Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, South and Southeast Asia, Volume XV

447. Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Southwest Pacific Affairs (Mein)¹

Washington, January 27, 1960.

BASES NEGOTIATIONS—PHILIPPINES

July 1–October 15, 1959

1. In a message dated July 2 the Ambassador reported that according to Arreglado, Serrano was determined not to leave the jurisdiction issue if there was any hope of reaching agreement; but that he felt he must have concrete United States proposals in draft form or subsequent negotiations on other issues would be “matter of formality with no real feeling or idea of reaching agreement.” (Embtel 39, 7/2/59.)²

2. The Ambassador advised the Department on July 7 that he and Serrano would meet on July 13 to take up the base lands question. He said that Serrano seemed to favor the idea that if there were no major problems of principle, but merely of delimitation of areas, the question might be referred to the MDB which could appoint a technical subcommittee to draw up the specific details, maps, etc. and then to report back to the Governments. The Ambassador asked that he be authorized to agree to this. As to jurisdiction the Ambassador said there was no immediate rush since he and Serrano would be discussing other subjects. (Embtel 86, 7/7/59.)

3. On July 9 the Ambassador submitted to Washington for approval a draft position paper on land requirements which he intended to use as a talking paper in a meeting with Serrano on July 13. He also indicated that he planned to play by ear any discussion on possible future combined United States-Philippine use of certain bases. (Embtel 127, 7/9/59.)

4. On July 11 the Ambassador was (a) authorized in event no major problems of principle remained but only that of delimitation of areas to agree to referring the question to the MDB, and (b) advised that we concurred in his draft paper with certain changes. (Deptel 121, 7/11/59.)

5. The Ambassador and Serrano met on July 13 and discussed base land requirements. They reaffirmed their informal understanding that their objective was to reach agreement in principle on relinquishments and acquisitions. It was agreed that lines would be drawn on maps indicating approximately those portions of existing bases we were relinquishing and the areas to be acquired. Those maps would be referred to technical metes and bounds committee to be established for appropriate action. With regard to the concept of joint use, Serrano proposed a general formula that all areas outside the perimeter of the five present major bases be made Philippine bases available to the United States on a combined-use basis or for exclusive United States use, as appropriate. The Ambassador said that although Serrano had raised other points, this was the main question on which he required instructions. He also submitted his recommendations on this point. (Embtel 198, 7/14/59.)³

6. The Ambassador and Serrano discussed land requirements again on July 17, and reached agreement on many points. On procedure they agreed that a statement would be prepared showing the items on which they had agreed and those still to be resolved. Serrano agreed that it would be unnecessary for the metes and bounds committee to delimit the areas to be relinquished in their entirety. They also agreed to refer several matters to the MDB for their opinion before reaching a final agreement. No agreement was reached on Camp John Hay and the entire subject was left open. The question of fishing rights in Subie Bay was also left unresolved. (Embtel 277, 7/17/59.)⁴

7. On July 19 the Department cabled the Ambassador (a) that it was not clear what the Filipinos had in mind regarding future jurisdiction discussions, and that while we had no objection to discussing jurisdiction concurrently with other items on the agenda, we thought the initiative for this should come from Serrano or Garcia rather than the United States; (b) that on assumption Serrano did not want to discuss jurisdiction at that time, we continued to think it would be unwise to submit the texts of the Japanese formula and the modified Philippine Panel formula;⁵ (c) requesting his comments on Washington’s position on submission of the two texts; (d) clarifying our position on certain modifications in the Philippine Panel position, namely (1) stressing the importance which we attached to the unresolved points, (2) pointing out that we had in fact made concessions and were not insisting on 100 percent satisfaction as stated by the Ambassador, (3) commenting on the status of civilian component and dependents. (Deptel 250, 7/8/59.)

8. In commenting on the Department’s position (Deptel 250) the Ambassador felt that Washington was trying to dictate tactics and that the “desire to direct and control from Washington all tactical aspects of these negotiations is I think a fundamental mistake and one that has hampered progress of the discussions.”⁶ The Ambassador recommended: (a) that for present we should forget the Japanese formula; (b) that he be given a text on the Philippine Panel formula with instructions on the degree of negotiability on (1) Philippine position that the proposed Panel waiver language should be reciprocal, (2) duty definition, (3) consultative formula, and (4) off-base coverage of components and dependents. (Embtel 344, 7/22/59.)

9. On July 22 the Ambassador sent in a list of questions on which he would need further instructions in event an agreement were reached on base lands and he and Serrano moved on to other subjects. These were: currency, immigration, taxation, duration and termination of the 1947 agreement, correlation of agreements, consultation regarding use of bases, related aspects of military aid, and Philippine sovereignty. (Embtel 350, 7/22/59.)

10. On August 7 the Ambassador reported that the meeting with Serrano on August 10 should dispose of the major aspects of the base lands problem and result in a formal agreement on relinquishments. He said that Serrano had indicated he wanted to move on to “correlation of agreements” as the next subject for discussion. He requested that Department give priority to furnishing him instructions on this item. (Embtel 586, 8/7/59.)

11. On August 8 Washington informed the Ambassador that it assumed that by “formal agreement” he meant a package agreement in principle on relinquishments, delimitation and new United States requirements. Also, that the requested instructions were being prepared for transmittal. (Deptel 446, 8/8/59.)

12. The meeting on August 10 resulted in agreement on all the items under base lands requirements except Camp John Hay and fishing and navigation rights in Subie Bay. The Ambassador and Serrano agreed they would keep these two questions before them for further discussion but would not delay implementation of the other agreed points pending settlement of these two issues. A formal paper embodying the agreed relinquishments and acquisitions was to be drawn up. The Ambassador and Serrano also agreed on the terms of reference and membership of the metes and bounds and Olongapo committees. (Embtel 625, 8/10/59.)

13. Instructions on consultation on use of bases were sent to the Ambassador on August 13. We were prepared to agree to consultation on operational use of the bases but not on major deployment of United States forces and major changes in their equipment. [5½ lines of source text not declassified] We hoped that above formula would eliminate any need for separate handling of question of the use of bases for defense purposes. (Deptel 481, 8/13/59.)⁷

14. Additional instructions were sent to the Ambassador on August 13 regarding duration of the agreement. Our position was that at the request of either party the two Governments would consult through the Philippine-U.S. Council of Foreign Ministers, and if they should agree that no further or future need existed for the base system the two Governments would enter into negotiations for the termination of the Agreement. Instructions were also sent on questions of currency, sovereignty, retaliation and Philippine Offices on Bases. (Deptel 483, 8/13/59.)

15. On August 14 the Ambassador and Serrano signed a Memorandum of Agreement regarding the agreements reached on base lands relinquishments and acquisitions; exchanged letters regarding jurisdiction question on Loran Stations; signed a memorandum to the MDB regarding the amount of land for relinquishment at Clark Field and Tarumpitas Point Loran Station, and signed memoranda establishing two committees, one to arrange the turnover of Olongapo and one to set forth the metes and bounds of the remaining bases. (The Department had no expectation that such a memorandum would be signed without reference to Washington. Furthermore, the memorandum omitted any reference to Camp John Hay or to fishing rights in Subie Bay, thus departing from the concept of a package agreement on base land operations stressed in Deptel 446, August 8.) (Embtel 687, 8/14/59.)⁸

16. The Ambassador and Serrano met on August 21 to discuss the topics listed under Agenda Item IV⁹—Correlation of Agreements (a. Bases for defensive purposes, b. Retaliation, c. Consultation in use of bases, d. Related aspects of military aid). They agreed that no further discussion was necessary on the MDB and on control of new bases, both of which had been disposed of earlier. Serrano did not refer to the specific question of correlation of agreements, nor did he mention the subject of related aspects of military aid. Regarding consultation on the use of bases, Serrano took the position that the Philippines should be consulted as to use of bases for logistic supply and staging purposes in situations which seemed to involve the imminence of actual United States involvement for military action. After discussing this point Serrano agreed to put his position on paper. With regard to duration and termination of the Agreement, Serrano proposed that the 99-year duration period should be reduced to 25 years¹⁰ with the provisions that (a) the Agreement could be renewed after 25 years by mutual consent, and (b) that it could be terminated before 25 years by mutual agreement. On retaliation, the Philippine view was that it would be made clear in simple direct language that an attack on the Philippines would be the equivalent of an attack on the United States. Serrano was satisfied with the Ambassador’s explanations on this point, but he expressed the desire that any agreement resulting from the discussions contain a reaffirmation of United States commitments as contained in the Dulles letter of 1954¹¹ and the Eisenhower–Garcia statement of 1958.¹² In reporting the meeting, the Ambassador commented that the points at issue had been narrowed down to (a) question of consultation on logistic use of bases in certain situations, and (b) reduction of terminal clause of the Agreement to 25 years. The Ambassador stressed the value from the viewpoint of United States interests of closing as quickly as possible on the complex matter grouped under the heading “correlation of agreements.” Serrano did not raise any question of deployment of weapons or missile bases. (Embtel 743, 8/21/59.)

17. On August 27 the Ambassador, in view of the possible time limitation for the conclusion of the bases negotiations and consequent need for acceleration of the discussions, summarized the various aspects of the negotiations with particular emphasis on the points on which he still needed instructions: jurisdiction, base lands, military consultation and cooperation, base operating problems. He asked that his instructions give him the maximum degree of negotiating leeway possible depending on the nature of the subject, and that if possible they contain fallback as well as the preferred position. (Embtel 823, 8/27/59.)

18. On August 31 we informed the Ambassador that we could not agree to Serrano’s proposal on consultation on use of the bases, since the use of the bases for logistic and staging operations was vital in the maintenance of United States posture to meet limited aggression in the Pacific area. As to duration of the Agreement, we informed the Ambassador we were reluctant to accept Serrano’s proposal to reduce the period to 25 years. We stated we were prepared to accept the 25 years period, however, if necessary to overcome Serrano’s proposal concerning consultation with respect to logistic and staging operations, subject to renewal by mutual agreement at the end of that period. (Deptel 656, 8/31/59.)

19. The Ambassador said he would agree with the unacceptability of Serrano’s proposal if it in fact involved prior consultation, but Serrano did not envisage that. The Ambassador also requested clarification on some other points. (Embtel 868, 9/1/59.)

20. On September 2 the Ambassador was informed that we could not accept Serrano’s consultation proposal since it would in effect give the Philippines a veto in such cases. (Deptel 678, 9/2/59.)

21. The Ambassador said that in view of the apparent strong feeling on the question of consultation, he would inform Serrano of his instructions but he wished to point out that he did not consider Serrano’s proposal as giving the Philippines a veto. He pointed out that even without inclusion of the formula there would be nothing to prevent the Philippine Government from making a normal and direct request to the United States to halt any operation it might consider as endangering Philippine security. The Ambassador said it was his considered opinion that we would have greater possibility of avoiding such a situation if we were to accept a general consultation provision without any specific mention of the use of bases than we would if we in effect told the Filipinos that we would assert the right to the absolute untrammeled use of the bases without any reference to Philippine views. The Ambassador said he would be interested in a legal opinion as to whether, in the absence of a specific agreement permitting the United States to use the bases in time of peace for any operations it might see fit, the inherent right of sovereignty would not prevail in event of a major dispute on this point, or if the Philippines could only have recourse to the extreme measure of abrogating the entire agreement. The Ambassador thought there was a danger that our position might lead to protracted discussions during which Serrano might get into other aspects of the negotiations which might be avoided by reaching quick agreement on the points still outstanding. (Embtel 904, 9/3/59.)

22. The Ambassador reported on September 10 meeting in which Serrano submitted a paper and explanation setting forth his views on duration, consultation, retaliation, military assistance, termination of agreements, etc. In this meeting it developed that Serrano wanted “prior” consultation. (Embtel 1010, 9/11/59.)¹³

23. Following the meeting with Serrano on September 10 Ambassador Bohlen advised the Department that we had two courses of action open: a) at the next meeting tell Serrano that if he persisted in maintaining his position on consultation on logistical use of the bases, we had best leave all matters under item 4 of the agreed agenda and move on to the next item; or b) prepare and submit to Serrano a memorandum covering all matters in this category on which agreement would be possible. He recommended the latter course of action. (Embtel 1011, 9/11/59.)

24. On September 16 Ambassador Bohlen submitted to Washington for approval a draft of a Memorandum of Agreement on the subject covered under item 4 of the agreed agenda, namely, consultation on use of the bases, duration and termination of the bases agreement, retaliation, and related aspects of military aid. (Embtel 1083, 9/16/59.)

25. On September 15 the Ambassador was informed that texts on criminal jurisdiction based on a) the Japanese formula, and b) the modified 1956 Philippine Panel formula were being forwarded by airgram,¹⁴ both texts containing maximum and minimum positions on various points at issue. He was given wide discretion in the use of those texts. (Deptel 828, 9/15/59.)

26. On September 23 we informed the Ambassador we concurred with his recommendation regarding the courses of action open on consultation and related items, and authorized him to give Serrano the proposed memorandum with minor modifications. (Deptel 922, 9/23/59.) (Tab A)¹⁵

27. Ambassador Bohlen and Serrano met on September 24, at which time the Ambassador presented the memorandum. In the course of the discussion, Serrano said he could accept everything in the memorandum except that it did not cover the use of the bases for supply purposes as he had presented it. Also, he indicated he wanted the following statement included: “The matter of the correlation of the duration of the MDT, MBA and the MAA, Military Assistance and other matters raised by the Government of the Philippines under par. 2A of this memorandum of agreement shall be subject to subsequent discussions.”

The Ambassador said that unless the Department accepted the inclusion of this paragraph, he proposed to maintain his position at the next meeting and to state his unwillingness to sign any memorandum that did not dispose of all the items under this agenda item. (Embtel 1180, 9/24/59.) The Department concurred in this position. (Deptel 950, 9/25/59.)

28. At a meeting on September 29 Serrano presented the following amendments to the memorandum:

a. Par. 1. Drop paragraph as unnecessary.

b. Par. 2(A). Change the phrase “direct launching of combat operations” to “war purposes.” After discussion he said he would accept merely omission of “direct launching.”

c. Par. 2(A). Insert “The US shall upon request consult with the Philippines on other uses of subject bases.”

d. An agreed minute to read as follows: “The Memorandum of Understanding signed today shall be understood to be without prejudice to consideration by the Governments of the US and the Philippines, at a time to be fixed by mutual agreement, of a concrete program of military assistance for development of a modern, balanced and effective Armed Forces of the Philippines and consequent updating of the Mutual Security Agreement.”

Ambassador Bohlen presented objections to all these amendments, but Serrano asked that he put them to Washington. (Embtel 1232, 9/29/59.)

29. Commenting on the results of the meeting, Ambassador Bohlen said that Serrano had in effect gotten himself in a box on the question of consultation, but that “nevertheless, it is my considered judgment that we cannot accept his general consultation formula which, although innocuous in itself, in the light of the negotiating history of this question and Serrano’s attitude, would undoubtedly be interpreted by the Filipinos immediately and in the future as an implied commitment on the US to logistic consultation in a ‘critical situation.’” The Ambassador thought one way to resolve the situation, and perhaps avoid a breakdown would be to recognize that in this issue, as well as that of jurisdiction, we were talking about the inherent right of any government to raise any question with a friendly and allied country which it may desire. He suggested that he might be authorized, therefore, to propose the following formula: “Nothing in this Memorandum of Agreement prejudices the inherent right of either government to raise with the other in appropriate circumstances any question of particular interest to it.”

As to the minute on military assistance, the Ambassador felt that the disadvantages were not sufficient to warrant its rejection, since the Philippine Armed Forces were greatly concerned about this question, and sooner or later we would have to go into this matter with the Filipinos. (Embtel 1240, 9/30/59.)

30. On October 3 we instructed the Ambassador as follows:

a. We were agreeable to dropping par. 1, as proposed by Serrano.

b. We agreed with the Ambassador that we should not substitute the phrase “war purposes” for “direct launching of combat operations“, as being far too broad.

c. We agreed with the Ambassador’s rejection of Serrano’s two proposals on consultation.

d. As to military assistance we said that we did not consider this subject as relevant to other points now under consideration, and that the problem should be discussed with JUSMAG, which is responsible for such matters.

e. As to the Ambassador’s suggestion on a general statement recognizing, the inherent right of governments to consult, we thought that the arguments used by him with Serrano on the latter’s consultative formulas applied equally here and that in view of the negotiating record, we could not accept it. (Deptel 1031, 10/3/59.)

31. The Ambassador decided not to discuss consultation on the use of the bases with Serrano at his meeting on October 5. Instead, he took up administrative problems and jurisdiction. (Embtel 1297, 10/5/59.)

32. In the Ambassador’s opinion, unless we could iron out the remaining issues in the consultation complex, we would have considerably less chance of reaching an agreement on jurisdiction before his departure. He requested that he be authorized to have the following drop-back positions in discussing the memorandum on consultations:

a. Accept “military combat operations” for “direct launching.”

b. As to military assistance (1) agree to Serrano’s proposed minute with deletion of words “mutually satisfactory“, or (2) have question referred to MDB for their consideration.

c. Regarding consultation, he asked that we reconsider our position. (Embtel 1307, 10/6/59.)

33. In a telegram to Mr. Parsons the Ambassador said he would use any authorized fall-back positions only in event it would produce an agreement. The Ambassador also stated that since an agreement on jurisdiction before his departure seemed doubtful, it would be useful in resuming the talks at a later date to have an agreement on consultation and related matters. A deadlock on both issues would make, in his opinion, any future prospect of success extremely dubious. (Embtel 1317, 10/7/59.)

34. At the meeting on October 7 the question of jurisdiction was taken up again, but encountered difficulties on first paragraph on definitions. It was agreed that Serrano would take the United States draft proposal on the Philippine Panel position and indicate in writing his proposed changes. The Ambassador indicated that a memorandum submitted earlier by Arreglado had not been blessed by Serrano. He also thought that Serrano would propose many changes and that it was unlikely, therefore, that the talks on jurisdiction would be concluded before his departure. (Embtel 1325, 10/7/59.)

35. On October 8 the Department sent the Ambassador instructions

a) suggesting several alternatives to substitution of “military combat operations” for “direction [direct?] launching of”;

b) agreeing to inclusion of general consultation statement in any over-all agreement which might be concluded but not in an agreement on Agenda IV items only;

c) agreeing that military assistance should not be included in agreement, and authorizing the Ambassador to agree that the matter should be referred to the MDB rather than JUSMAG if this were the only remaining point of difference. (Deptel 1090, 10/8/59.)

36. The Ambassador expressed his appreciation for the prompt and helpful reply, and requested that he be authorized to set forth our willingness to include a statement on general consultation in any final over-all document formulating any agreements reached in a separate minute of understanding or letter to Serrano. He also stated he thought there would be not one single final agreement but a series of agreements. (Embtel 1347, 10/9/59.)

37. On October 9 the Ambassador raised the question of how the item on jurisdiction should be left. He said that unless the Department objected, he would leave with Serrano our draft of the 1956 Philippine Panel position which could serve as a point for departure for subsequent talks. (Embtel 1352, 10/9/59.)

38. The Department agreed that no memorandum on jurisdiction should be signed before the Ambassador’s departure, and requested that he also table officially our text of the Japanese formula so that record would show clearly our position. (Deptel 1098, 10/9/59.)

39. The Department concurred in the Ambassador’s recommendation that he note in a separate written document our willingness to include a general consultation formula in an over-all agreement on all points at issue in the base discussions. It was also indicated that while no final decision had been made as to form, we would prefer a single over-all agreement incorporating and formulating all memoranda of agreements. (Deptel 1099, 10/9/59.)

40. The Ambassador questioned the tabling of the full text of the Japanese formula, and recommended that it not be done since it was clear we had offered this text and Serrano was adamant in his refusal to accept it as basis of discussions. (Embtel 1368, 10/11/59.)

41. The Ambassador and Serrano met on October 12. After some discussion on various points the following documents were signed:¹⁶

a. A Memorandum of Agreement on consultation on operational use of the bases, establishment of missile bases, and duration of the 1947 agreement;

b. A Minute of Understanding on assumptions on which use of the bases is predicated;¹⁷

c. A Minute of Understanding referring questions of military assistance to the Mutual Defense Board;

d. A letter from the Ambassador to Serrano stating we are prepared to include in whatever document formalizes the agreement we had reached “that nothing in the agreement prejudices the inherent right of either Government to raise with the other in appropriate circumstances any question of particular interest to it.”

The Ambassador reported that it was thoroughly understood that these were memoranda of understandings reached on the basis of the exploratory talks and that they would be incorporated into formal agreements to be signed by the Plenipotentiaries of both countries.

He also reported that Serrano had given him a long and detailed document on jurisdiction based on a draft given him earlier by the Ambassador. (Embtels 1377, 1379, 10/12/59.)

42. The Ambassador in a telegram to Mr. Parsons expressing appreciation for his support, commented that the agreement represented revisions or additions favoring the Philippines, but that this was true of the entire subject of the bases negotiations. He added that he was convinced, however, that the concessions we had made would not harm our position in the Philippines nor cause us any difficulty in the future. He thought also that the agreement should set the stage for an easier resumption of the talks by his successor. (Embtel 1380, 10/12/59.)

43. The Ambassador was instructed to table the Japanese Formula before leaving Manila. (Deptel 1154, 10/13/59.)

44. The Ambassador handed Serrano a draft of the Japanese Formula in the course of his farewell call on October 14. (Embtel 1413, 10/14/59.)

45. The Ambassador left Manila on October 15. Congratulatory messages were sent to him by the Secretary and by Mr. Parsons.¹⁸

1. Source: Department of State, SPA Files: Lot 64 D 469, Memoranda. Secret.
2. All the telegrams cited in this memorandum are ibid., Central File 711.56396.
3. The Ambassador recommended that sensitive communications facilities remain exclusive U.S. bases. The Loran stations, however, might be classified as Philippine installations and turned over as soon as the Philippines was able to operate them.
4. At that meeting, the negotiators agreed that a special committee be set up to deal with administrative questions for the eventual turnover of the town of Olongapo, located in the Subie Bay Naval Base, to Philippine administration. The transfer was effected through an exchange of notes, signed in Manila on December 7, 1959. For text, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1959, pp. 1247 ff.
5. The Philippine Panel’s view on jurisdiction was embodied in a March 5 Philippine “White Paper” on bases negotiation. The panel insisted on two points: the U.S. military authorities on U.S. bases in the Philippines had no jurisdiction over a Philippine national and the present provisions regarding off-base offenses should be maintained. (Despatch 702 from Manila, March 5; Department of State, Central Files, 711.56396/3–557)
6. In the same telegram, the Ambassador also noted that instructions from Washington had met with “inevitable delay” so that when they arrived they were no longer valid “in view of changed local situation.”
7. Document 438.
8. On August 14, Bohlen and Serrano signed eight papers regarding base lands relinquishments and acquisitions with the proviso: “The above listed papers are in the nature of interim agreements which, as appropriate, will eventually be supplanted by formal Government to Government agreements.” Despatch 81 from Manila, August 18, transmitted all the texts. (Department of State, Central Files, 711.56396/8–1859)
9. See footnote 3, Document 428.
10. In his talks with Bohlen, Serrano repeatedly said: “99 years had a very unfortunate political and psychological connotation in the Philippines.” (Telegram 743 from Manila, August 21; Department of State, Central Files, 711.56396/8–2159)
11. See footnote 8, Document 401.
12. At the end of Garcia’s State visit to the United States in June 1958, a joint statement was issued, in which President Eisenhower made clear that “any armed attack against the Philippines would involve an attack against United States forces stationed there and against the United States and would instantly be repelled.” For full text, see Department of State Bulletin, July 21, 1958, p. 121.
13. In this telegram, Bohlen reported that during the meeting there was a lengthy discussion on various wordings for a formula on consultation. Serrano also mentioned military assistance and denounced the inadequacy of U.S. military aid.
14. Airgrams G–33 and G–34 to Manila, September 23. (Department of State, Central Files, 711.56396/9–2359)
15. Not found attached. The memorandum contained the text suggested by the Embassy in telegram 1083 from Manila, September 16, and modified by the Department in telegram 922 to Manila, September 23. (Department of State, Central Files, 711.56396/9–1659 and 711.56396/9–1159, respectively)
16. The major aspects and political significance of these documents were spelled out in a memorandum from J. Graham Parsons to Secretary Herter, October 14. (Ibid., SPA Files: Lot 67 D 279, Resumption of Bases Negotiations)
17. The Memorandum of Agreement is printed in U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on United States Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., United States Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad, The Republic of the Philippines: Hearings, Pt. 1, September 30, October 1, 2, and 3, 1969, p. 24. Information on the Minute of Understanding on the bases is in airgram A–162 from Manila, May 27, 1972. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIETS)
18. Bohlen left Manila to take up his new post as Special Assistant to Secretary of State Herter.