157. Telegram From the Embassy in Afghanistan to the Embassy in Pakistan1
263. For Rountree. Greatly appreciate your frank talk with Qadir (Karachi telegram 235)2 which serves to bring things more into the open where at least there should be better chance of handling situation, if it can in fact be handled.
I have grave doubts, which believe you share, regarding Qadir’s justification for divergence in Pakistan and US courses of action, particularly in view US-Pakistan alliance. Apparently Qadir believes our identical objectives justify divergent means. The point is, however, that in eyes of RGA we cannot really have different policies, and that we will be associated with Pakistan policy whatever it is, even if we should go to extremes of denying it. The RGA considers Pakistan, and particurlarly Ayub so close to us that it would never occur to them that we were not in step.
At the present time we have concrete case in point. I have learned from several reliable sources that Naim and others in RGA inclined to blame US and me for unhappy denouement of Rawalpindi talks. They believe Ayub’s planned tactics and remarks must have been fully known to you and me prior to Naim’s trip. They therefore inclined suspect they were led up garden path and that we did this with foreknowledge that Pakistan position would harden after talks. It is reported to me that high RGA officials, and particularly Naim feel my role was dictated by US government instructions designed to let RGA know where we stand on issues between Afghanistan and Pakistan. [Page 333] Even now they consider hardening Pakistani position and propaganda could not happen without at least tacit approval. It is of course not unusual that third nations, particularly neutrals, tend to over-emphasize our influence over our allies but wanted you to know that this particularly the case here. It also understandable that Ayub and Qadir would not now fully appreciate this point.
While my personal relations remain unchanged, believe official position Embassy perhaps somewhat blunted by my role in encouraging recent talks. Am more concerned, however, that recent events have added justification to Daud’s position in ruling circles, and this is a time when had hoped in Daud’s coming absence to capitalize on apparent growing divergence of views between Daud and Naim. It very unlikely now that there will be much chance along these lines. There seems little doubt that Naim, who Ayub apparently had wished to strengthen here, is now weaker and this undoubtedly adds to his resentment. Depending on your estimate of situation in Pakistan you may wish use this as case in point to prove that policy of blindly hitting back may produce results contrary to GOP’s own desires.