140. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, October 12, 1959, 3 p.m.1
SUBJECT
- Call of Deputy Prime Minister Naim on Assistant Secretary Jones
PARTICIPANTS
- His Royal Highness Prince Naim, Deputy Prime Minister
- Ambassador Maiwandwal
- Ambassador Pazhwak, Afghanistan’s Representative to the UN
- NEA—Assistant Secretary G. Lewis Jones
- NEA—Deputy Assistant Secretary Parker T. Hart
- SOA—Leon B. Poullada, Acting Deputy Director
Prince Naim and his party called on Assistant Secretary Jones at 3 p.m. Prince Naim expressed his great pleasure at having had the opportunity to meet with the President that morning.
Soviet-Afghan Relations
Prince Naim then elaborated on the theme that the Afghans are resolved to preserve their independence. In his opinion the greatest threat to this independence is the economic weakness of his country. He mentioned that the greatest help to Communist ideology is lack of economic progress. His people must be given some hope of bettering their lot or they will be susceptible to subversive ideas. He referred to his recent visit to China,2 noting that the ability of the Communist leaders to keep a firm grasp on the Chinese people is directly related to the improved economic conditions of the ordinary man in China.
Mr. Jones remarked that Afghan leaders should give some thought to the motives which the USSR might have in giving extensive economic assistance to Afghanistan. If their purpose is to promote Communism, why are they giving Afghanistan economic aid, thus presumably making it less susceptible to Communism?
[Page 298]Prince Naim replied that while undoubtedly the world aims of Communism remain unchanged, for the present their aims in his country seem to be directed towards impressing other Asian nations with the benevolent intentions of the USSR. He indicated that Afghan leaders were not unaware of the deeper motives underlying Soviet actions and for that reason were taking all possible precautions to prevent subversive activities in Afghanistan.
Mr. Jones remarked that he was very pleased to have Prince Naim present this picture of Afghan intentions because reports of Soviet activities in Afghanistan have presented to the American people an image of a country falling under Soviet domination. Undoubtedly the massive Soviet economic and military aid to Afghanistan tends to create such an impression and it was very helpful to American officials to have this picture placed in proper perspective by Prince Naim.
United States-Afghan Relations
Mr. Jones went on to say that we did not intend to compete in an economic war with the Soviets in Afghanistan and that our aid was aimed at proving to Afghanistan the friendship of the United States and to convince Afghan leaders that a reasonable alternative existed to over-dependence on the USSR.
Prince Naim assured Mr. Jones that the Afghans do not wish to stimulate a competition between the United States and the USSR for the benefit of Afghanistan. He smilingly remarked that this approach has at times been referred to as “blackmail” and that the Afghans were not in favor of such an approach to the problem. He wanted the United States to know that the feeling of friendship which Afghanistan has for the United States is quite independent of any economic assistance which the United States may see fit to extend to his country. He did want us to know, however, that Afghanistan had turned for aid to the USSR, both in the economic and military field, after the Afghans had made repeated requests to the United States for aid. At first these requests had been disregarded and when finally the United States had extended economic assistance it had been “too little and too slow.” Afghanistan continued to be in dire need of economic assistance particularly in the fields of communications, agriculture, and education.
Iranian-Afghan Relations
Mr. Jones stated that he had been pleased by the President’s emphasis on the need for better relations between Afghanistan and its two free world neighbors, Pakistan and Iran. Prince Naim stated that relations with Iran have been on the whole quite good; that there have been no serious political differences and the only issue between the two countries is the division of the Helmand River waters. Prince [Page 299] Naim then launched into a long and detailed review of the negotiations between the two countries over this problem. He stressed that Afghanistan had in every case agreed with the recommendations of the various groups which had studied this question and with the recommendations of the Neutral Commission in 1951, but that in every case Iran had refused to abide by these recommendations. Prince Naim then reviewed the recent negotiations in Kabul in which Iran was represented by Senator Jahanbani. Naim was obviously incensed with the manner in which Jahanbani had conducted the negotiations. His specific complaint against Jahanbani revolved around Jahanbani’s refusal to abide by the terms of reference of his mission as previously agreed to by both governments and by the fact that Jahanbani had resorted to “intimidating” the Afghan Government in certain communications which he had addressed to Prince Naim. Naim repeated that Afghanistan is at all times prepared to reopen negotiations but the discussions would have to take into full account the work which the Neutral Commission has already done. He then proceeded to indicate on the map the location of the proposed dam which Afghanistan wants to build, the areas which are subject to periodic floods, etc.
Mr. Jones suggested that perhaps a new look could be taken at the problem on the basis of data which might have accumulated since the 1951 Neutral Commission Report. Prince Naim replied that he did not believe such an approach would be productive. Afghanistan has available data on water flow since 1951 but it sees no reason why it should be made available to Iran. Mr. Jones inquired whether the proposed Afghan Dam would not be capable of altogether cutting off water from Iran. Prince Naim agreed that might be so but that, of course, Afghanistan would never reduce the share to Iran which it had agreed to furnish, namely 22 CMS.
Mr. Jones then led the conversation into a review of some of the projects which are under consideration in CENTO, and pointed out that some of these might well be of great assistance to Afghanistan. He mentioned the fact that the CENTO railroad link would eventually provide transportation facilities from Europe as far as Meshed and inquired whether some thought should not be given to extending the link from Meshed into Afghanistan. He particularly stressed the possibility of Iranian petroleum products as an alternative source of supply so that Afghanistan would not be so dependent on the USSR for these commodities. Prince Naim recalled that the Afghans had on several occasions suggested linking the railroad systems of Iran and Pakistan through a link constructed in Afghanistan through Herat, Farah, Kandahar, and Chaman. He said that Afghan overtures to the United States on this project had not been taken seriously.
[Page 300]Mr. Jones then mentioned briefly the proposed development of a port on Pakistan territory at Ormara and inquired whether this could not be useful to Afghanistan. Prince Naim agreed that if a suitable road or rail link could be built to the port it would be very useful. Mr. Jones then mentioned the CENTO Telecommunications Project and inquired whether a link into Afghanistan would not be helpful. Prince Naim replied that he had not heard of this project and was not prepared to comment on it at this time.
Pak-Afghan Relations
The meeting lasted one-and-one-half hours and towards the end Prince Naim said he would have liked also to have discussed Pak-Afghan relations. He then briefly summarized Afghan unhappiness over the fact that during President Mirza’s regime relations with Pakistan seemed to have been improving but had deteriorated since the Ayub regime came into power. Mr. Jones inquired whether Prince Naim had the opportunity of meeting with Pakistan’s Foreign Minister Qadir, and Ambassador Maiwandwal confirmed that Qadir was to call on Prince Naim that evening for informal discussion.