Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, South and Southeast Asia, Volume XV

240. Memorandum From the Operations Coordinator (O’Connor) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Jones)¹

Washington, August 5, 1959.

For your information or action, there is quoted below an excerpt from the preliminary and informal notes of U/OP on the OCB meeting of August 5:²

“Briefing by Ambassador Bunker

“In conformance with NSC Action 2073b, of April 30, 1959,³ the Department has been reviewing means by which disputes between India and Pakistan might be resolved. This subject has been raised in the OCB several times.

“Ambassador Bunker appeared before the Board today to brief the members on the situation in India.

“In response to Mr. Harr’s⁴ request for a general outline by Ambassador Bunker for the Board’s benefit and in answer to specific questions arising therefrom, Ambassador Bunker covered, inter alia, the following points:

“While a solution of the Indus Waters problem will eliminate an important economic problem and is a big first step in an Indo-Pakistani rapprochement, further progress should be allowed to develop ‘step-by-step’ and efforts to try and do everything at one time should be restrained, particularly in view of Indian allergy to intrusion of third parties in issues which the Indians consider only of bi-lateral concern. Settlement of the Kashmir dispute will probably be the last problem to be solved by this step-by-step process. The major irritant in U.S./Indian relations is U.S. military assistance to Pakistan, in which the Indians are as concerned with the quality of U.S. military assistance to Pakistan as with the level of the assistance.

“Ambassador Bunker stated that while he originally had some misgivings about Mrs. Gandhi serving as leader of the Congress Party, she has, despite organizational problems and a paucity of funds, proven to be more effective than he had anticipated. It is possible that the Congress Party will divide into two wings when Mr. Nehru passes from the scene—a development which Mr. Bunker felt should not disconcert us.

“The Congress is likely to win the elections in Kerala, but the Communist Party may have the capability, if they coalesce with other groups, to win other isolated State elections.

“Ambassador Bunker advised the Board that the U.S. should develop some means to substitute continuity of assistance programs for present annual programs; should ‘step up’ the U.S. information programs in light of the ‘massive and subtle’ Soviet effort; and should reconsider the U.S. policy to concentrate only in the private sector in assistance programs or face a default to the Soviets in economic areas critical to the Indian economy. Mr. Bunker described the Soviet effort to influence India economically as a ‘three-pronged effort’ consisting of trade, aid, and technical assistance.

“Mr. Bunker also reviewed for the Board his impressions of the U.S./Soviet situation with regard to Nepal.”⁵

Jeremiah J. O’Connor⁶

1. Source: Department of State, S/S–OCB Files: Lot 61 D 385, India. Confidential. Drafted by William J. Sheppard, Deputy Operations Coordinator.
2. The notes of the OCB meeting of August 5 are ibid.: Lot 62 D 430, Preliminary Notes.
3. See Document 68.
4. Karl G. Harr, Jr., Vice Chairman of the OCB.
5. On August 6, Bunker also briefed the National Security Council on certain aspects of U.S. policy toward India; see Document 4.
6. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.