Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, South and Southeast Asia, Volume XV

499. Telegram From the Commander in Chief, Pacific’s Political Adviser (Steeves) to the Department of State¹

Pearl Harbor, October 11, 1958—11:10 p.m.

220220Z. From POLAD 29. Ambassador Thanat Khoman stopped over in Honolulu this morning for a few hours en route home to Bangkok from Washington. I have known Khoman for ten years and although he is sometimes reticent to discuss national politics on short notice, this morning he was not only willing but anxious to discuss recent events in Thailand. It was quite obvious that Dr. Khoman had previous knowledge of the steps which would be taken by Sarit on the 20th. These measures were discussed rather fully when they met in London about two weeks ago. He would have been present in Bangkok on the 20th had he been able to get travel bookings to reach there in time. Although he did not say so directly, he strongly implied that he was going back to Bangkok to take some leadership in the new regime, most likely in the cabinet with the portfolio of Foreign Affairs. During the very illuminating conversation, highlights of Khoman’s opinions expressed follow:

1. Takeover again by Sarit and firm measures instituted, such as martial law, etc., had full concurrence of the King. He believes strongly that any new form of government organization which may evolve will certainly retain the institution of the Crown.

2. Khoman firmly believes that there was sufficient evidence of subversive activity (probably Communist) working towards Thai neutrality at least (if not actually orienting country towards compromise with Communist China) to warrant strong action which has been taken, while he did not believe that Thanom or Praphat were involved in any such machinations, quite the contrary, that they were too weak and lacking in firm leadership to take the stern measures required to stabilize the country in face of this drift to the left. In addition Thanom is more interested in getting back to his military career than continuing in his present role.

3. He hopes that Thailand’s friends will understand but it is quite obvious that Thailand cannot afford some of the trappings of Western democracy which have led to corruption, economic deterioration, and Wanton vilification of government institutions by the press adding up to a dangerous drift towards national incompetence and instability. He has urged Sarit not to destroy democratic institutions, such as freedom of the press and the right of opposition; that these rights must be exercised in a limited way under a rather benevolent but strong leadership.

4. Khoman repeated several times that Thailand’s success in remaining free and strong depended very largely on continuing cooperation in all fields with the United States. He said, “you may rest assured if I have anything to do with the government our ties will be strengthened with the United States, not weakened.”

5. He said people like Prince Wan, while devoted government servants, were weak and vacillating. He even said that Wan’s experience in the United Nations had made him more interested in internationalism, far removed from Thailand and less concerned with the domestic situation and relationships with its close neighbors than he ought to be. He said that part of the unfortunate relationships with Cambodia were Thailand’s fault; that at one period Thailand had actually snubbed Sihanouk on one of his visits and that the latter had never really recovered from that affront. He said that Thailand must move to strengthen bonds with Cambodia, Viet-Nam, Burma and Malaya. Sarit has already heard from Ne Win since the coup in Burma and he thought there was a good understanding between the two.

6. He was anxious to know the latest news of the situation in the Taiwan Straits. He said he endorsed completely United States’ strong stand against Communist aggression against TaiWan and that all Southeast Asia felt safer and more confident seeing the U.S. stand by its commitment to the GRC.

7. He expressed great concern over Thailand’s three million Chinese who, he said, would turn to the Communists “at the drop of a hat” if the Chinese Communists ever made any attacks on Thailand. The handling of this minority was one of their biggest problems. CINCPAC has seen this telegram and suggests pass CNO your discretion.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 792.00/10–2258. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Bangkok.