Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, South and Southeast Asia, Volume XV

254. Report Prepared by the Operations Coordinating Board¹

Washington, February 17, 1960.

SPECIAL REPORT: EXPLOITATION OF KERALA ELECTIONS

1. The elections just completed in Kerala have resulted in a sound defeat of the Communists in terms of legislative seats. However, the Communists increased their popular vote markedly in absolute terms and even slightly in terms of the percent of the total vote.

2. The Communists had been able to form a government after the 1957 elections because the other political parties in the state had been divided and had fought amongst themselves; in addition, general apathy toward the 1957 election caused a relatively small vote. After two years of observation of what Communist rule meant to them in fact (as opposed to the Communists’ election promises), the non-Communists overcame their apathy; they put aside their differences and opposed the Communists with all their strength. The Communists, however much lip service they may have paid to constitutional procedures, were unable to disguise the fact that they had placed the interests of their party above those of state, nation, and people—in fact above all other considerations.

3. Any exploitation of this political lesson would be vitiated if it appeared to come from the United States. However, outside India, it might be possible to make the story widely available on an unattributed basis. Inside India, we can count on a fair measure of exploitation by the non-Communist parties and by the press.

4. As the story now stands, there is partial documentation for an impressive list of misdeeds by the Communist State Government. It stole money from State funds for party use in such operations as the Andhra rice deal. It was excessively partisan in its administration of justice, in its use of the police power, and in its licensing of cooperatives and other businesses. Through its transfer and appointment actions, it corrupted the police and civil administrative services. It attempted in several ways to gain control of the ideology taught in the schools Now that the Communist Government of Kerala has been removed, more penetrating investigations of these misdeeds can be made by Indian authorities, and more thorough documentation provided. Discreet encouragement might be given to such investigations and their results worked into publicity for use inside as well as outside India.

5. If would be to the U.S. interest if the election defeat were to cause greater confusion among the rank and file of the Communist Party of India and a deeper cleavage in the party leadership between the radical revolutionaries, who counsel a policy of increased violence and underground activity, and the more moderate leaders, who recommend continued adherence by the party to the constitutional practices of parliamentary democracy. Communist sympathizers remaining inside the administrative and school systems in Kerala may also try to sabotage the new government. It would be useful to uncover and publicize such sabotage.

6. The long-term effectiveness of the lesson of Kerala will depend in part on the ability of the new government to produce a record of accomplishment. Efforts should be made, to the extent possible under our development assistance policies and the Government of India’s economic planning, to ensure that Kerala benefits directly from at least part of our developmental and technical assistance. To this end, Washington agencies and our posts in India should give prompt consideration to possible projects or programs being planned by India which could have an impact in Kerala. U.S. investment in Kerala should be encouraged, particularly the building of fertilizer plants. U.S. importers and exporters should be encouraged to increase their trade with Kerala.

1. Source: Department of State, S/S–OCB Files: Lot 61 D 385, India. Secret. Circulated on February 17 under cover of a memorandum by Bromley Smith, Executive Officer of the OCB, which summarized the discussion at the OCB meeting of February 10. See Document 252.

   Assistant Secretary Jones transmitted a copy of this report to Ambassador Bunker under cover of a letter of March 18. (Department of State, S/S–OCB Files: Lot 61 D 385, India) In despatch 181 from New Delhi, August 23, the Embassy noted that it had given careful study to the OCB report and offered its comments on and reactions to the suggestions made in the report. (Ibid., Central Files, 611.91/8–2360)