141. Editorial Note
Bartlett and Poullada met with Pakistani Foreign Minister Qadir in Washington on October 12 with regard to the Pushtunistan dispute and the prospects for a rapprochement between Pakistan and Afghanistan. A memorandum of that conversation, drafted by William F. Spengler of SOA, reads in part as follows:
“Mr. Qadir hoped the United States might find it possible to assist in bringing about a solution of this problem and an improvement in Afghanistan’s relations with the free world. He referred to American aid to Afghanistan, and observed that there appeared to be two alternatives: either to increase aid to counteract Soviet influence in that country or to threaten to curtail aid unless Afghanistan adopted a more cooperative attitude. He thought the latter, in particular, would have a strong impact on the Afghan Royal Family which, he was convinced, must appreciate the dangers of mounting Soviet influence. The Royal Family, he said, must know ‘it would be the first to go’ if the Russians took over in Afghanistan.
“Mr. Poullada pointed out that because of financial and policy considerations the United States was not prepared to ‘outbid’ the U.S.S.R. in Afghanistan. On the other hand, United States ‘withdrawal’ would only serve to drive the RGA into the arms of the [Page 301] U.S.S.R. Therefore, our room for maneuver was rather limited, which meant, in effect, maintaining our aid and influence more or less along present lines.
“Mr. Bartlett stated that the United States would assist where it could in encouraging an improvement in relations between Afghanistan and the free world, and pointed to the regional transit project as an example of how we might be helpful. But the United States considered the ‘Pushtunistan’ dispute a problem to be settled by the parties most immediately concerned. We did not possess the depth of experience in the complexities of tribal affairs—particularly in their psychological aspects—to intervene directly in a matter as involved as the ‘Pushtunistan’ dispute.
“Mr. Qadir stated that he understood this position and that he intended to try once more to get the Afghans to clarify the issues in the ‘Pushtunistan’ dispute so that a solution might be negotiated. He said he had arranged to call on the Foreign Minister of Afghanistan, Prince Naim, that evening in Washington and would take up the matter personally with him.” (Department of State, Central Files, 689.90D/10–1259)
That evening Qadir and Naim met for informal discussions at the Afghan Embassy. At the Secretary’s Staff Meeting on October 13, Jones reported that the atmosphere at the meeting was described as good and that as a result of the meeting there were “seeds of hope.” (Notes of the Secretary’s Staff Meeting; ibid., Secretary’s Staff Meetings: Lot 63 D 75)