88. Letter From the President to the Secretary of State, at Paris1
Dear Chris: The following message, which I have drafted to send to our Ambassadors in Karachi and New Delhi, conforms to the facts of my conversations with Ayub and Nehru. In order to keep this properly on the communication tracks, I would like to have you transmit it to Rountree and Bunker if it meets with your concurrence. If you see any objection, please hold up on transmitting it and send me a message on the matter on the Des Moines.2
Proposed message to Karachi and New Delhi follows.
“Following message to you is from the President:
During the course of my conversations in Delhi with Nehru, a good deal of time was devoted to Indo-Pakistani relations. I stressed the importance which we attach to this question and the hope we entertain that the improvement which has already occurred will develop further into a close and confident working relationship. I expressed the opinion that such improvement would be in the interest not only of the parties directly concerned but of the entire free world. I [Page 196] would be glad to be helpful if that were needed and welcome, but made clear that I could not be in the position of a mediator. I mentioned that in our Mutual Security Program for Pakistan I was often perplexed between a desire to see Pakistan well equipped militarily, and an equal wish not to cause embarrassment or anxiety to India. I told Mr. Nehru that we regarded the deployment of Pakistan and Indian troops on the Kashmir cease-fire line as wasteful and as tending to weaken the front that the free world presented to the Communists. Incidentally, I said to Mr. Nehru that President Ayub personally expressed his great desire for consideration of differences, saying that, at the very least, he and the Indians should not continue to find it necessary to deploy forces on the Kashmir line. I also told Mr. Nehru that so far as any risk or danger that Pakistan might attack India is concerned, I could not believe there is even a remote possibility, and furthermore I believe the United States could be effective in preventing it.
While Mr. Nehru in the first instance dwelt briefly on his apprehension at one time of a Pakistan “stab in the back,” in our conversation Sunday3 evening he expressed a desire for an approach in the form of either a joint declaration by himself and Ayub or separate statements to the effect that all questions between India and Pakistan would be settled for the indefinite future by peaceful negotiations. Resort to force and war would be excluded. In reply to a question of mine, Nehru said that this declaration should apply to all questions, both present and future, i.e., including those now existing (e.g. Kashmir).
If this were done, Nehru indicated—without being precise about it—that he would then be less opposed to our assisting Pakistan in modernizing its army. He clearly left the road open for further communication with me on this matter should his proposal find any favorable reaction in Karachi.
For Karachi:
Rountree is instructed to talk with Ayub on a secret and personal basis. Likewise he should make an exploratory effort to obtain reaction. He should not show this message to him or other Pakistanis. Our purpose would be to make sure that President Ayub understands the great opportunity this could give him in modernization of his army. I would appreciate a report as promptly as possible in your EYES ONLY series.
[Page 197]For Delhi:
It would be appreciated if Bunker would deliver to Nehru personally the following message:
After reflecting on our last evening’s conversation I have instructed my Ambassador in Karachi to discuss with Ayub personally on a strictly confidential basis the thought you expressed regarding the possibility of a joint declaration or separate statement by India and Pakistan. This would be to the effect that all questions between them for the indefinite future will be settled by peaceful negotiations, i.e., without resort to force or war. As I told you I am not trying to be a mediator but I also said I should like to repeat to President Ayub your feelings on the matter, as I told you of his. My Ambassador will stress to Ayub the great importance attaching to such an initiative not only to the parties directly concerned but to the entire free world. I am sure President Ayub will understand the importance this might have in respect of United States assistance to Pakistan in the future, particularly as to his hope of modernizing his regular forces.
I shall hope to inform you as soon as possible of Ayub’s reaction or other development. It does seem to me that your inspiration could lead to a substantial step forward; but I do not minimize your difficulties in this field. I know they are many. Should any type of useful information come to my notice I shall inform you promptly.
With warm personal regard, Dwight D. Eisenhower.”
End of proposed message.
As ever,
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 690D.91/12–1459. Secret. Transmitted to Paris in telegram 111 from Athens captioned: “Eyes only for Secretary.” Telegram 111 was repeated to the Department of State as Murto 23, which is the source text. Herter was in Paris for a Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council which was scheduled to open on December 15.↩
- Herter approved the President’s message without change and transmitted it to Karachi in telegram 12 from Paris, December 16 (sent to New Delhi as telegram 53 and repeated to the Department as Cahto 3). (Ibid., 711.11–EI/12–1659)↩
- December 9.↩
- Murto 23 bears these typed initials.↩