494. Telegram From the Embassy in Thailand to the Department of State1
20. At meeting somewhat over hour this morning I gave Sarit note and memorandum accordance Deptel 31732 and draft press release accordance Deptel 3174.3 (Text memorandum was modified conform Embtel 3552 and Deptel 5.)4 Response Sarit’s inquiry assured him text memorandum was being given Thai Embassy, Washington.
Sarit carefully read memorandum, asking Chalermchai translate points not clear. He showed little interest in military portion of memorandum and my oral amplifications of military portion, concentrating rather on economic section. Said he Wanted carefully consider memorandum and discuss further with me. Also said would let me know about draft press release but showed little interest in it.
He took initiative in opening discussion of political matters by stating that if I Wanted to know anything about Thai politics “I should come to him”. He made following points: he had returned to Bangkok to tighten up party. He had talked at great length yesterday with party [Page 1041] and was telling them that if individuals did not get in line they would be dropped from party. He was going to give Assembly utimatum to “get in line” or he would bring about dissolution and hold new election. As I had seen, general debate had been called off. While general debate may be good in some countries, it is bad for Thailand because of lack of political maturity. He intended to bring press under control. In response my comment leaders of government should be more forthcoming in refuting false press statements, he said he entirely agreed and so told Ministers but they were reluctant to “become involved with press”. Issara was “particularly violent and nasty” and “some friends” told him that it had been supported by USIS. However, he did not believe this but thought that it was supported by Phao, Pibun and Phin by providing money through Nai Det who is lawyer in Bangkok. He had been told that US firms in Bangkok were carrying advertising in Issara. “He did not know whether this was true, and if it was not, he apologized.” In reply I assured him US was not supporting Issara and noted paper had also violently attacked US and Embassy. In reply my noting Issara nevertheless appeared somewhat counter extreme left-wing organs such as Khao Phap and Daily Mail “which read same as Communist papers I had read in Czechoslovakia,” he agreed Khao Phap and Daily Mail troublesome and with chuckle turned and said Thai RaiWan and Sam Seri were also troublesome. He was thoroughly convinced importance of private investment and was trying hard to get change in investment law. He said that while he now understood difference between grant aid, DLF, Export-Import Bank, World Bank and private investment, he had great difficulty in explaining matter, even to members of government. One of problems in this connection was that in Thai language same word was used for “investments” as for “loans” and thus people felt that foreign investment meant they were mortgaging future generations. In Thai concept this was bad.
I emphasized that our desire was to do maximum fit in our programs with desires Thai Government and, as pointed out in memorandum, present programs were based on expressed desires Thai Government. Programs could, of course, be changed but this may in many cases require cancellation existing contracts and entering into new contracts. All this involves considerable discussion and consideration at technical level. Sarit commented that I could be assured his “full support” in getting Thais to work on project changes.
In reply to question by Colonel Weld on his estimate possibility coup, Sarit said only military could pull coup and he saw no one on horizon with military force to do so. He was calling in commanders at all levels to talk with them. I took advantage this opening to say that I know General Partridge welcomed his return as he hoped Sarit would [Page 1042] impress upon officers importance carrying out training program which General Partridge felt had been neglected. Sarit only responded with effusive expression his high regard for Partridge.
“Thailand was little country half-way around world from US” and Sarit recognized problems of Thailand were remote from many Americans. However, glad to note in Washington that persons who had been to Thailand were sympathetic and understood Thailand’s situation.
Throughout interview Sarit was his usual affable self and gave no evidence, expressed or implied, of resentment over results Washington negotiations. Last night Pote Sarasin, who had seen him shortly after arrival, said Sarit had returned very “pro-American”.
When I briefly saw Chalermchai on Monday he volunteered that he realized Washington negotiations had been badly timed and had not been as thoroughly prepared as they should have been on Thai side. Have impression that Sarit may be somewhat concerned as to reactions Embassy, USOM and JUSMAG to his attempt at “end run” in Washington and now realizes importance working through us.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 792.551/7–258. Confidential; Limit Distribution. Repeated to CINCPAC and to CINCPAC for POLAD.↩
- Document 491.↩
- See footnote 4, Document 490.↩
- See footnotes, 4, 5, and 6, Document 491.↩