156. Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State1
1880. Foreign Minister Qadir and I discussed Pakistan-Afghan relations yesterday in course his three-day visit Karachi. Discussion covered much ground previously reported.
Qadir said that while he had thought Naim talks might not produce positive results, he had assumed situation would be no worse after they held.2 He had been pleased with atmosphere, although regretted that Naim did not discuss “Pushtunistan” frankly so that matter could be fully aired. He said several openings had deliberately been given by President and himself for discussion economic matters and particularly railway spur but Naim had not responded, merely saying he hoped existing agreements would be implemented. He was invited to set forth any instances in which they were not being implemented, and said he not aware of any particular instances as he had not been briefed.
Qadir said GOP had been greatly disappointed following talks by sudden step-up in hostile Afghan propaganda. Qadir had always been of opinion that great restraint on part of Pakistanis and “gentlemanly attitude” was best course to follow with respect to Afghan propaganda, although officials with greater experience in Afghan had urged view this attitude would be taken as sign of weakness and that Afghans would thus exacerbate situation. He had not [now?] reluctantly come to conclusion that they were right and that GOP should not remain so indifferent to GOA propaganda. While GOP was determined continue exercise restraint, it had permitted press at its own initiative to report developments in Afghan without imposing martial law restrictions, although it had not stimulated any press stories. Particular care had been exercised in past to avoid use Pakistani radio to respond to Radio Kabul “lies”. Instructions had recently been issued which would relax restrictions so that Radio Pakistan may now reply to misleading Afghan radio propaganda about Pakistan. Implication was that broadcasts might now go beyond simple rejoinder and explanations and might respond in kind to Afghan broadcasts against Pakistan.
I outlined again our views of Afghan situation including view that it was mistake for Pakistan to engage in propaganda war with RGA. I felt policies implied by what Foreign Minister had told me would [Page 331] further impair Afghan-Pakistan relations and thus impair Afghan’s relation with free world. Obviously our common objective should be to endeavor bring about situation in which Afghan relied less rather than more upon Soviet Union, and there was strong possibility that “tough” Pakistani attitude would have opposite effect. I did not see clearly what Pakistan expected to achieve; one might assume purpose of strong policy to be undermining of Afghan regime, but I felt sure this was not objective unless it was expected that something better from free world’s point of view would emerge. Regardless of one’s evaluation of RGA policies, I thought we were agreed that present regime would [not?] deliberately submit to Communist takeover in Afgan. If anything should happen to that regime, it seemed most likely that what would emerge would be worse than at present. Qadir agreed with this and said it was not purpose to “undermine” present regime. Only objective was to let RGA officials know that such propaganda can be two-way street and that if they hit they will be hit back. It was earnestly hoped that when they recognized this they would be far more willing than at present to maintain sensible relationship with Pakistan, which would be warmly reciprocated.
Qadir said he fully appreciated that our evaluation of best course to pursue was different than GOP’s. Our objective, however, was the same. Perhaps it was best in any event for US to pursue “soft and understanding approach” while Pakistan followed what it considered for itself to be more effective policies in circumstances. Combination of the two might in fact be excellent.
Wollmar, USOM Director Afghan, and I spoke briefly with President Ayub during intermission opening ICA all mission conference. Ayub followed line similar Qadir. Only addition was he expressed hope US in its attitude would not show undue concern to Afghans, particularly in manner which would imply “weakness.” He said Afghans respected only firmness and determination, and American influence, extremely important in situation, would greatly diminish if Afghans should think we weak. Re rail spur, he said he hoped arrangements could be made to proceed, but he thought would be unwise for US to give Afghans impression we more anxious than RGA to complete project. Afghan appreciation would be nil if they could say it “forced” on them.
In talks with both Ayub and Qadir, there were clear indications they not averse construction rail link. In fact both indicated disappointment Naim did not pursue matter at Rawalpindi. Both expressed willingness despite unfriendly relationship now existing proceed with specific economic projects which might contribute to improvement.
GOP position, while perhaps understandable under provocation Afghan propaganda following Naim visit, seems to us likely at best to lead to dead-end situation of constantly increasing crescendo of propaganda [Page 332] and counter-propaganda in which both governments will become prisoners their own statements. While Embassy will continue its efforts persuade GOP leaders of wisdom modifying their present approach, it seems unlikely any change will be made at least until they have tested reaction. Embassy constantly considering possible course of action which might redress situation, and I hope in near future be able provide suggestions.