Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, South and Southeast Asia, Volume XV

428. Telegram From the Embassy in the Philippines to the Department of State¹

Manila, November 12, 1958—6 p.m.

1548. MILBA. At 1000 hours today accompanied by Newman I met with Serrano and Arreglado for the first session of the exploratory talks. Our meeting lasted about an hour and a half and was marked by an amiable and informal atmosphere.

In opening the session Serrano stated that the list prepared by Arreglado and Newman (Emb desp 345)² appeared satisfactory. I then indicated that we wished to suggest a slightly revised list of subjects and propose an order for their consideration. Revised list follows in separate cable.³ Serrano readily agreed to the changes, after I explained the reasons, and to the proposed order. He indicated that we should consider the list basically as a guide for our future discussions and not as an unalterable document. I concurred, pointing out that we do not consider the list all-inclusive and that any subjects related [to] bases matters on which either side had views could be added to the list at any time. On the item of military aid I explained that any discussion of program details was more properly a subject for JUSMAG-AFP consideration but, as Serrano had described, we could consider military aid, not in terms of program substance but as a factor in relation to bases problems. The final procedural point we discussed and agreed upon was that no press announcements would be made on the nature of the discussions except as had been jointly agreed to by both sides and that any such announcements would be issued by the FonOff. In closing the procedural talks Serrano emphasized that any understandings or agreements reached during the discussion would be considered only as being the recommendations of the participants to their govts and not binding until acted upon.

Before proceeding to substantive discussion of the subjects I expressed the view that a basic assumption in these discussions, and one in which I hoped he concurred, was that both govts recognized that the bases were necessary to their mutual defense and to carry out their joint obligations under SEATO. Serrano in replying stated that as he viewed this matter there were three considerations involved: 1) that the bases are intended fundamentally for the mutual defense of the US and the Phils; 2) that the bases, in conformance with both nations’ democratic and constitutional principles, could not be used for aggressive purposes but would be used purely for defensive purposes; and 3) that the US would not use the bases in pursuit of its own national policy or in conformity with agreements with third nations to which the Phils was not a party without the consent of the Phil Govt. In the ensuing discussions Serrano clearly indicated that he had in mind with respect to the third point the use of bases in carrying out US national policies with respect to nations with whom the Phils had no security arrangements. We agreed that it was not necessary to consider this point at this time since it would be the subject of later discussion under the agreed listing of subjects. Otherwise Serrano indicated his agreement on the points I advanced that bases are for the mutual defense of the Phils and the US and to enable both nations to carry out their joint obligations under SEATO.

At the conclusion of our exchange on assumptions Serrano stated that he hoped that at the end of our talks it would be possible to issue a statement similar to the one issued by the White House (sic)⁴ concerning the establishment of missile bases in the Phils. He explained that this was purely for psychological purposes and would provide a favorable atmosphere for the final adoption of any agreements which we may reach. I indicated that I thought there would be no difficulty in a restatement of US policy to this effect. (We did not go any further into this subject and I intend to have clarified what Serrano had in mind. I do not intend to make formal commitments of any nature in connection with these talks.)

Serrano then suggested that we might move to the substantive questions. I noted that since Serrano had indicated a desire to explore the jurisdiction question first we could start with that subject, and asked if he wished to express his views on that matter. Serrano began by stating that there were two methods of approach to the question of jurisdiction: 1) to consider modifications of the existing article in the MBA; or 2) to explore and develop a formula which would be a substitute for the existing article. He went on to say that as a result of his discussions with Pres Garcia it was the preference of his govt to develop modifications of the existing article rather than attempting to start afresh. I pointed out to Serrano that the program as I saw it was to reach agreement first on the substance of a jurisdiction provision and then to determine whether the substance could be better effected by modification of Article XIII or by substitution as [of] a completely new article for the existing one. Serrano concurred and then went on to describe his understanding of the degree of substantive agreement on jurisdiction that had been reached in the 1956 negotiations. During his recapitulation of the 1956 area of agreement he pointed out that both sides had agreed to maintain the status quo for off-base offenses and that modification of the existing MBA was recommended only with respect to the provisions for on-base offenses.

I agreed that what he described was the situation in 1956 but that we had experienced developments since that time which would justify reexamining the entire problem. I then went on to make a comparison between the jurisdictional arrangements as they exist here under the MBA and as they exist in the NATO countries and Japan pointing out that it is only in the Phils that any aspect of determination of duty is solely in the hands of the host govt. I remarked that I felt that one approach which would be fruitful would be to eliminate the geographic factor of “on base-off base” which characterizes the existing MBA jurisdiction provision and concentrate in its stead on the question of “official duty”. The Secretary reiterated that his govt felt it would be better to concentrate on modifications of the existing article rather than to start afresh. If we used the NATO approach it would mean virtual substitution for the existing article. There was a rather lengthy discussion centering on the question of duty determination in the course of which I explained that I considered this to be a critical area in our discussions. I stressed the reasons why we considered it necessary for the US military authorities to make the determination as to duty status pointing out that logically the determination of duty should be consistent both on-base and off-base. In my arguments I also highlighted the feelings and attitude of the US Congress and American public which have been expressed on this question. In response to my query as to whether the Phils would accept a change in the present off-base duty determination, Serrano stated that any such change would be “virtually impossible”. He explained that for domestic political reasons and the strong feelings of nationalism a change of this type would be interpreted as a backward step which would not be conducive to the kind of relationships between the Phils and US which he wished to see exist. He went on to use the “special relationship” argument (I interrupted him to point out that the “special relationship” worked both ways) and to express his feelings that any change which would reduce the present scope of Phil jurisdiction would lead to a “tide of unreasonable nationalism” which he felt must be avoided. He on several occasions stressed the political problems involved with respect to changing the present off-base duty determination provision of the MBA. In general Serrano did not attempt to refute my arguments on consistency or that the commanding officer in best position determine duty status but used argument of political impossibility accept concepts involved.

Serrano during the discussion explained that he considered that his suggestion, which is essentially the Phil panel proposal of 1956, was a better arrangement than we had in Japan where the final determination is in the hands of the Japanese court in spite of the Joint Committee. He stressed that in case of off-base determinations the final decision rests with a responsible Cabinet officer rather than a lower court; on base, if the senior US military commander and the Phil Secretary of Justice did not agree, the certificate of the commanding officer would prevail. Serrano considered that his proposal virtually maintained the status quo where the Phils have duty determination off-base and the US has duty determination on-base. During the discussion it was suggested that it might be possible to develop guidance or criteria as to what constituted official duty which would be used by the base commander or the Secretary of Justice in making their determinations. We explained the difficulties involved and recited some of the negotiating history in NATO dealing with this point which had been unable to arrive at any clear definitions and had left it to the appropriate military authorities. After further inconclusive discussion on the duty determination question it was agreed that we would look into the feasibility of developing such guides.

Before concluding our session we reviewed and agreed upon a proposed press release on our first meeting to be issued by the FonOff. Text being transmitted by separate message.⁵

Bohlen

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 711.56396/11–1258. Secret; Priority. Repeated to CINCPAC for POLAD, CINCPACFLT, CINCPACAF, CINCUSARPAC, CINCPACREPPHIL, COMNAVPHIL, and 13th AF.
2. Despatch 345 from Manila, November 10, contained a list of subjects for exploratory talks on base matters. (Ibid., 711.56396/11–1058)
3. Telegram 1552 from Manila, November 12. (Ibid., 711.56396/11–1258) The list of subjects for discussion agreed upon by Bohlen and Serrano included the following main subjects: I. Jurisdiction; II. Base Operating Problems; III. Bases Lands; and IV. Military Consultation and Cooperation.
4. As on the source text. It was not the White House but Bohlen who in a speech at Cebu stated: “the U.S. has no intention at the present time to establish missile sites in the Philippines.” (Despatch 65 from Manila, July 23; ibid., 711.56396/7–2358)
5. Transmitted in telegram 1553 from Manila, November 12. (Ibid., 711.56396/11–1258)