-sensitive to attitude of Army, his principal basis of support. Considerable progress has been made in improving relations between Pakistan and India, but it would be unrealistic in my view to assume that much further progress can be made beyond efforts and projects now in train, in the absence of some successful approach to Kashmir.

It has been our earnest hope that gradually improving atmosphere in Indo-Pakistan relations would lead to attitude of reasonableness on both sides in discussion of this crucial issue at some future time. We have been reluctant to undertake mediation and have concentrated our efforts upon quietly trying to bring the two sides together. In this process we have tried to keep balance so that our influence in neither country would be jeopardized by underwriting position of the other on highly controversial issues such as Nehru’s “no war declaration” and Ayub’s “joint defense proposals”. While this policy of quiet influence has, I believe, helped to produce closer Pakistan-Indian relations as well as maintained US influence in both countries, it is clear that at present rate of progress it will be some time before Kashmir settlement can be expected.

It appears to me that President’s visit and resulting good will toward the US in both Pakistan and India may offer unique opportunity for our intervention on this key issue which divides India and Pakistan. I am not in position to canvass all possibilities but I would urge that Department review all previous approaches to Kashmir settlement and explore alternative avenues which may be open to us. Experience in reaching satisfactory settlement of Cyprus issue, even though for several years it appeared to be impossible of solution and likely to result in permanently strained relations between three of our NATO allies, encourages me to believe that solution to Kashmir may be possible, particularly in improved atmosphere following President’s talks with Ayub and Nehru.

Rountree

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 690D.91/12–2359. Secret; Priority; Presidential Handling. Repeated to New Delhi.
2. See footnote 2, supra.
3. Telegram 1445, December 18, noted that President Ayub would not be in Rawalpindi until December 22 when Rountree would try to see him. (Department of State, Central Files, 790D.11/12–1859)
4. Former Prime Minister of Pakistan.
5. Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 690D.91/6–2559)
6. Ellipsis in the source text.