Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, South and Southeast Asia, Volume XV

349. Telegram From the Embassy in India to the Department of State¹

New Delhi, April 17, 1959—7 p.m.

2428. Rountree from Ambassador. Reference: Department telegram 2477,² repeated Karachi 2445. I am convinced that supply of “Sidewinders” to Pakistan Air Force would be received with consternation in India and would be regarded as definitely unfriendly act. It would come as culmination of series of events which have caused deep misgiving here, i.e., signing of bilaterals, announcement of coming delivery of jet bombers to Pakistan Air Force, alleged firing upon UN observer team in Kashmir, raid in Coochbihar, and shooting down of unarmed Indian Canberra.³ It would be difficult to think of worse time for taking this step.

This would mark entry of Pakistan into guided missile field and would therefore arouse particular apprehension. We have just been through storm of bilaterals and were fortunate that announcement of forthcoming bomber deliveries was for time being so completely overshadowed by Tibet. Bilateral issue is however by no means dead and when bombers actually start arriving this issue will certainly arise acutely again.

Fear of attack from Pakistan, fear of increased strength and quality which American arms aid gives to Pakistan forces, and fear that such aid makes them more confident and “trigger happy” is, rightly or wrongly, profound and lies close to surface of every Indian’s thinking. For US to equip Pakistan Air Force with “Sidewinders” or any important additional modern piece of equipment particularly after shooting down of Canberra and in view recent public statements by Pakistan Minister that India is their enemy⁴ would outrage public opinion here and would in my opinion materially set back good progress in improved relations with India which we have made over past two years. Reaction in terms of additional expenditures by India for counterbalancing equipment would be very probable.

I fully appreciate problem posed by necessity of keeping any military force up to date but I am convinced that only way in which this problem can be solved at all satisfactorily would be to deal with it in context of a general understanding for arms limitation by both countries such as we had discussed before. If Indians could see that there was some end to process of arming Pakistan with American equipment or some understood limits of maintenance and modernization within which our help would be confined, there would be chance of getting some degree of public understanding and acceptance here. In absence of such an understanding I can see nothing but acute trouble for US in proposed action.

I am particularly concerned by the fact that such action will certainly be regarded here as wholly inconsistent with our repeated assurances that no additional aid above level of 1954 agreement is contemplated. We will be charged with having seriously misled GOI and Indian public.

In addition to everything said above I feel that any action now or in next few months would be peculiarly unfortunate because of fact that Indus waters matter is just about to come to head. I feel and I am sure Department and Embassy Karachi agree that it is matter of primary concern to US, to India and to Pakistan that a real settlement be reached on this major issue. Nothing should be done which would render achievement of such settlement more difficult. Anything which adds to fear or suspicion of Pakistan, India will have precisely this effect.

Therefore I most earnestly recommend that no agreement for supply of more modern aircraft or “Sidewinders” to the Pakistan Air Force be reached and no indication that move being considered be revealed until after an Indus waters settlement has been achieved and then that effort be made to work out understanding with respect to modernization on both sides in context of some sort of arms limitation by the two countries.

Bunker

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 790D.5612/4–1759. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Repeated to Karachi.
2. In telegram 2477, April 15, Rountree requested Bunker’s estimate of the probable Indian reaction if the United States decided to supply “Sidewinder” missiles to the Pakistani Air Force. (Ibid., 790D.5–MSP/4–1559)
3. On April 10, the Pakistani Air Force shot down an Indian-piloted Canberra jet aircraft; see Document 65.
4. Reference is presumably to a statement made by Foreign Minister Qadir on April 1; the text of the statement was transmitted to the Department of State, in telegram 2231 from Karachi, April 2. (Department of State, Central Files, 690D.91/4–259)