NOTE BY THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY
COUNCIL ON U.S. POLICY TOWARD THE HORN OF AFRICA
A revised Financial Appendix will be circulated at a later date.
If adopted and approved, the enclosed statement of policy is intended to
supersede NSC 5903.
It is recommended that, if the Council adopts the enclosed statement of
policy, it be submitted to the President with the recommendation that he
approve it; direct its implementation by all appropriate Executive
departments and agencies of the U.S. Government; and designate the
Operations Coordinating Board as the coordinating agency.5
Enclosure
DRAFT
STATEMENT OF U.S. POLICY ON THE HORN OF AFRICA7
General Considerations
Importance of the Area
1. An area of geographical and cultural transition between Africa south
of the Sahara and the Near East, the Horn of Africa, under friendly
control, contributes to the security of Western sea and air
communications and offers a strategic position for the defense of
Western interests in the Red Sea and nearby African areas. The United
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States has a military
interest in the Horn of Africa, particularly in view of the presence of
critically required U.S. communications facilities in Ethiopia which we
are seeking to expand.8
Threats to Peace and Stability in the
Area
2. Internally, the Horn of Africa presents a picture of political
fragmentation, ethnic and religious cleavages and marked economic
backwardness. The two principal political elements in this situation
are: (a) the Ethiopian Empire (with its federated territory of Eritrea)
with a population of about 18 million divided between Christian highland farmers and Moslem
nomads in the lowland, and in which only the barest beginnings have been
made toward national unity; (b) the Somali people, who are divided
between the newly independent Somali Republic (population 2 million),
French Somaliland (25 thousand Somalis, 40 thousand others), southeast
Ethiopia (350 thousand Somalis) and Kenya (60 thousand Somalis). The
conflicting aims and aspirations of Ethiopia and the Somalis are a major
source of tension jeopardizing prospects for peaceful and orderly
progress in the entire area.
3. One of Ethiopia’s main objectives, since World War II, has been to
ensure that the adjoining Red Sea or Indian Ocean coasts do not become
bases for a future attack upon Ethiopia. It has, therefore, sought to
acquire control of these regions and in 1952 succeeded through the
UN in obtaining the incorporation of
Eritrea as a federated territory. Since that time the autonomy of
Eritrea has been gradually reduced. The growth of Nasser’s influence and
the resulting enhancement of the threat of hostile Moslem encirclements
led the Emperor of Ethiopia in 1956 to suggest publicly, but without
success, federation of the Somalilands with Ethiopia.
4. The development of national consciousness among the Somalis has been
accompanied by demands for independence and political unification
through the creation of a Greater Somaliland, uniting all the Somali
people in one independent country. These aspirations have been partly
achieved with the independence of former British Somaliland on June 26,
1960, and its subsequent union with the former Trust Territory of
Somaliland when the latter became independent on July 1, 1960. The
constitution of the new Somali Republic contains the proviso that the
union of the Somali peoples is to be promoted by legal and peaceful
means, as well as a repudiation of war as a means of
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solving international disputes.
Nevertheless, the Somali drive for unification, in considerable part at
the expense of Ethiopia, constitutes an intrinsic threat to Ethiopia’s
security and territorial integrity.9 Especially when achievement of Somali
expansionist aims by force is advocated by Somali extremists, Ethiopian
fears are aroused and Ethiopian antagonism toward the Somalis is
increased. For their part, the Somalis interpret earlier Ethiopian
suggestions for federation as evidence of an Ethiopian plan to subjugate
them, if necessary by force of arms, including those furnished by the
United States under its Mutual Defense Assistance agreement with
Ethiopia. The periodic use of force by the Ethiopians to maintain order
in areas occupied by their Somali subjects as well as the restrictions
on nomadic Somalis penetrating Ethiopian territory from the Somali
Republic tend to confirm the Somalis in their fears.
5. Ethiopian and Somali leaders lend lip service to the fact that the
long-term interests of the countries in the Horn of Africa would be
advanced by an accommodation between the Ethiopians and the Somalis.
However, the terms upon which each side proposes such an accommodation
are not acceptable to the other and have increased the antagonism and
suspicion between them. It is open to serious question whether the
Ethiopian suggestion for federation, which would increase Ethiopia’s
internal difficulties through the accession of a very large additional
Moslem element, would contribute to area stability. On the other hand,
the Somali aspiration for a Greater Somaliland, if realized, would
extend, through the acquisition of large increments of territory and
population without corresponding gains in economic resources, the grave
political and economic difficulties of a non-viable Somali State
scarcely past the embryonic stage. Under these circumstances, the United
States and other Western nations interested in the area have made little
progress in their direct efforts to lessen tensions between Ethiopia and
the Somali Republic, but hope for some success in encouraging both
Ethiopia and the Somali Republic to look to the UN as a source of their security. However, neither of the
protagonists has been willing to accept a U.S. position of neutrality in
this dispute.
6. In addition to the threat posed by the conflict between Ethiopia and
the Somalis, and the marked reduction in direct Western influence in the
Somali Republic, there is a threat to the peace and stability of the
area stemming from efforts of the UAR,
and USSR and the Chinese Communists to
exploit existing antagonisms and weaknesses in order to undermine the
Western position in the Horn of Africa and to
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expand their influence. In exploiting the
Ethiopian-Somali conflict it is possible that the Chinese Communists
will give priority to activities in the Somali Republic (either in
cooperation with or in competition with the USSR), in view of the existing Soviet emphasis on
activities in Ethiopia.
7. Of great concern to Ethiopia is the extension of UAR influence to Northeast Africa. UAR propaganda and subversive activity
among the Moslems in the area and limited UAR support of Somali extremists as well as the likely
increase of UAR influence in the Somali
Republic are all regarded by Ethiopia as a danger. In fact, however, the
UAR’s support of Somali expansionism
will probably continue to be moderated by a desire to avoid too direct a
challenge to Ethiopia, at least so long as Haile Selassie remains in power, as well as by the
relatively low priority of the Horn as a UAR target.
Ethiopia
8. Ethiopia occupies a commanding position in the Horn of Africa and is
the only economically viable country in the area. Although internal
stability has been achieved under the authoritarian rule of the Emperor,
the feudal nature of the government, the fact that the central
government does not exercise effective administrative control over
outlying areas, the presence of a large Moslem minority susceptible to
UAR and other blandishments and
still-extant discontent in Eritrea are serious fundamental weaknesses.
The Ethiopian Government has been following a policy of military
modernization, economic development of the country’s resources, and
almost imperceptibly gradual political advancement. Economic stability
has been maintained through careful use of internal resources, the
long-term expansion of export revenues, and the availability of external
financing. The long-range consequences of the attempted coup of December
1960 cannot as yet be predicted. It is unlikely, however, that the
Emperor can, even if he wishes, accelerate appreciably the political
advancement and economic development of Ethiopia with the human and
economic resources available without resorting to forced mobilization of
manpower and capital. The situation will probably be kept under control
so long as Haile Selassie reigns,
but his death or incapacitation is likely to precipitate a struggle for
power at the center, possibly complicated by secession movements,
especially in Eritrea and the Somali-inhabited areas. Crown Prince Asia
Wossen has suffered from the restraints placed on him by his father, and
although publicly exonerated from culpability in connection with the
December, 1960 coup attempt, he may be quietly removed from the line of
succession. If, however, he remains the legally designated heir, he may
be able to succeed to the throne, if only as a symbol, especially should
he be supported by the Army.
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9. There are no major difficulties between Ethiopia and its western
neighbor, the Sudan, and relations between the two states are cordial.
However, in the absence of an agreement on the use of the Nile’s waters,
any developments on the Nile River which might establish “beneficial
use” rights for other powers to the detriment of Ethiopia’s future use
are a source of great concern to Ethiopia and will continue to have an
important bearing on its relations not only with the Sudan and the
UAR, but also with any other country
participating in such projects through financial assistance or
otherwise. The Ethiopian Government relies heavily upon the formal
assurance in this connection which it received in 1956 from the United
States Government “that no action in derogation of Ethiopia’s legitimate
rights should be taken without Ethiopia’s consent.”10
10. Following World War II Ethiopia adopted a policy of active
cooperation with the United States. In 1950, it supported the United
Nations in Korea and subsequently followed the U.S. position on many
other major international issues. In 1959, however, Emperor Haile Selassie made a state visit to
Moscow, accepted long-term credits of $100 million from the USSR and $10 million from Czechoslovakia,
and embarked on a more neutralist foreign policy. These moves were
almost certainly stimulated by the Emperor’s discontent with the United
States and Western responses to his demands for material aid and
diplomatic support, particularly as related to the Somali issue. The
Emperor’s fear that the U.K., with U.S. assent, was pushing for a
“Greater Somalia” had become and remains an obsession affecting
Ethiopia’s attitude on all other matters. More recently, difficulties
and delays in the utilization of Soviet assistance (in part reflecting,
as with previously initiated Western aid programs, the administrative
and technical difficulties of doing business in Ethiopia), an increase
in the U.S. aid program and developments in the Congo (where Ethiopian
troops support the UN action) have all
tended to disillusion Ethiopia with the USSR. There are indications that the Emperor is pleased
that the drift away from the United States has been reduced.
Nevertheless, Ethiopian acceptance of the Soviet and Czech aid
represents an advance in the Bloc’s efforts to undermine Western
influence and to expand its own presence and prestige in Africa,
provides a framework for further Bloc overtures to Ethiopia itself, and
affords greater opportunities for Bloc subversion.
11. Ethiopian armed forces and constabulary total approximately 59,000
men of whom 28,000 are in the National Police, 24,000 are in the Army,
and 6,000 in the Imperial Bodyguard. The army is capable
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of maintaining internal security or
repressing border incursions made by any of the military establishments
existing in neighboring areas. The economic burden imposed by the
maintenance of such an extensive military establishment—defense
expenditures constitute 20 percent of budgetary allocations—is being
partially offset by the U.S. Military Assistance Program initiated in
1953.11
12. U.S. economic aid to Ethiopia under the Mutual Security Program has
been granted at the level of $5 million to $6 million per year in recent
years. The cumulative total of grant MSP
economic aid from FY 1952 through FY 1960 was $38 million. Of this total, $27
million has been for technical assistance mainly in the fields of
agriculture, education, health and surveys of natural resources. The
balance has been given as Defense Support or Special Assistance for
economic development projects. DLF loans
of $0.5 and $2 million have been made in FY 1960–1961, mainly to provide lending capital for
agricultural and industrial projects. Further loans have been requested
primarily for financing improvements in airways and highways.
13. In spite of the expanded Soviet Bloc presence, the United States
still occupies a leading position in Ethiopia and remains able to exert
considerable influence on Ethiopia’s orientation. While the Emperor
desires to maintain a substantial Western presence in Ethiopia and to
avoid heavy involvement with the Bloc, his aspirations to play an
important role in African affairs will cause him to attempt to avoid
antagonizing “neutrals” and thus becoming isolated. An example of this
attitude was the Ethiopian voting record in the Fifteenth General
Assembly (1960) where Ethiopia voted with the Afro-Asians (and against
the United States) on numerous occasions.
14. As a result of the Emperor’s growing interest in the development of
Pan-African cooperation, Ethiopia has participated in Afro-Asian
Conferences, although with increasing caution in view of the attempts of
the USSR and the UAR to use such conferences to achieve
their own objectives. The Emperor’s desire to exert a leading influence
in Africa is tempered by his fear of a rebuff, damaging to his prestige,
from the newer, more radical, African leaders. He has, for instance,
openly supported the UN effort to the
Congo, without, however, being willing to play an aggressive part in
African circles.
The Somali Republic
15. The independence of former British Somaliland on June 26, 1960, and
its union with the former Trust Territory of Somaliland when the latter
became independent on July 1, 1960, added to the international scene an
extremely weak and impoverished country
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faced, in addition to the problems of resolving
tribal rivalries, by major administrative problems involved in combining
two formerly separate governmental mechanisms established by the British
and the Italians.
16. Post independence developments have to date resulted in a
readjustment of internal political alignments and the installation of a
government which has advanced a program based on moderation in the
political sphere and economic austerity. Faced, however, with major
economic and financial problems, the Government is under great pressure
to produce tangible improvements in the domestic economic situation and
also to obtain sizeable amounts of foreign aid. Moreover, in spite of
the official attitude of the Somali Government,12 Ethiopian actions
against Somalis (whether Ethiopian subjects or not and whether within
Ethiopian territory or not) and the popular appeal of the Greater
Somalia issue are effectively exploited by opposition politicians and
anti-Western propagandists. The net result is a strong tendency toward a
politically neutralist position in international affairs and toward the
acceptance of economic assistance from both Western and Bloc
sources.
17. Economically, the Somali Republic faces an extremely difficult period
that is expected to continue for some years to come. Lacking any known
deposits of petroleum or mineral resources, its future economic growth
must depend on economic development in the agricultural sector. Banana
production and local handicrafts are virtually the only sources of
monetary income. Improvements in agricultural methods and techniques
could bring immediate but modest gains in production, particularly in
meats and hides and skins. The recent completion of the Inter-River
Economic Survey, conducted in the area between the Giuba and Uebi
Scebeli Rivers, has provided data which indicate that over the long term
economic growth could be obtained through expanding agricultural
production and introducing related processing industries.
18. The present economy of the Somali Republic provides a very limited
debt servicing capacity and the opportunities for financing economic
development of the Republic through external private capital investments
appear to be very limited. Accordingly, continuing external subsidies
will be required for the foreseeable future both to meet ordinary budget
deficits and to finance the limited economic growth which seems
feasible.
19. Although the new government has proclaimed policies of reform and
austerity, the requirements for external assistance in the period
1961–1965 have been estimated by the Somalis themselves, if somewhat
generously, at $150 million for economic development and
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$50 million to meet deficits in the
ordinary budget. These amounts are not based on any rigorous analysis
and are clearly beyond the capability of the Somali Republic to
absorb.13
20. Italy and the U.K. can be expected to continue to provide economic
support to the Somali Republic.
- a.
- In the nine and one half years that it administered the former
Trust Territory, Italy in addition to providing an assured market
for the Somali crop contributed to it an average equivalent of about
$10 million per year. As indicated by its commitment to provide some
budgetary aid and to assure a continued banana market, Italy will
probably continue a moderate level of economic and technical
assistance to the Republic for reasons of prestige and to protect
residual private interests.
- b.
- The U.K. contributed the equivalent of $5 to $6 million annually
to its Protectorate. The British probably hope to retain some
leverage for countering Soviet and UAR influence and have promised an annual grant to the
Somali Republic. However, they have little hope of occupying a
preponderant position in the new state and will probably seek to
induce Italy and especially the United States to assume more and
more of the burden of support.
- c.
- The United States has programmed economic and technical assistance
to the area in recent years at an annual rate of $1–3 million for a
total of $6.8 million through the end of FY 1960. As early as 1958, the United States gave the
Somali Government an assurance that the United States would continue
its interest in the area’s economic future after independence and
would be willing to help, by supplementing the aid provided by other
Free World countries subject to the availability of funds.
Other potential sources of economic support for the Somali Republic
include the European Common Market fund, from which the Republic is
scheduled to receive $5 million during the next five years; Free World
financial institutions (when the Republic joins them); the UN Special Projects Fund; and the UAR, the USSR, and Communist China.
21. Because of the concern of the UN for
the political and economic future of the Somali Republic and to provide
a “UN presence” to discourage adventures
by either the Somalis or the Ethiopians, the UN Secretary General contemplates assigning a personal
representative to Mogadiscio. The Somali Government has requested that
the UN provide, in addition, high-level
experts in the fields of economics, finance, public administration and
law. Should this UN group function as
hoped, it could make a major contribution to the maintenance of
stability in the area as well as providing disinterested expert advice
to
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the Somalis on their
internal problems. Such a group of experts would be particularly welcome
to the Somalis because of the general lack of confidence in some of the
Italian experts who occupied high positions in the Somali civil service
before, and to some extent since, independence. It has been reported
that the low caliber of a great many of these experts has caused great
dissatisfaction on the part of the Somalis and has rendered it unlikely
that they would agree to accept a corps of permanent Italian
advisors.
22. Relations between the Somali Republic and the United States are
generally good because of U.S. support for the Somali Republic’s
independence, past and prospective U.S. assistance, and Somali
confidence that the United States has no territorial or other ambitions
in the area. However, in spite of reiterated U.S. explanations and
statements of support for the Somali Republic’s independence, the close
ties between the United States and Ethiopia give rise to Somali
apprehension that the United States tends to favor Ethiopian designs on
them, and through its military and economic assistance is increasing
Ethiopia’s capability to absorb the Somali Republic by force of arms or
otherwise. The U.K. and Italy have agreed between themselves to provide
assistance to the Somalis in the military field, including a joint
training mission if the Somalis should so request.14 The UAR has also offered to assist with small arms and
training. The United States has informed both the Somalis and the
Ethiopians that, while it will continue to help the Somali police, it
has no plans to aid the Somali Army. Because of the strong interests of
the U.K. and Italy in the area, the United States has closely
coordinated with both countries its own action in the Somali Republic,
and relies on them to exercise a restraining influence on Somali desires
for military expansion.
23. The UAR has made assiduous efforts to
identify itself with Somali nationalist aspirations. It will probably
retain a special position in the Somali Republic by virtue of its
historic rivalry with Ethiopia, its appeal to religious ties, and its
readiness to provide some educational, cultural, military and economic
assistance. In addition, it will continue some covert meddling in Somali
politics. However, most Somali leaders are probably too concerned with
the problems of their own state and too much subject to the conflicting
pull of Pan-Africanism for the country to fall under preponderant
Pan-Arab influence as represented by the UAR.
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24. Even before independence, Somali representatives had attended
Pan-African meetings and at the 1960 All-African Peoples Conference held
in Tunis were able to obtain a resolution supporting Greater Somalia.
The Somalis are anxious to be regarded as a full-fledged member of the
emerging African Bloc and hope to obtain African support for their
claims against Ethiopia.
25. Activity in the Somali Republic by the Sino-Soviet Bloc before
independence was held to a minimum by the U.K. and Italy. Commencing
with the independence ceremonies both the USSR and Communist China have increased their efforts to
gain a foothold. The Chinese Communists appear to have made considerable
headway with the leadership of the opposition Great Somalia League. The
Somalis have agreed to the establishment of diplomatic relations with
the USSR, Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary,
Romania, Czechoslovakia and Communist China. In the light of increased
Soviet and Chinese Communist interest in Africa both may be expected to
take advantage of any opportunities to establish a foothold in the
Somali Republic, although the USSR and
its European satellites will be inhibited by the need to avoid
jeopardizing their position in Ethiopia.
Somali Areas in Kenya
26. One of the four areas inhabited by Somalis which is included in
Somali aspirations for union is the eastern portion of Kenya’s northern
Frontier Province. Some efforts have been made by the Somali Republic to
persuade the British to cede this area prior to Kenya’s independence
although the some 60,000 Somalis in Kenya have only recently shown any
interest in this question and are divided in their reaction. The British
position has been that the question of the secession of any part of
Kenya is a matter to be decided when independence arrives, by the
British and Kenya governments, who would consider the wishes of the
inhabitants. Kenya African leaders do not yet seem to have focused on
the problem to any extent.
French Somaliland
27. France has opposed Greater Somalia, particularly in view of the value
of the port of Djibouti, which is the only city in French Somaliland and
is considered by the French to be of strategic importance to them.
Djibouti is also of great importance as the principal port of entry for
Ethiopia and the terminus of the railroad to Addis Ababa. French policy
has in the past been one of holding French Somaliland firmly within the
Republic,15 basing this position on the
plebiscite of 1958. More recently, however, the French have given the
Somalis
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indications that
greater freedom, perhaps even independence, may be possible at some
future date. As European-controlled areas in Africa continue to become
independent, France will be under increasing pressure to grant French
Somaliland its independence. At the same time, Ethiopia will view with
great suspicion any steps which might result in Somali control of its
sole railway exit from Addis Ababa to the sea and may be goaded by its
fear of this eventuality into taking unilateral action to protect its
interests.
Objectives
28. Denial of the Horn of Africa to Soviet Bloc or Chinese Communist
domination and minimization of Soviet Bloc and Chinese Communist
influence.
29. So far as consistent with the preceding paragraph, denial of the Horn
of Africa to UAR domination and
limitation of UAR influence to a
moderate level.
30. Such military rights and facilities in the area as the United States
may require, including the continued use of the Asmara communications
facilities.
31. Orderly political, economic and social evolution along lines
favorable to cooperation with other Free World countries.
32. Reduction of tensions between Ethiopia and the Somali Republic.
Policy Guidance
General
33. Cooperating with friendly nations wherever pertinent and efficacious:
(a) encourage the resolution of conflicts and tensions in the area; (b)
seek to deny the area to Soviet Bloc or Chinese Communist domination and
to minimize Soviet Bloc or Chinese Communist influence; (c) so far as
consistent with (b), seek to deny the area to UAR domination and to limit UAR influence to a moderate level; and (d) encourage
orderly economic progress.
34. In view of the distinct possibility that the tensions between
Ethiopia and the Somali Republic may be seriously exacerbated or result
in armed conflict (going beyond border incidents), determine which
courses of action by the United States would be feasible and would serve
best the long-term interests of the United States in such an
eventuality.
35. Strengthen U.S. information and cultural exchange programs in the
Horn of Africa, and encourage other friendly Free World nations to take
similar action.
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Ethiopia
36. Consult with Ethiopia on Middle East and African matters of concern
to it. Encourage Ethiopia to maintain an interest in Pan-African affairs
and to exercise a moderating influence in such affairs.
37. Continue to provide Ethiopia with: (a) technical assistance, with
emphasis on education and training programs; (b) to the extent necessary
to meet our objectives, limited economic assistance and minimum military
equipment and training of a kind suitable for maintaining internal
security and offering resistance to local aggression, making every
effort to avoid a military build-up which would strain the Ethiopian
economy, lead to commitments for indefinite U.S. support, or to
increased tension within the area.16
38. While recognizing the right of the Ethiopians to trade with and
accept assistance from the Sino-Soviet Bloc, seek to meet the challenge
posed by Bloc offers of economic and military aid and cultural ties by:
- a.
- Vigorous implementation of the aggregate U.S. programs
described above.
- b.
- Seeking to dissuade the Ethiopian Government, wherever
feasible and without creating antagonism toward the United
States, from:
- (1)
- Accepting assistance from the Sino-Soviet Bloc in
particularly sensitive fields (such as the armed forces,
internal security, communications and education) of a
kind which would be damaging to Ethiopia’s
security.
- (2)
- Accepting aid or engaging in trade with the Bloc at
levels or on terms likely to create undue Ethiopian
dependence on the Bloc.
- (3)
- Extensive use of Bloc technicians.
- c.
- To the ends specified in b above, be prepared in particular
circumstances to provide further U.S. technical, economic and
military assistance if required. Direct counter offers to
specific Bloc offers should be considered only as a last
resort.
39. Avoid U.S. involvement, insofar as possible, in negotiations on the
Nile waters between Ethiopia and other riparian states and, above all,
avoid U.S. identification with the position of any riparian state.
40. Consider steps which might be taken to ensure that French plans for
the future of French Somaliland take into account the vital Ethiopian
interest in maintenance of unhampered use of the Addis Ababa—Djibouti
railroad or the provision of an acceptable alternative.
41. Keeping in mind the many advantages of an orderly succession by the
legally designated heir, seek to identify and, to the extent feasible,
foster, before the death or incapacitation of Emperor Haile Selassie I,
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a successor who will prove acceptable to
the nation (especially the Army), who will be able effectively to
counter the subversive efforts of the Communist and who will be
responsive to “modernist” aspirations and pressures.
The Somali Republic
42. Encourage Italy and the U.K. to continue to exercise the primary
external responsibility for the maintenance of the Somali Republic’s
stability and Free World orientation.
43. a. Encourage Italy, the U.K. and other friendly nations to provide
economic and technical aid, including budgetary, military and police
assistance, to assist Somali leaders favorable to the West to remain in
power and to maintain stability in areas under their control.
b. Encourage the UN to provide technical
assistance.
c. Encourage the Somali Republic to join Free World financial
institutions. If the Somali Republic becomes a member of these
institutions, encourage efforts by the institutions to promote sound
economic and financial policies in the Somali Republic and support loans
to the Republic by these institutions where consistent with relevant
U.S. policies governing such loans.
d. Be prepared to supplement these efforts as necessary by providing
limited U.S. economic and technical assistance, including assistance for
police-type units.
44. Encourage Somali leaders to be moderate in advancing the concept of a
Greater Somaliland and emphasize to both Ethiopia and the Somali
Republic the danger of attempting to alter the existing political
situation by force.
45. Encourage the UN Secretary General to
take an active role, through a personal representative in the Somali
Republic, in attempting to reduce tensions in the area and to find
solutions to various conflicts (including border disputes and the future
of the Somalis in Kenya and French Somaliland) which are acceptable to
the states and peoples concerned.
