Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, South and Southeast Asia, Volume XV

122. Telegram From the Embassy in Afghanistan to the Department of State¹

Kabul, January 7, 1959—2 p.m.

552. Accompanied by DCM Elwood I called on Prime Minister Daud morning of 6th at my request and spent two hours discussing with him US-Afghan relations and related subjects. I spoke (through interpreter) during first hour, reviewing most important US aid activities Afghanistan (air project, transit project, Kabul–Torkham paving project, Kabul University buildings project, Helmand Valley) explaining delays in implementation as best I could on grounds our time-consuming recruiting and contracting procedures are necessary feature our democratic system, and admitting authoritative [authoritarian] Soviet regime could get technicians on job more quickly than we. Regarding Helmand I referred to frictions between RGA and MK and hoped these could be settled quickly so remaining first phase work for which funds already allocated could be got under way. I mentioned report I had received that Daud believed US not interested in Afghanistan and he believed delays in implementing aid program were politically motivated. I denied this categorically and assured him US would meet all its aid commitments.

As RGA and Kabul press in recent weeks have shown little understanding of US defense policy I also explained in some detail evolution and basic purposes US defense arrangements with other countries, beginning with Rio Treaty through NATO, bilateral arrangements with Pacific powers, SEATO, and association with Baghdad Pact committees.

Daud most gracious to me personally, stating he knew I had done all I could to improve Afghan-Pakistan and Afghan-US relations. There are, however “certain points in US policy which create apprehension in countries like Afghanistan”. He mentioned specifically “new military alliances” between US and Pakistan and Iran. I replied these were not new, that our defense arrangements with these countries had been in effect for several years, and that current negotiations with them are nothing more than review, which takes place annually, of their requirements under these arrangements.

Daud expressed gratitude for US economic aid. He felt quantity of such aid less important than fact US willing extend it. He thought I had explained well reasons for delays in implementation and did not wish comment thereon except to say time factor important as US projects are part of RGA’s 5-year plan, and if projects not completed on schedule RGA would be criticized. He said untrue that he believed US not interested in Afghanistan. He, along with other members of RGA, believed US projects were proceeding rather slowly, but he did not connect this with question of lack of US interest Afghanistan.

Daud said Afghanistan wants sincere and close relations with all countries and particularly with US, and would continue its policy of neutrality as long as “no extraordinary factors oblige it to change its policy”. I said my principal concern throughout my stay Kabul had been that RGA would become so mortgaged to USSR that it would find it impossible remain neutral, and I cited recent experience of Finland where Soviet economic pressure has unseated neutral but non-Communist government with prospect Communists will have to be included in new government to placate Moscow. Daud replied RGA had taken such dangers into consideration. RGA would prefer not to move to either side except when it has no other alternative—when its market cut off, it sees no other way to develop economically, or when menaced. Unilateral treatment of Pakistan and Iran (by which I am sure he meant arming those countries without at same time strengthening Afghanistan), not only recently but over period of last several years had pushed RGA towards Soviets. He had not had opportunity discuss this with Secretary during Washington visit but had made his views on this subject very clear to Armin Meyer² (then Deputy Director SOA). I said Washington officials had been prepared at that time discuss US aid to Afghan gendarmérie, which would have offset to some extent our military aid to Afghanistan’s neighbors, but that Prime Minister had not raised subject. I stated further that US had considered offer of help in basic military and civil aviation training but had regarded Afghan acceptance unlikely as already receiving jet training from Soviets. Daud said he had not raised question of aid to gendarmerie as he had not been interested in this. He seemed mildly interested in idea of basic aviation training school, and said if aid in either sphere should become feasible RGA would approach US Government, which I took to be purely pro forma answer. He expressed thanks for US training Afghan military officers in US and said RGA would approach us for further such training in future when this deemed desirable. My remarks intended counter Daud’s assertion GOP and Iran receiving unilaterally favorable treatment in military sphere.

During discussion military training Daud stated emphatically that although Russians are training Afghan army, there are no Russians in Afghan army and never would be any.

At one point in discussion Daud said RGA well aware of military developments in Pakistan and Iran, and that both countries strengthening their armed forces and creating air bases along Afghanistan’s borders. I replied I was sure Pakistan, which RGA appeared fear most, offered no military threat to Afghanistan as its main preoccupation was India. On other hand, Iranians professed much concern over military buildup at Herat, creating of ports on Oxus and of facilities for storing wheat and oil, all of which Iranians feared might be used by Soviets to launch attack on Iran. Daud in effect said these fears were nonsense.

Also called on Education Minister Popol and First Deputy Prime Minister Ali Mohammed same morning. After brief discussion US education projects Popol turned conversation to political matters, and I covered much same ground on US defense arrangements as with Daud. Nothing important developed from conversation with Ali Mohammed.

Comment: Although conversation with Daud was unusually frank he remained agreeable throughout and showed no trace of rancor towards US. I could discern none of tenseness which might be expected if RGA about to make major shift in foreign policy. Am inclined believe he sincere in stating RGA would continue maintain neutral policy unless forced do otherwise, but believe it quite possible he would not regard acceptance additional military or economic aid from Soviets, which may have been purpose Naim’s visits to Moscow,³ as constituting a deviation from that policy; certainly he does not consider acceptance US aid, e.g., transit project, as compromising neutrality.

Mills

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.89/1–759. Confidential. Repeated to Tehran, Karachi, Ankara, London, and Moscow.
2. Regarding Daud’s visit to Washington in June 1958, see Documents 106–112 Meyer accompanied Daud on his tour of the United States.
3. Foreign Minister Naim visited Moscow on December 29 to discuss the possibility of additional Soviet aid to Afghanistan. Documentation on his visit is in Department of State, Central File 033.8961.