Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, South and Southeast Asia, Volume XV

130. Telegram From the Embassy in Afghanistan to the Department of State¹

Kabul, June 16, 1959—10 a.m.

1047. In struggle which we are waging to keep Afghanistan independent and neutral events of past few weeks have brought us little to cheer about. Three events in particular have been disappointing to us. Firstly, there was return of Daud to take up duties of Prime Ministry following medical treatment in Switzerland. When he departed in early April there were frequent rumors, some of which could not be discounted entirely, that Daud was in disfavor for leading the country into dangerously close relations with the USSR and for his tribal policies, and that he would be replaced by someone more favorable to West. His return to office has largely discredited range rumors. Secondly, failure of Pak Ambassador Jaattaktr [Khattak?] to persuade his government accept his project for settling Pushtunistan issue together with Prime Minister Daud’s strong public statement on this subject of May 27 has, at least for moment, dashed hopes which had been raised that Afghan-Pak relations might be on verge of improving substantially.² Thirdly, and perhaps most important, has been agreement by Soviets to build paved highway from Soviet border through Herat to Kandahar and information given me by Prince Naim few days ago that negotiations are continuing in Moscow for further Soviet assistance in form of additional military equipment and construction of an airfield.³ We have been further disturbed by large number high-level Afghan visits to Moscow since beginning of year (including visits by Naim, Daud, and Commerce Minister Sherzad as well as negotiating team which included Deputy Chiefs of Staff), by fact RGA and government controlled press followed straight Communist line on Tibet, by unusually favorable press treatment received by Communist countries in recent weeks, by fact RGA either by choice or poor management has got itself in position where only Communist countries appear likely participate in 1959 Jeshyn,⁴ and by [fact] RGA Commerce Minister Sherzad has been voicing opinion what US is doing lately [is] dragging feet on implementation its aid projects. All foregoing developments however reported in greater detail elsewhere.⁵

My staff and I have given good deal of thought to significance these developments. With respect to new road project, I believe it undoubtedly true, as Naim recently told me, that Afghans themselves would eventually have built the road, and while strategic significance of road should not be discounted, its main significance lies in (1) fact Soviets have shown themselves so interested in currying favor with Afghanistan that they have been willing set precedent of extending grant aid for its construction, (2) access to southern Afghanistan which Soviet technicians will have for first time in large numbers, and (3) public relations effect which this Soviet move will have in Afghanistan.

With respect to Pushtunistan issue we continue feel that settlement or at least relaxation of tensions may be possible. Afghan motivations in continuing to keep this issue alive are undoubtedly extremely complex and are compounded out of desire on part of Royal Family to reinforce its position GOA and of dominant racial group in Afghanistan [sic], fear that leadership of all Pushtuns might pass to Karachi, and simple irredentism.

Seems possible that fact that a strong government is in power in Karachi may be regarded by Daud and company as reason for keeping issue alive. On other hand, to extent that they are aware of gravity of danger inherent in attention being showered on them from north there is, I feel certain, some desire for better relations with Pakistan. We deduce from Daud’s public statement of May 27 that RGA will at least insist on appearing to retain their position with tribesmen until settlement reached and for this reason as well propaganda will not be eased.

In any case and even though we hold several basic assets in important fields such as education, civil air, et cetera we are convinced that trend of events is running against us here and that unless this trend can be halted Afghanistan will eventually become de facto Soviet satellite. Nothing could be as effective in reversing this trend as a rapprochement with Pakistan which can only be brought about if tensions over Pushtunistan issue are eased. I believe it of greatest importance that GOP do everything that it can without weakening itself to bring about settlement of this issue.

Most effective thing which we can do ourselves to improve situation here is take such further steps as we can to prove to Afghans we interested in their welfare. We believe that Commerce Minister’s recent accusations of “foot dragging” reflect fairly widespread view among Afghan intellectuals that US really interested only in Pakistan and Iran in this part of world, and that our efforts here are halfhearted and directed mainly at excluding Soviets from certain areas of Afghan economy and society. It is certain that there is fairly widespread belief here and [that?] Soviets, rather than Afghans, are our major target and this tends reinforce deep-seated Afghan sense of isolation and insecurity. Most important thing we can do is show Afghans as soon as possible more concrete results of our aid problems, and I am glad note that although we continue face many problems in implementing program both in Washington and Kabul, these problems appear to be receiving more energetic and imaginative attention than in past. As indicated in Embassy G–36 April 14,⁶ I believe it would be advantageous to us to provide the RGA certain additional aid of somewhat different type of the near future. A despatch detailing Country Team’s views on this subject will be pouched later this week.⁷

Still another action which would have most salutary effect on situation here would be to invite King Zahir to US. As King more popular than Daud and owing his position as temporal and religious leader of Afghans, visit by him would have much more impact here than did successful Daud visit last year. Although actual visit presumably could not take place before 1960, issuance of invitation in fairly near future, with timing of visit left somewhat flexible, would have excellent and timely impact on Royal Family and people.

Byroade

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 689.00/6–1659. Repeated to Karachi, Tehran, Ankara, London, Moscow, Lahore, and Peshawar.
2. In an interview on May 27, Daud reacted to a recent statement by Ayub Khan that the Pushtunistan issue was “artificial and baseless.” Daud said that Ayub’s statement had been received with “surprise and regret” in Afghanistan. He claimed that the formal announcements of previous Pakistani authorities had admitted the existence of the Pushtunistan problem as the solitary political difference between the two countries and asserted that Ayub’s statement was meant to be a retreat from and evasion of that previous standpoint. The Embassy reported Daud’s statement in telegram 1005 from Kabul, June 2. (Ibid., 689.90D/6–259)
3. Byroade reported on this conversation with Naim in telegram 1035 from Kabul, June 11. (Ibid., 611.89/6–1159)
4. An upcoming trade fair scheduled to be held in Kabul.
5. Reference is to telegram 1035 from Kabul, June 11. (Department of State, Central Files, 611.89/6-1159)
6. Document 126.
7. Despatch 1 from Kabul, July 1. (Department of State, Central Files, 611.89/7–159)