Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, South and Southeast Asia, Volume XV

575. Telegram From the Embassy in Thailand to the Department of State¹

Bangkok, December 24, 1960—5 p.m.

1114. Department circular telegram 879.²

Political

Trend in Thailand during past five years has definitely been favorable to US interests. Basic pol stability has been maintained and 1957 coup d’etat brought to power group which has maintained more forthright free world posture than previous group. Economic stability has been maintained as result favorable basic conditions and prudent management fiscal affairs.

Five years ago leadership was divided between Phibun, Phao and Sarit with uneasy balance. This rivalry created insatiable demand for private funds reward respective followers with consequent increase in corruption and even flirtation with Commie China in pursuit trading profits. In 1956 Phibun regime launched turbulent and ill-starred course of “fuller democracy”. Newly-granted press freedom rapidly degenerated into license with editorial policy in some cases purchased by Commies. Left wing was generally taking increased advantage opportunities for propaganda and agitation. Regime was cool toward Monarchy and there appeared be possibility change to republic. Phao was increasingly controversial figure making political use hoodlums, resort to violence and even murder. Phao’s election-rigging activities Feb 1957 outraged Thai sense of proprieties and for first time in recent history caused genuinely popular demonstrations. Sarit skillfully handled popular resentment to force Phao into exile in Sept 1957, bringing about downfall Phibun regime and beginning Sarit-dominated era that still continues.

Thailand enters 1961 with far fewer disturbing elements present. Irresponsible press has been tamed and extreme left fringe, which was never rep any considerable group, has been jailed or silenced. Although Constitution has been abolished and country under modified form “martial law”, other elements population have felt govt’s repressive hand but lightly. There is nothing approaching “police state” atmosphere familiar to Western dictatorships. Sarit has gathered around him probably most able Cabinet in Thai history and, while Sarit makes final decisions, questions are exhaustively discussed within Cabinet and with others and are generally rep broad consensus of views. There has been renewed emphasis on econ development and public welfare activities and, except for small leftist fringe and few intellectuals, country seems basically satisfied with Sarit regime. Conservatives are particularly satisfied with Sarit’s deliberate enhancement prestige Monarchy.

While jockeying for position within pol-mil hierarchy continues and coup promoting goes on among some junior officers, Sarit’s basic domestic and foreign policies are not seriously challenged. Thus it does not now appear that even if successful any new coup group would bring about basic changes Thai policies.

However, present situation cannot be expected last indefinitely. Although such process does not yet seem to have started, Thailand not immune to classic pattern of benevolent one-man rule becoming enmeshed in vicious circle of opposition and repression. Sarit and many others around him well aware this possibility but it remains to be seen have wisdom handle. However, Sarit’s basically poor health may take care this situation for better or worse. Principal problem is [garble— lack of?] orderly process for transfer pol power. At present appears that in event Sarit’s death or incapacity there would be orderly transition power to General Thanom with support General Praphat.³ Although Thanom widely respected and popular, doubt he has leadership ability and toughness maintain himself. Although Praphat seems in strongest position, many factions would oppose him, and impossible predict outcome. However, unless struggle for power became so protracted and bitter as permit small leftist minority exploit, believe any leadership likely emerge would continue be basically favorable to US interests. It my own view European-style parliamentary govt ill-suited to Thailand (as it is to most underdeveloped countries) and has understandably been discredited here. Believe broad trend is toward evolution some form strong executive type govt with representative features and that this will eventually emerge.

Basically, Thai and US interests have found common ground in fear of ChiCom expansion and conviction this cannot be contained by policies of appeasement. Thailand’s essentially conservative population also recognizes that it “has something to lose” from application Communist system. Its present leaders and a broad band of opinion have had only scorn for the “neutralist” attitudes of such countries as India and Cambodia. From these attitudes arise the two major problems which are points of friction in Thai-US relations and which tend to draw Thai leaders in direction neutralism. The first problem is levels of US assistance to neutrals vs. allies such as Thailand. They feel that the US pays a disproportionate amount attention and devotes a disproportionate amount resources to wooing “neuralists” as compared with assisting friends such as Thailand. The second basic problem which has recently emerged is the feeling that the US may pay such a disproportionate respect to the views of neutralists as well as UK and France (which in Thai view are basically not interested in Southeast Asia) as to inhibit the US taking vigorous measures prevent Communist expansion in Southeast Asia. There is also problem of Thai resentment of US PL–480 and “payment in kind” subsidized rice exports to traditional Thai markets Asia and Europe. Although Thailand has been able dispose its rice export surplus, it feels US actions have had depressive effect on market and fears for future. Although problem probably more psychological than economic, it nevertheless real problem in Thai minds.

Because foregoing problems, there exists possibility Thailand may make some moves towards acceptance Sov econ assistance or other accommodation with Sovs in conviction such moves would increase US interest in Thailand and shake what Thais feel is complacent US assumption Thailand irrevocably tied to US policies. While such foregoing move would be largely tactical and possibly in nature of bluff, genuine move towards neutralism would take place if Thailand came to conclusion that US regard for opinion “neutralists” and US concern for European alliance with UK and France would be such as prevent US taking any necessary mil action defend SEA. Thai attitude this regard will be heavily dependent outcome present crisis in Laos. If in Thai view Laos “lost” to Commies, even though conditions two countries very different, Thailand would fear same result here and seek to move from policy of dependence on US military force as represented by SEATO to a policy of accommodation.

While nationalism has been relatively minor factor in post-World War II Thai history, it is growing. While its people and leaders are basically very friendly toward the US and without complexes and self-assertiveness of former colonial countries, Thailand is increasingly self-conscious of accusations it too closely tied to US and isolated from its neighbors. During coming years it may be expected become more self-assertive.

Economic

In econ picture over past five years, fol seem be most important developments (1) continued stability currency and wise management fiscal affairs; (2) growing diversification exports; five years ago rice, rubber, tin, teak dominated; today corn and tapioca have moved to positions importance; (3) govt emphasis on econ development and encouragement foreign investment, incl private; (4) with notable exception planned oil refinery, there is good evidence govt desires avoid increasing its industrial holdings in competition with private business; (5) improved power availabilities and communications, particularly roads and bridges.

US econ assistance has been notably successful in helping Thailand begin to build the infrastructure which is required before real econ development can begin. Moreover aid and its accomplishments known to people and benefits widespread. It is my feeling that US econ program here is close to model of what can be accomplished by such a program under favorable conditions. Continued econ assistance plus a number of econ reforms already made (e.g., central planning board, legislation encouraging private investment) and other reforms which must be made in future (e.g., tax structure) can put Thailand at econ “take off” point.

RTG determination foster econ growth and to obtain additional large amounts of foreign assistance to that end reinforced by results recent census and basic econ trends analyzed in IBRD studies, (a) Population growth of nearly 3 percent annually threatens absorb Thailand’s exportable rice surplus, (b) combined with prospective peaking and decline rubber output, increased domestic rice consumption could cripple Thailand’s import capacity, especially ability import capital goods, and (c) econ diversification and increased productivity becoming imperative with limited area remaining for rice expansion. In summary, failure to quickly accelerate rate of econ growth and to diversify the country’s econ structure could result in a serious deterioration in the country’s econ situation within decade or less.

In view Thailand’s geographic and pol orientation, it would be grave error if the US failed to meet need for such assistance, especially in view of our conviction that such an expanded effort with measurable amount resources can within a relatively short period succeed in helping Thailand reach a stage of rapid self-generating development where further extraordinary assistance would not be necessary.

This conviction is based on an analysis (spelled out in detail in the FY 62 country program book) of country’s recent investment effort, its existing infrastructure which is sufficient (although far from complete) to permit and encourage rapid econ development, its resources and the many dynamic elements of change which have appeared during the last decade. At this stage Thailand’s growth, if RTG is prepared press forward reforms already begun and to institute number additional reforms believed essential for maximum contribution of govt toward inducing econ growth, a very significantly greater inflow of econ and tech assistance of all types in order magnitude $120 million per annum during the next five years and rising over the period to approx $150 million in FY 1966 would make major contribution toward assuring the success of the govt’s highest priority; namely, creation of an econ climate that will not only permit it to maintain pol and social stability, but also significantly improve standard of well being of Thai people. Of above amount it is recommended that US provide an average of approx $63 million per year, of which approx $35 million primarily loans and $28 million would be in the form of grant assistance, latter being only slightly above levels of recent years. Assistance of above magnitude largely devoted to improvement and expansion of Thailand’s infrastructure would act as major stimulant to development of private enterprise economy. It would be essential that such a program be accompanied by more effective efforts to stimulate foreign private investment.

If this can be accomplished, Thailand could well become a model of what can be accomplished in such a country with what the US believes is proper relationship between public and private endeavor. This could have a considerable effect on other South and Southeast Asian countries inclined to more doctrinaire “statist” or socialist approaches to development.

Military

In mil as in econ field Thailand is not a country mostly dependent upon US “crutch” of US assistance, but rather itself contributes major portion its support and development so that US assistance able be of maximum usefulness in contributing key mission elements which could otherwise not be supplied by Thailand itself. In mil field Thailand largely supports its own forces and US assistance is primarily confined to supply of “hardware” and training, with some mil construction, a portion of which is largely of US interest although charged to Thai program.

Relations between Thai and US armed forces are increasingly close and harmonious. Training of Thai mil personnel in US armed forces schools is contributing much to this end and should be maintained at high level. This also not without long-term pol effects, particularly considering large role armed forces likely continue play in Thai pol scene.

Particularly since Sarit assumption power there has been marked improvement in Thai mil capabilities. Maintenance and other logistics activities are generally well-conducted and tactical training and ability of units is now good within limits equipment their possession. Present JCS force objectives are realistic and I believe tailored to Thai capabilities. It is important these force objectives be realized and to extent possible deliveries accelerated. Would particularly hope acceleration could be accomplished in those fields where matériel already in surplus in US, but transfer delayed by requirement for funding from services to MAP, essentially a bookkeeping transaction.

In summary Thai armed forces now represent substantial and increasing mil asset and given basic pol stability of country one that should for long be available in case need, if US continues minimum support which not less than present levels. Nevertheless I feel that although there are wide differences in mil opinion on subject it would be useful more thoroughly and impartially in some way to examine whether type of ground force being developed in Thailand and other SEA countries is best possible to meet and defeat type of warfare Commies have thus far so successfully conducted in SEA, including now in Laos.

Summary

Thailand represents an especially healthy and vigorous plant in the free world garden, but like all such plants its future growth will depend upon it receiving a sufficient amount care, nourishment and attention. US policy must assure it receives such treatment. The cost is not high and the rewards can continue to be substantial.

Johnson

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.92/12–2460. Confidential.
2. Circular telegram 879, December 19, requested the principal officers in East Asian and Pacific posts to prepare by December 24 a concise year-end review which would place the current situation in the perspective of events and trends of the past few years. (Ibid., 120.201/12–1960)
3. Praphat Charusathien.