Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, South and Southeast Asia, Volume XV

123. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Pakistan¹

Washington, January 9, 1959—3:55 p.m.

1589. Reference Karachi’s 1581² [51/2 lines of source text not declassified]. Baig consistently took hard line re Afghanistan and only grudgingly accepted Mirza and Suhrawardy³ decisions cooperate with US policies seeking Pak-Afghan rapprochement and reducing RGA dependence upon USSR. Khattak has vacillated but [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] he must be adjudged as unfavorably disposed toward US policy. Moreover Department notes both Iran and Turkey, but particularly former, recently expressed concern over Soviet influence Afghanistan which suggests that Ayub’s remarks may reflect Pak-Iran and possibly Turk intention pose Afghanistan problem as threat to area at upcoming Baghdad Pact meetings. This impression strengthened by fact that as far back as January 1958 under GOP urging Baghdad Pact staff study on danger Afghan aggression was prepared.

Department seriously concerned at Ayub’s apparent attitude toward present Government of Afghanistan. It appears reflect unwarranted anxiety that RGA’s present policies pose serious threat to Pakistan. Department’s own belief is it in interest of free world, including Pakistan, to support Zahir, Daud and Naim at present juncture. In this respect, of course, our assessment of situation and conclusions which we draw from this assessment appear to be diametrically opposed to those of Ayub and Baig. As friend of Pakistan it would therefore appear necessary for us make quite clear to Ayub our position vis-à-vis Afghanistan. Therefore, unless you perceive serious objection you are requested approach Ayub soonest and inform him orally as follows:

USG appreciates confidence which Ayub has placed in it by informing it through its Ambassador of his thinking in connection with Afghanistan and it desires continue such exchanges in spirit of equal frankness. USG wishes to impart to President Ayub its own considered assessment of Afghan situation and conclusions which it has carefully drawn therefrom. In general, as GOP aware, we do not believe present Government of Afghanistan poses any aggressive threat to its neighbors in spite of military and economic assistance it has unfortunately accepted from Soviet Union to date. On contrary another Government than present [one] might alter our assessment. It has therefore been, as indicated by our aid to Afghanistan, and continues to be policy of USG to support present RGA in order help that country maintain its position of neutrality vis-à-vis USSR, since such posture by Afghanistan is best that can be envisioned by US at present juncture. USG therefore believes security of free world and particularly of members of Baghdad Pact would similarly be augmented by supporting present RGA. If this conclusion valid any gesture which GOP might be able make to reassure RGA of its sympathy and friendship would appear to be helpful. We have already suggested and we understand GOP considering possibility of clemency in connection with arrested Pushtu leaders. We can do no more than this since this issue is entirely domestic one for GOP alone to decide. However possibly there might be some alternate or additional way in which GOP, as stronger party, could make gesture which would reassure RGA of its desire maintain as friendly relations as possible under present circumstances. USG certain GOP objective is, like ours, to reduce tensions between two countries.

In addition you might wish work into discussion following points:

1) Remind Ayub of Soviet-Afghan Treaty of Neutrality and Non-aggression 24 June 1931 (published League of Nations Treaty Series Volume 157, 1935) renewed in 1956 for ten years, particularly Article 2 under which USSR undertakes “not to tolerate on part of anybody whatsoever any act which might inflict political or military damage” on Afghanistan.

2) USG sees no validity in Afghan contentions re “Pushtunistan”. We recognize Durand Line as Pakistan’s border with Afghanistan. Nevertheless “Pushtunistan” as a problem must be recognized and dealt with. We are gratified to learn that Foreign Minister Qadir has addressed himself to this problem in constructive manner (Embtel 1475).⁴

FYI. Suggest foregoing not be implemented until GOP informed re FY 59 military program in accordance instructions contained separate message.⁵

Dulles

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 689.90D/1–659. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Soulen, Bartlett, and Hart and approved by Rountree. Repeated to Kabul.
2. Dated January 6. (Ibid., 689.90D/1–659)
3. Huseyn Shaheed Suhrawardy, former Prime Minister of Pakistan.
4. Telegram 1475, December 20, reported on a conversation the previous day between Langley and Qadir. (Department of State, Central Files, 689.90D/12–2158)
5. Reference is to telegram 1588 to Karachi, January 9. (Ibid., 790D.5–MSP/1–759) On January 10, Langley spoke to Ayub along the lines suggested in telegram 1589. “Ayub appeared to be agreeable to policy of supporting present Afghanistan Royal Family,” the Ambassador reported, “but insisted it was only a matter of time, maybe 5, maybe 10 years, before Russians, biding their time, took over country.” (Telegram 1621 from Karachi, January 11; ibid., 790D.5–MSP/1–1159)