498. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Southeast Asian Affairs (Kocher) to the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Parsons)1
SUBJECT
- Item for Possible Use at Secretary’s Staff Meeting: Coup at Bangkok2
Summary of Events
Field Marshal Sarit flew secretly from London to Bangkok, arriving October 19. At 7 p.m., October 20, an emissary from the King informed [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] that a coup was in the offing which would make Sarit a military dictator. The King had reportedly received this information from Sarit who implied the coup was necessary to head off a power grab by General Praphat, Minister of Interior, and permit drastic anti-Communist measures.
At 9 p.m. Thanom announced on the radio that the King had accepted his and his Cabinet’s resignation. He assured the King of his continued loyalty. As indicated by subsequent radio announcements, a “Revolutionary Council” headed by Sarit abrogated the Constitution, dissolved the Assembly, declared martial law and instructed Permanent Under Secretaries (the highest career official in each Ministry) to [Page 1047] perform the functions of Cabinet Ministers. The Council claimed it seized power “on behalf of the Thai people” because of “external and internal tensions, especially strong Communist threats.” It also stated it would protect foreigners, uphold the King as Head of State, and not change institutions “more than necessary” for national security.
On October 20, here in Washington, Prince Wan cancelled his call on the Acting Secretary scheduled for October 21 and Ambassador Khoman departed for Bangkok. An Embassy Secretary asserted he might become Foreign Minister.
Build-Up
[less than 1 line of source text not declassified] reports received today suggest a build-up of tension over the past week as coup rumors multiplied, with various potential leaders being suggested. Some of this build-up may have been intended to justify Sarit’s coup. Other [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] reports emphasize Sarit’s intention of arresting Communists and other plotters, including two Phao-Phibun cronies.
Comment
This coup parallels one in November 1951 in that it was carried out by those who already held power. As in that one the primary objective is probably to end the influence of the parliament, control of which Thai military leaders find expensive and uncertain. Another objective was probably to forestall Interior Minister Praphat from creating a foundation for seizing power (although there are no signs he will be eliminated from the military group). To a lesser extent Sarit may hope to reduce the threat of Communist subversion, as implied in the communiqués and private statements [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. Whether this reason has been advanced as window dressing can be determined by the extent of the Government’s counter-Communist moves.
It appears from pre-coup rumors that Sarit may have in mind revision of the Constitution to provide for a strong upper house to serve as a curb on the elected Assembly. This could explain the coup as it is doubtful if the Assembly would have voted such a change thereby seriously reducing its strength and its “squeeze.”
Subsequent Information
Additional information received by Ambassador Johnson from Sarit’s aide tends to confirm the above comment. The aide stated this is a movement against the Assembly. He also assured the Ambassador the coup portends no change in Thailand’s alignment with the Free World, and discharge of its international obligations including SEATO.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 792.00/10–2158. Secret. Drafted by Bushner.↩
- Thailand was discussed briefly at the Secretary’s Staff Meeting on October 24, when Parsons noted that Sarit was clearly in charge and that, while the legal situation was being analyzed, there seemed to be no question of recognition being raised. (Ibid., Secretary’s Staff Meetings: Lot 63 D 75)↩