Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Africa, Volume XIV

51. National Intelligence Estimate⁰

NIE 72.1–60

August 30, 1960.

THE OUTLOOK FOR THE SUDAN

The Problem

To estimate the outlook for the Sudan over the next few years.

Conclusions

1. The present Sudanese regime—or something very like it—will probably remain in power for the next few years. However, it will continue to be faced with: (a) pressure from the proscribed political parties for a return to civilian government; (b) an internal Communist potential which is likely to grow as Soviet and Chinese Communist activities in the country expand; (c) possible unrest in the South; and most importantly, (d) dissension and plotting within the military services on which its power rests. At present there is less external meddling in Sudanese politics than two years ago. We believe this situation is likely to obtain for the next few years. It is possible, however, that within the period of this estimate, the UAR, in particular, might make a more active effort to influence internal events. (Paras. 5–14)

2. In the economic field, we believe that the Sudan’s present modest prosperity will continue. However, no comprehensive plan for economic development has yet been evolved and the country’s relative prosperity will remain vulnerable to all dangers that face a one-crop economy. (Paras. 15–18)

3. The Sudanese Government’s chief foreign policy concerns are to maintain its independence, to sell its cotton, and to get funds for economic development. Except where its own particular interests are at stake, it will tend to follow the lead of the UAR and the Arab League on foreign issues. The UK probably has more influence in the Sudan than any other Western country. Sudanese relations with the US are likely to remain friendly, though not intimate. Thus far the Sudan has taken no assistance from the Bloc, but relations are likely to expand gradually. Yugoslav influence is likely to grow. The Sudan will seek above all to avoid becoming an active battleground between East and West. (Paras. 19, 21–26)

[Here follows the “Discussion” portion of the estimate (paragraphs 4-26, with sections headed “The Political Situation and Outlook,” “Economic Prospects,” and “Foreign Affairs.”]

0. Source: Department of State, INR–NIE Files. Secret. A note on the cover sheet reads as follows:

   “Submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence. The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and The Joint Staff.

   “Concurred in by the United States Intelligence Board on 30 August 1960. Concurring were the Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State; the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army; the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (Intelligence), Department of the Navy; the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF; the Director for Intelligence Joint Staff; the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, Special Operations; and the Director of the National Security Agency. The Atomic Energy Commission Representative to the USIB, and the Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, abstained, the subject being outside of their jurisdiction.”