68. Editorial Note
On April 30, at the 404th meeting of the National Security Council, Allen Dulles discussed Chinese actions in Tibet during his usual intelligence briefing. The memorandum of that discussion reads:
“The President said that the present situation should promote a better understanding between Pakistan and India. Pakistan had always maintained that it was arming because of the danger from Communist China, but Nehru had pooh-poohed this contention. Now, however, Nehru must recognize that Communist China is getting tough and might start trouble in Nepal next. The President thought that in this situation the U.S. should work quite actively toward promoting a better understanding between India and Pakistan. Secretary Dillon felt that the Indus Waters were the key to better relations between India and Pakistan. The State Department was working closely with the World Bank which had definite proposals on the Indus Waters; in fact, Mr. Black of the World Bank was just arriving in the area with proposals for settling the problem which would cost less than the previous proposals. Pakistan has already indicated that it will support the World Bank proposals, but India’s attitude is thus far unknown. The World Bank proposal would involve an expenditure of $270 million by the U.S. Mr. Black has been told that an Indus Waters settlement is a matter of top priority for the U.S. and that the Department of State would do what it could to secure administrative support and necessary legislation for measures designed to settle the problem. Perhaps Germany can come into the picture and make a contribution. All the British Commonwealth countries except Canada have agreed upon a British Commonwealth contribution of $70 million. Mr. Black is asking India to contribute $250 million in the hope that he can get Nehru eventually to contribute $200 million. Thus far India has said that its contribution should be between $100–$150 million. In conclusion Mr. Dillon said we should give our strong support to efforts to settle the Indus Waters problem. He felt the Indus Waters question was the key to the Kashmir question; if the Indus Waters problem could be resolved, the Kashmir question could probably be settled on the basis of the status quo.” (Memorandum of discussion by Marion W. Boggs; Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records)
NSC Action No. 2073–b, which was approved by the President on May 4, recorded the President’s view “that in the present situation, particularly the deterioration in Indian-Communist Chinese relations as a result of the Tibetan revolt, the United States should make special efforts to promote better understanding between Pakistan and India.” This action was subsequently transmitted to the Secretary of State for implementation. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)