577. Telegram From the Embassy in Thailand to the Department of State1
1122. With reference to Department circular telegram 8 792 I submit following views on SEATO:
Some progress has been made during past few years in fulfilling desire Asian members obtain implementation Article III of treaty.3 Useful cultural exchange program and educational and economic projects such as graduate school engineering, skilled labor projects, cholera research lab and medical research lab have been established and a community development project is now being considered. However, basic demand of Asian members for substantial additive economic assistance through SEATO remains problem. It my opinion such program not practicable, but we should continue along same lines as past few years that is, being responsive to sound projects, having at least some multilateral aspects, in fields exchange, education and public welfare.
Considerable progress has been made in military field through operation military planning office and joint exercises. These have been useful as mechanism for establishing relations between forces and accustoming them to working together.
[Page 1175]Have been particularly valuable in stimulating training and planning activities of Thai forces and their cooperation with U.S. forces. In event Communist success in Laos and/or South Viet-Nam we should urgently consider establishing at least token SEATO “trip-wire” standing SEATO force in Thailand.
SEATO Council representatives have been useful mechanism for carrying out and arriving at agreement on more or less routine activities of organization, but in situations such as that at present in Laos have not proved to be effective in political field. This because lack competence, background and instructions of Asian Council representatives, presence in Singapore of UK Council representative who only occasionally appears for meetings in Bangkok, and general reluctance of governments use Council representative forum for basic political discussions. France and UK have been particularly reluctant air any differences with U.S. in Council representatives. This understandable, but tends result in basic SEATO political discussions be carried on in first instance between U.S., France and UK in Washington, London or Paris. Asian members very conscious of and sensitive to this. Have no particular suggestions to remedy, but is problem to be kept in mind.
Basic problems of SEATO remain, that is, geographical distribution and varying interests of Asian members which, except for Thailand, are tied to U.S. through other defense arrangements; and fundamentally different interests of France, and to lesser extent UK from those of U.S. in Southeast Asia. From parochial Southeast Asian point of view France is largely liability rather than asset to organization. On other hand, Australia has been definite asset and SEATO provides framework for its participation.
From standpoint other Asian countries, SEATO has through past few years gained some greater degree acceptability. However, there seems no possibility that any additional Asian countries would be willing to join SEATO in foreseeable future.
While SEATO far from ideal envisaged, it still serves as useful political framework for projecting U.S. force into Southeast Asia and thus as substantial deterrent to overt attack by Communist bloc. It is not capable of taking effective part in meeting situations such as presently exist in Laos and South Viet-Nam. Perhaps no international organization could be. However, SEATO is especially inhibited by character of its membership. I am inclined to think that any fundamental changes in SEATO would not be practicable or desirable, and that we should be content with having it serve its limited but important purpose of serving as a deterrent to overt Communist aggression, and dealing with the problem of indirect and covert aggression on an ad hoc basis. Although we need to find some better way to deal with this latter problem, regret I have no constructive suggestions to offer except that we review whether type of ground forces we have established [Page 1176] and are maintaining in these countries is best suited to purpose, and to find some way of administering our economic assistance programs with more expedition and flexibility.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.92/12–2660. Secret. Repeated to CINCPAC for POLAD.↩
- See footnote 2, Document 575.↩
- In this article, the signatories agree to strengthen their free institutions and cooperate for economic progress.↩