Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, South and Southeast Asia, Volume XV

256. Memorandum of a Conversation Between the President and the Ambassador to India (Bunker), White House, Washington, April 25, 1960¹

Washington, April 25, 1960

SUBJECT

• U.S.-Indian Relations

I referred to the President’s visit to India; to the unprecedented reception he had received; and to the fact that it seemed to be the consensus among keen Indian observers, both in and out of government, that the visit would have a permanent beneficial effect on Indo-U.S. relations.

The President said that he was pleased to hear this. He then inquired about the village of Laronda which he had visited and to which he had made a contribution for purchase of a radio. I informed the President that the radio had been purchased, that the villagers were greatly pleased with it, and that I would send him a report when I returned to India.

I also mentioned to the President the great interest in his visit which has been shown in the parts of India he had not had an opportunity to visit. The people everywhere seemed to share the enthusiasm shown in Delhi and Agra. For example, a citizen of Madras had written me that he had named his residence “Ike House”, and invited me to participate at its inauguration.

The President referred to his concern over the situation in Afghanistan, especially over the heavy Soviet penetration, and the friction between Afghanistan and Pakistan over the Pushtunistan question. At the same time he noted his pleasure at the improvement in Indo-Pakistan relations, and his feeling that Mr. Nehru was taking a more realistic view of world developments.

I replied that I felt there had been a substantial bettering of Indo-Pakistan relations and that one of the important contributions to this improvement had been the assurance the President had given Mr. Nehru that American weapons would not be used by Pakistan to attack India. I felt that this had made a great impression on Mr. Nehru and in Indian Government circles.

I added, however, that our recent action in giving Sidewinders and the ten F–104’s to Pakistan had caused considerable concern to the Indians, not because they in any way questioned our intentions or objectives, but because our doing so, they felt, rendered their air force obsolete vis-à-vis that of Pakistan. They also believed that this strengthening of Pakistan would have the collateral effect of making their negotiations with the Pakistanis more difficult. It seemed to me that this source of friction could be overcome if, when we gave Pakistan more modern military equipment, we should also offer to sell similar equipment to India. The Indian Air Force will undoubtedly feel that it will have to buy equipment similar to the Sidewinders from the British, but the British equipment is much more expensive than ours. Thus its purchase will place an additional burden on the Indian budget at a time when India is facing an expenditure of some $250 million for roads and communications along the northern border, and at a time when they feel so strongly that they should be investing everything possible in building up their economy vis-à-vis the Communist Chinese.

The President replied that he saw no reason why we should not offer to sell similar equipment to the Indians, and in fact thought we should do so. He asked me to inform the Department of his views.

I referred to the accelerating program of India’s economic development program and expressed my opinion that our assistance, because it had been flexible, had been the most effective aid rendered the Indians. I said that I believed that the Indian Government recognized this and greatly appreciated it. I expressed the hope that our aid would continue to be flexible as between project and other types of aid, and as between the public and private sectors: that we would not be doctrinaire about this.

The President expressed the view that we should continue to be flexible. It was obvious that India and others of the underdeveloped countries would develop systems differing from ours which had started out in a vast, empty continent with few people in it. Had we had our present population at the time we achieved independence, we undoubtedly would also have developed along different lines. The President said he might refer to this in a forthcoming speech.

1. Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries. Confidential; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Bunker, who was in Washington for consultations, April 20-26.