Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Africa, Volume XIV

55. National Security Council Report⁰

NSC 6028

December 30, 1960.

NOTE BY THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL ON U.S. POLICY TOWARD THE HORN OF AFRICA

REFERENCES

• A. NSC 5903
• B. OCB report on NSC 5903, dated July 13, 1960¹
• C. NSC Actions Nos. 2215–c and 2279²
• D. NIE 76–20³
• E. Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated December 30, 1960⁴

The enclosed draft statement of policy on the subject, prepared by the NSC Planning Board pursuant to the recommendation of the Operation Coordination Board that NSC 5903 should be brought up to date (Reference B), is transmitted herewith for consideration by the National Security Council.

A revised Financial Appendix will be circulated at a later date.

If adopted and approved, the enclosed statement of policy is intended to supersede NSC 5903.

It is recommended that, if the Council adopts the enclosed statement of policy, it be submitted to the President with the recommendation that he approve it; direct its implementation by all appropriate Executive departments and agencies of the U.S. Government; and designate the Operations Coordinating Board as the coordinating agency.⁵

James S. Lay, Jr.⁶

Enclosure

DRAFT

STATEMENT OF U.S. POLICY ON THE HORN OF AFRICA⁷

General Considerations

Importance of the Area

1. An area of geographical and cultural transition between Africa south of the Sahara and the Near East, the Horn of Africa, under friendly control, contributes to the security of Western sea and air communications and offers a strategic position for the defense of Western interests in the Red Sea and nearby African areas. The United States has a military interest in the Horn of Africa, particularly in view of the presence of critically required U.S. communications facilities in Ethiopia which we are seeking to expand.⁸

Threats to Peace and Stability in the Area

2. Internally, the Horn of Africa presents a picture of political fragmentation, ethnic and religious cleavages and marked economic backwardness. The two principal political elements in this situation are: (a) the Ethiopian Empire (with its federated territory of Eritrea) with a population of about 18 million divided between Christian highland farmers and Moslem nomads in the lowland, and in which only the barest beginnings have been made toward national unity; (b) the Somali people, who are divided between the newly independent Somali Republic (population 2 million), French Somaliland (25 thousand Somalis, 40 thousand others), southeast Ethiopia (350 thousand Somalis) and Kenya (60 thousand Somalis). The conflicting aims and aspirations of Ethiopia and the Somalis are a major source of tension jeopardizing prospects for peaceful and orderly progress in the entire area.

3. One of Ethiopia’s main objectives, since World War II, has been to ensure that the adjoining Red Sea or Indian Ocean coasts do not become bases for a future attack upon Ethiopia. It has, therefore, sought to acquire control of these regions and in 1952 succeeded through the UN in obtaining the incorporation of Eritrea as a federated territory. Since that time the autonomy of Eritrea has been gradually reduced. The growth of Nasser’s influence and the resulting enhancement of the threat of hostile Moslem encirclements led the Emperor of Ethiopia in 1956 to suggest publicly, but without success, federation of the Somalilands with Ethiopia.

4. The development of national consciousness among the Somalis has been accompanied by demands for independence and political unification through the creation of a Greater Somaliland, uniting all the Somali people in one independent country. These aspirations have been partly achieved with the independence of former British Somaliland on June 26, 1960, and its subsequent union with the former Trust Territory of Somaliland when the latter became independent on July 1, 1960. The constitution of the new Somali Republic contains the proviso that the union of the Somali peoples is to be promoted by legal and peaceful means, as well as a repudiation of war as a means of solving international disputes. Nevertheless, the Somali drive for unification, in considerable part at the expense of Ethiopia, constitutes an intrinsic threat to Ethiopia’s security and territorial integrity.⁹ Especially when achievement of Somali expansionist aims by force is advocated by Somali extremists, Ethiopian fears are aroused and Ethiopian antagonism toward the Somalis is increased. For their part, the Somalis interpret earlier Ethiopian suggestions for federation as evidence of an Ethiopian plan to subjugate them, if necessary by force of arms, including those furnished by the United States under its Mutual Defense Assistance agreement with Ethiopia. The periodic use of force by the Ethiopians to maintain order in areas occupied by their Somali subjects as well as the restrictions on nomadic Somalis penetrating Ethiopian territory from the Somali Republic tend to confirm the Somalis in their fears.

5. Ethiopian and Somali leaders lend lip service to the fact that the long-term interests of the countries in the Horn of Africa would be advanced by an accommodation between the Ethiopians and the Somalis. However, the terms upon which each side proposes such an accommodation are not acceptable to the other and have increased the antagonism and suspicion between them. It is open to serious question whether the Ethiopian suggestion for federation, which would increase Ethiopia’s internal difficulties through the accession of a very large additional Moslem element, would contribute to area stability. On the other hand, the Somali aspiration for a Greater Somaliland, if realized, would extend, through the acquisition of large increments of territory and population without corresponding gains in economic resources, the grave political and economic difficulties of a non-viable Somali State scarcely past the embryonic stage. Under these circumstances, the United States and other Western nations interested in the area have made little progress in their direct efforts to lessen tensions between Ethiopia and the Somali Republic, but hope for some success in encouraging both Ethiopia and the Somali Republic to look to the UN as a source of their security. However, neither of the protagonists has been willing to accept a U.S. position of neutrality in this dispute.

6. In addition to the threat posed by the conflict between Ethiopia and the Somalis, and the marked reduction in direct Western influence in the Somali Republic, there is a threat to the peace and stability of the area stemming from efforts of the UAR, and USSR and the Chinese Communists to exploit existing antagonisms and weaknesses in order to undermine the Western position in the Horn of Africa and to expand their influence. In exploiting the Ethiopian-Somali conflict it is possible that the Chinese Communists will give priority to activities in the Somali Republic (either in cooperation with or in competition with the USSR), in view of the existing Soviet emphasis on activities in Ethiopia.

7. Of great concern to Ethiopia is the extension of UAR influence to Northeast Africa. UAR propaganda and subversive activity among the Moslems in the area and limited UAR support of Somali extremists as well as the likely increase of UAR influence in the Somali Republic are all regarded by Ethiopia as a danger. In fact, however, the UAR’s support of Somali expansionism will probably continue to be moderated by a desire to avoid too direct a challenge to Ethiopia, at least so long as Haile Selassie remains in power, as well as by the relatively low priority of the Horn as a UAR target.

Ethiopia

8. Ethiopia occupies a commanding position in the Horn of Africa and is the only economically viable country in the area. Although internal stability has been achieved under the authoritarian rule of the Emperor, the feudal nature of the government, the fact that the central government does not exercise effective administrative control over outlying areas, the presence of a large Moslem minority susceptible to UAR and other blandishments and still-extant discontent in Eritrea are serious fundamental weaknesses. The Ethiopian Government has been following a policy of military modernization, economic development of the country’s resources, and almost imperceptibly gradual political advancement. Economic stability has been maintained through careful use of internal resources, the long-term expansion of export revenues, and the availability of external financing. The long-range consequences of the attempted coup of December 1960 cannot as yet be predicted. It is unlikely, however, that the Emperor can, even if he wishes, accelerate appreciably the political advancement and economic development of Ethiopia with the human and economic resources available without resorting to forced mobilization of manpower and capital. The situation will probably be kept under control so long as Haile Selassie reigns, but his death or incapacitation is likely to precipitate a struggle for power at the center, possibly complicated by secession movements, especially in Eritrea and the Somali-inhabited areas. Crown Prince Asia Wossen has suffered from the restraints placed on him by his father, and although publicly exonerated from culpability in connection with the December, 1960 coup attempt, he may be quietly removed from the line of succession. If, however, he remains the legally designated heir, he may be able to succeed to the throne, if only as a symbol, especially should he be supported by the Army.

9. There are no major difficulties between Ethiopia and its western neighbor, the Sudan, and relations between the two states are cordial. However, in the absence of an agreement on the use of the Nile’s waters, any developments on the Nile River which might establish “beneficial use” rights for other powers to the detriment of Ethiopia’s future use are a source of great concern to Ethiopia and will continue to have an important bearing on its relations not only with the Sudan and the UAR, but also with any other country participating in such projects through financial assistance or otherwise. The Ethiopian Government relies heavily upon the formal assurance in this connection which it received in 1956 from the United States Government “that no action in derogation of Ethiopia’s legitimate rights should be taken without Ethiopia’s consent.”¹⁰

10. Following World War II Ethiopia adopted a policy of active cooperation with the United States. In 1950, it supported the United Nations in Korea and subsequently followed the U.S. position on many other major international issues. In 1959, however, Emperor Haile Selassie made a state visit to Moscow, accepted long-term credits of $100 million from the USSR and $10 million from Czechoslovakia, and embarked on a more neutralist foreign policy. These moves were almost certainly stimulated by the Emperor’s discontent with the United States and Western responses to his demands for material aid and diplomatic support, particularly as related to the Somali issue. The Emperor’s fear that the U.K., with U.S. assent, was pushing for a “Greater Somalia” had become and remains an obsession affecting Ethiopia’s attitude on all other matters. More recently, difficulties and delays in the utilization of Soviet assistance (in part reflecting, as with previously initiated Western aid programs, the administrative and technical difficulties of doing business in Ethiopia), an increase in the U.S. aid program and developments in the Congo (where Ethiopian troops support the UN action) have all tended to disillusion Ethiopia with the USSR. There are indications that the Emperor is pleased that the drift away from the United States has been reduced. Nevertheless, Ethiopian acceptance of the Soviet and Czech aid represents an advance in the Bloc’s efforts to undermine Western influence and to expand its own presence and prestige in Africa, provides a framework for further Bloc overtures to Ethiopia itself, and affords greater opportunities for Bloc subversion.

11. Ethiopian armed forces and constabulary total approximately 59,000 men of whom 28,000 are in the National Police, 24,000 are in the Army, and 6,000 in the Imperial Bodyguard. The army is capable of maintaining internal security or repressing border incursions made by any of the military establishments existing in neighboring areas. The economic burden imposed by the maintenance of such an extensive military establishment—defense expenditures constitute 20 percent of budgetary allocations—is being partially offset by the U.S. Military Assistance Program initiated in 1953.¹¹

12. U.S. economic aid to Ethiopia under the Mutual Security Program has been granted at the level of $5 million to $6 million per year in recent years. The cumulative total of grant MSP economic aid from FY 1952 through FY 1960 was $38 million. Of this total, $27 million has been for technical assistance mainly in the fields of agriculture, education, health and surveys of natural resources. The balance has been given as Defense Support or Special Assistance for economic development projects. DLF loans of $0.5 and $2 million have been made in FY 1960–1961, mainly to provide lending capital for agricultural and industrial projects. Further loans have been requested primarily for financing improvements in airways and highways.

13. In spite of the expanded Soviet Bloc presence, the United States still occupies a leading position in Ethiopia and remains able to exert considerable influence on Ethiopia’s orientation. While the Emperor desires to maintain a substantial Western presence in Ethiopia and to avoid heavy involvement with the Bloc, his aspirations to play an important role in African affairs will cause him to attempt to avoid antagonizing “neutrals” and thus becoming isolated. An example of this attitude was the Ethiopian voting record in the Fifteenth General Assembly (1960) where Ethiopia voted with the Afro-Asians (and against the United States) on numerous occasions.

14. As a result of the Emperor’s growing interest in the development of Pan-African cooperation, Ethiopia has participated in Afro-Asian Conferences, although with increasing caution in view of the attempts of the USSR and the UAR to use such conferences to achieve their own objectives. The Emperor’s desire to exert a leading influence in Africa is tempered by his fear of a rebuff, damaging to his prestige, from the newer, more radical, African leaders. He has, for instance, openly supported the UN effort to the Congo, without, however, being willing to play an aggressive part in African circles.

The Somali Republic

15. The independence of former British Somaliland on June 26, 1960, and its union with the former Trust Territory of Somaliland when the latter became independent on July 1, 1960, added to the international scene an extremely weak and impoverished country faced, in addition to the problems of resolving tribal rivalries, by major administrative problems involved in combining two formerly separate governmental mechanisms established by the British and the Italians.

16. Post independence developments have to date resulted in a readjustment of internal political alignments and the installation of a government which has advanced a program based on moderation in the political sphere and economic austerity. Faced, however, with major economic and financial problems, the Government is under great pressure to produce tangible improvements in the domestic economic situation and also to obtain sizeable amounts of foreign aid. Moreover, in spite of the official attitude of the Somali Government,¹² Ethiopian actions against Somalis (whether Ethiopian subjects or not and whether within Ethiopian territory or not) and the popular appeal of the Greater Somalia issue are effectively exploited by opposition politicians and anti-Western propagandists. The net result is a strong tendency toward a politically neutralist position in international affairs and toward the acceptance of economic assistance from both Western and Bloc sources.

17. Economically, the Somali Republic faces an extremely difficult period that is expected to continue for some years to come. Lacking any known deposits of petroleum or mineral resources, its future economic growth must depend on economic development in the agricultural sector. Banana production and local handicrafts are virtually the only sources of monetary income. Improvements in agricultural methods and techniques could bring immediate but modest gains in production, particularly in meats and hides and skins. The recent completion of the Inter-River Economic Survey, conducted in the area between the Giuba and Uebi Scebeli Rivers, has provided data which indicate that over the long term economic growth could be obtained through expanding agricultural production and introducing related processing industries.

18. The present economy of the Somali Republic provides a very limited debt servicing capacity and the opportunities for financing economic development of the Republic through external private capital investments appear to be very limited. Accordingly, continuing external subsidies will be required for the foreseeable future both to meet ordinary budget deficits and to finance the limited economic growth which seems feasible.

19. Although the new government has proclaimed policies of reform and austerity, the requirements for external assistance in the period 1961–1965 have been estimated by the Somalis themselves, if somewhat generously, at $150 million for economic development and $50 million to meet deficits in the ordinary budget. These amounts are not based on any rigorous analysis and are clearly beyond the capability of the Somali Republic to absorb.¹³

20. Italy and the U.K. can be expected to continue to provide economic support to the Somali Republic.

a. In the nine and one half years that it administered the former Trust Territory, Italy in addition to providing an assured market for the Somali crop contributed to it an average equivalent of about $10 million per year. As indicated by its commitment to provide some budgetary aid and to assure a continued banana market, Italy will probably continue a moderate level of economic and technical assistance to the Republic for reasons of prestige and to protect residual private interests.

b. The U.K. contributed the equivalent of $5 to $6 million annually to its Protectorate. The British probably hope to retain some leverage for countering Soviet and UAR influence and have promised an annual grant to the Somali Republic. However, they have little hope of occupying a preponderant position in the new state and will probably seek to induce Italy and especially the United States to assume more and more of the burden of support.

c. The United States has programmed economic and technical assistance to the area in recent years at an annual rate of $1–3 million for a total of $6.8 million through the end of FY 1960. As early as 1958, the United States gave the Somali Government an assurance that the United States would continue its interest in the area’s economic future after independence and would be willing to help, by supplementing the aid provided by other Free World countries subject to the availability of funds.

Other potential sources of economic support for the Somali Republic include the European Common Market fund, from which the Republic is scheduled to receive $5 million during the next five years; Free World financial institutions (when the Republic joins them); the UN Special Projects Fund; and the UAR, the USSR, and Communist China.

21. Because of the concern of the UN for the political and economic future of the Somali Republic and to provide a “UN presence” to discourage adventures by either the Somalis or the Ethiopians, the UN Secretary General contemplates assigning a personal representative to Mogadiscio. The Somali Government has requested that the UN provide, in addition, high-level experts in the fields of economics, finance, public administration and law. Should this UN group function as hoped, it could make a major contribution to the maintenance of stability in the area as well as providing disinterested expert advice to the Somalis on their internal problems. Such a group of experts would be particularly welcome to the Somalis because of the general lack of confidence in some of the Italian experts who occupied high positions in the Somali civil service before, and to some extent since, independence. It has been reported that the low caliber of a great many of these experts has caused great dissatisfaction on the part of the Somalis and has rendered it unlikely that they would agree to accept a corps of permanent Italian advisors.

22. Relations between the Somali Republic and the United States are generally good because of U.S. support for the Somali Republic’s independence, past and prospective U.S. assistance, and Somali confidence that the United States has no territorial or other ambitions in the area. However, in spite of reiterated U.S. explanations and statements of support for the Somali Republic’s independence, the close ties between the United States and Ethiopia give rise to Somali apprehension that the United States tends to favor Ethiopian designs on them, and through its military and economic assistance is increasing Ethiopia’s capability to absorb the Somali Republic by force of arms or otherwise. The U.K. and Italy have agreed between themselves to provide assistance to the Somalis in the military field, including a joint training mission if the Somalis should so request.¹⁴ The UAR has also offered to assist with small arms and training. The United States has informed both the Somalis and the Ethiopians that, while it will continue to help the Somali police, it has no plans to aid the Somali Army. Because of the strong interests of the U.K. and Italy in the area, the United States has closely coordinated with both countries its own action in the Somali Republic, and relies on them to exercise a restraining influence on Somali desires for military expansion.

23. The UAR has made assiduous efforts to identify itself with Somali nationalist aspirations. It will probably retain a special position in the Somali Republic by virtue of its historic rivalry with Ethiopia, its appeal to religious ties, and its readiness to provide some educational, cultural, military and economic assistance. In addition, it will continue some covert meddling in Somali politics. However, most Somali leaders are probably too concerned with the problems of their own state and too much subject to the conflicting pull of Pan-Africanism for the country to fall under preponderant Pan-Arab influence as represented by the UAR.

24. Even before independence, Somali representatives had attended Pan-African meetings and at the 1960 All-African Peoples Conference held in Tunis were able to obtain a resolution supporting Greater Somalia. The Somalis are anxious to be regarded as a full-fledged member of the emerging African Bloc and hope to obtain African support for their claims against Ethiopia.

25. Activity in the Somali Republic by the Sino-Soviet Bloc before independence was held to a minimum by the U.K. and Italy. Commencing with the independence ceremonies both the USSR and Communist China have increased their efforts to gain a foothold. The Chinese Communists appear to have made considerable headway with the leadership of the opposition Great Somalia League. The Somalis have agreed to the establishment of diplomatic relations with the USSR, Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania, Czechoslovakia and Communist China. In the light of increased Soviet and Chinese Communist interest in Africa both may be expected to take advantage of any opportunities to establish a foothold in the Somali Republic, although the USSR and its European satellites will be inhibited by the need to avoid jeopardizing their position in Ethiopia.

Somali Areas in Kenya

26. One of the four areas inhabited by Somalis which is included in Somali aspirations for union is the eastern portion of Kenya’s northern Frontier Province. Some efforts have been made by the Somali Republic to persuade the British to cede this area prior to Kenya’s independence although the some 60,000 Somalis in Kenya have only recently shown any interest in this question and are divided in their reaction. The British position has been that the question of the secession of any part of Kenya is a matter to be decided when independence arrives, by the British and Kenya governments, who would consider the wishes of the inhabitants. Kenya African leaders do not yet seem to have focused on the problem to any extent.

French Somaliland

27. France has opposed Greater Somalia, particularly in view of the value of the port of Djibouti, which is the only city in French Somaliland and is considered by the French to be of strategic importance to them. Djibouti is also of great importance as the principal port of entry for Ethiopia and the terminus of the railroad to Addis Ababa. French policy has in the past been one of holding French Somaliland firmly within the Republic,¹⁵ basing this position on the plebiscite of 1958. More recently, however, the French have given the Somalis indications that greater freedom, perhaps even independence, may be possible at some future date. As European-controlled areas in Africa continue to become independent, France will be under increasing pressure to grant French Somaliland its independence. At the same time, Ethiopia will view with great suspicion any steps which might result in Somali control of its sole railway exit from Addis Ababa to the sea and may be goaded by its fear of this eventuality into taking unilateral action to protect its interests.

Objectives

28. Denial of the Horn of Africa to Soviet Bloc or Chinese Communist domination and minimization of Soviet Bloc and Chinese Communist influence.

29. So far as consistent with the preceding paragraph, denial of the Horn of Africa to UAR domination and limitation of UAR influence to a moderate level.

30. Such military rights and facilities in the area as the United States may require, including the continued use of the Asmara communications facilities.

31. Orderly political, economic and social evolution along lines favorable to cooperation with other Free World countries.

32. Reduction of tensions between Ethiopia and the Somali Republic.

Policy Guidance

General

33. Cooperating with friendly nations wherever pertinent and efficacious: (a) encourage the resolution of conflicts and tensions in the area; (b) seek to deny the area to Soviet Bloc or Chinese Communist domination and to minimize Soviet Bloc or Chinese Communist influence; (c) so far as consistent with (b), seek to deny the area to UAR domination and to limit UAR influence to a moderate level; and (d) encourage orderly economic progress.

34. In view of the distinct possibility that the tensions between Ethiopia and the Somali Republic may be seriously exacerbated or result in armed conflict (going beyond border incidents), determine which courses of action by the United States would be feasible and would serve best the long-term interests of the United States in such an eventuality.

35. Strengthen U.S. information and cultural exchange programs in the Horn of Africa, and encourage other friendly Free World nations to take similar action.

Ethiopia

36. Consult with Ethiopia on Middle East and African matters of concern to it. Encourage Ethiopia to maintain an interest in Pan-African affairs and to exercise a moderating influence in such affairs.

37. Continue to provide Ethiopia with: (a) technical assistance, with emphasis on education and training programs; (b) to the extent necessary to meet our objectives, limited economic assistance and minimum military equipment and training of a kind suitable for maintaining internal security and offering resistance to local aggression, making every effort to avoid a military build-up which would strain the Ethiopian economy, lead to commitments for indefinite U.S. support, or to increased tension within the area.¹⁶

38. While recognizing the right of the Ethiopians to trade with and accept assistance from the Sino-Soviet Bloc, seek to meet the challenge posed by Bloc offers of economic and military aid and cultural ties by:

a. Vigorous implementation of the aggregate U.S. programs described above.

b. Seeking to dissuade the Ethiopian Government, wherever feasible and without creating antagonism toward the United States, from:

(1) Accepting assistance from the Sino-Soviet Bloc in particularly sensitive fields (such as the armed forces, internal security, communications and education) of a kind which would be damaging to Ethiopia’s security.

(2) Accepting aid or engaging in trade with the Bloc at levels or on terms likely to create undue Ethiopian dependence on the Bloc.

(3) Extensive use of Bloc technicians.

c. To the ends specified in b above, be prepared in particular circumstances to provide further U.S. technical, economic and military assistance if required. Direct counter offers to specific Bloc offers should be considered only as a last resort.

39. Avoid U.S. involvement, insofar as possible, in negotiations on the Nile waters between Ethiopia and other riparian states and, above all, avoid U.S. identification with the position of any riparian state.

40. Consider steps which might be taken to ensure that French plans for the future of French Somaliland take into account the vital Ethiopian interest in maintenance of unhampered use of the Addis Ababa—Djibouti railroad or the provision of an acceptable alternative.

41. Keeping in mind the many advantages of an orderly succession by the legally designated heir, seek to identify and, to the extent feasible, foster, before the death or incapacitation of Emperor Haile Selassie I, a successor who will prove acceptable to the nation (especially the Army), who will be able effectively to counter the subversive efforts of the Communist and who will be responsive to “modernist” aspirations and pressures.

The Somali Republic

42. Encourage Italy and the U.K. to continue to exercise the primary external responsibility for the maintenance of the Somali Republic’s stability and Free World orientation.

43. a. Encourage Italy, the U.K. and other friendly nations to provide economic and technical aid, including budgetary, military and police assistance, to assist Somali leaders favorable to the West to remain in power and to maintain stability in areas under their control.

b. Encourage the UN to provide technical assistance.

c. Encourage the Somali Republic to join Free World financial institutions. If the Somali Republic becomes a member of these institutions, encourage efforts by the institutions to promote sound economic and financial policies in the Somali Republic and support loans to the Republic by these institutions where consistent with relevant U.S. policies governing such loans.

d. Be prepared to supplement these efforts as necessary by providing limited U.S. economic and technical assistance, including assistance for police-type units.

44. Encourage Somali leaders to be moderate in advancing the concept of a Greater Somaliland and emphasize to both Ethiopia and the Somali Republic the danger of attempting to alter the existing political situation by force.

45. Encourage the UN Secretary General to take an active role, through a personal representative in the Somali Republic, in attempting to reduce tensions in the area and to find solutions to various conflicts (including border disputes and the future of the Somalis in Kenya and French Somaliland) which are acceptable to the states and peoples concerned.

0. Source: Department of State, S/P–NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1. Secret.
1. See footnote 1, Document 50.
2. NSC Action No. 2215–c of April 7, provided that the Planning Board should submit for Memorandum Action by the Council revisions in NSC policy papers required for the purpose of bringing them up to date. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council) Regarding Action No. 2279, see footnote 7, Document 50.
3. Document 49.
4. Reference is to the covering memorandum that transmitted NSC 6028 to the Council and requested that members indicate their approval or disapproval by January 16, 1961.
5. A memorandum of January 18, 1961, from Lay to the NSC stated that the members had adopted the draft statement of policy in NSC 6028 by Memorandum Action and the President had that day approved it. (Department of State, S/P–NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1)
6. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
7. Ethiopia (including Eritrea), the Somali Republic and French Somaliland. [Footnote in the source text.]
8. The Asmara communications complex in Eritrea consists of Army and Navy facilities. In addition, the U.S. is authorized to use the Ethiopian air base at Asmara for transport and air movement operations and to store POL. Massawa provides important sea support to the Asmara communications facilities. Djibouti, because of its geographic location and existing facilities, is strategically important to the control of the southern approaches to the Suez Canal. [Footnote in the source text.]
9. The Greater Somaliland concept envisages incorporation into the Somali Republic of approximately one-fourth of Ethiopia (which includes a grazing area the use of which is vital to the pastoral economy of the Somali Republic); French Somaliland (which controls the Addis Ababa—Djibouti railroad); and a small part of Kenya. [Footnote in the source text.]
10. This assurance was contained in a letter dated May 26, 1956, from the Under Secretary of State to the Ethiopian Minister of Foreign Affairs. [Footnote in the source text.]
11. U.S. military assistance has gone to the Army and to the Imperial Bodyguard, and some limited assistance has gone to the police. [Footnote in the source text.]
12. Both the Constitution and the Government program advocate achievement of Greater Somaliland “by legal and peaceful means.” [Footnote in the source text.]
13. Paragraph 31 of NIE 76–60 (June 21, 1960) states that “total minimum requirements for external assistance will amount to $10–14 million annually for the foreseeable future.” [Footnote in the source text.]
14. The Somali armed forces consist of (1) the police numbering about 3,000 men, (2) the former Somaliland Scouts numbering about 1,000 men and an embryonic Army of about 3,500 men formed by the transfer of the Police Mobile Force to the Army and by recruitment. The stated Somali goal is an Army of 6,000 men. [Footnote in the source text.]
15. As an overseas territory it is constitutionally an integral part of the French Republic. [Footnote in the source text.]
16. The Ethiopians consider military aid to be a quid pro quo for our military base. [Footnote in the source text.]