331. Memorandum of Conversation0

SecDel/MC/134

PARTICIPANTS

  • U.S.
    • The Secretary
    • Assistant Secretary Satterthwaite
    • T.A. Cassilly (Reporting Officer)
  • Guinea
    • H. E. Telli Diallo, Ambassador to the U.S.
[Page 719]

SUBJECT

  • U.S.-Guinean Relations (One of two)2

The Secretary mentioned that he had hoped to have a chance to speak with President Toure the day before but that it would have been impossible for him to go all the way out to Riverdale in the late afternoon traffic and keep all the other appointments which he had made that day. He said he had a number of things to take up and thought that the best way to present them was in the form of aides-mémoire.

(The interpreter then read four aides-mémoire on: 1. Guinea’s neutral foreign policy;3 2. the Konkoure Dam project;4 3. American aid;5 4. the Congo.6)

The Ambassador replied that he was very pleased to have this opportunity to see the Secretary since he had made many requests in the past and had been unable to arrange an appointment. Mr. Diallo expressed great disappointment that the Secretary was not able to discuss the grave problems raised in the aides-mémoire directly with President Toure. He reiterated his previous requests to arrange an appointment between the President and Sekou Toure and was sorry this could not have been arranged. President Toure had not been able to receive the Secretary at the United Nations because he had considered that there were important matters between the two countries which should be discussed calmly, outside the atmosphere of the United Nations. He regretted that as Guinean Ambassador he had apparently so little credit with the U.S. Government that he was unable to arrange a meeting between his president and the U.S. Chief of State, let alone the American Secretary of State. The U.S. attitude appeared to raise the serious question whether Mr. Diallo should continue to remain in the U.S. or should ask to be relieved.

[Page 720]

After discussing the memorandum on the Congo (separate memorandum of conversation) the Ambassador raised the problems on the aide-mémoire concerning technical assistance. Generally he agreed with everything in the memorandum except for one point which was totally inexact: namely that concerning the million dollars for agricultural products. (The aide-mémoire had said “This credit was opened in June 1960, but it was not until October 11, 1960, during the current visit of President Toure that information was received that Guinea would be prepared to make purchases against it.” This was later changed to “This credit was opened in June 1960 but no orders have been placed so far.” before the aide-mémoire was handed to the Ambassador.)

Concerning the aide-mémoire on the Konkoure Dam the Ambassador agreed in principle to the points raised but noted that they would be subject to further discussion. One point he did want to emphasize, however, was the urgency with which Guinea regarded this very vital project. As President Toure had pointed out to Mr. Satterthwaite, the U.S. did not appear to appreciate the vital need to proceed with development in his country.

The Secretary suggested that there appeared to be something of a contradiction in what the Ambassador had just said. We had offered on July 19 to undertake a new survey of the Dam and no reply had yet been received. This had nothing to do with the “slowness” of our parliamentary procedures to which the Ambassador had referred. Certainly we would have had the survey well under way now if Guinea had accepted our offer in July. Moreover, the U.S. would not have made this offer unless it seriously considered helping the development program in Guinea.

The Ambassador replied that, since the U.S. already has the previous studies made on this project, Guinea expects something more than just another survey. Moreover, there were so many conditions in the U.S offer that Guinea was unable to conclude whether the U.S. was genuinely prepared to go ahead with this project or not. For this reason the American offer was considered as possibly constituting a delaying action.

As far as the aide-mémoire on foreign policy was concerned, this raised very serious problems to which President Toure himself would reply. The Ambassador very strongly urged the Secretary to arrange a meeting with Sekou Toure before the President left New York on October 18. The Ambassador said he was not in possession of all the declarations made during his President’s trip to the Far East, but he wished to confirm categorically that there was no basis to the assertion that Guinea had left the path of neutrality.

[Page 721]

Ambassador Diallo returned to his own “problem of conscience” in the development of U.S.-Guinean relations. He had himself insisted on separating Guinean representation to both the U.N. and the U.S. so that he could devote his full time to dealing with the U.S. In Guinea he is known as “the man of Americans”. This may not be completely so, since he is above all loyal to Guinea, but Ambassador Diallo emphasized that he was indeed a true friend of the U.S. If he could not be more useful in furthering good relations between the two countries than he appeared to be able to do now, it would be doing everyone a disservice if he remained at his post. If under the present circumstances, Sekou Toure should leave without meeting a high member of the U.S. Government, the situation would be very unfortunate.

The Secretary said that he would assure Mr. Diallo that someone from the U.S. Government would discuss these problems with President Toure before his departure.

Ambassador Diallo expressed appreciation for these encouraging words and urged again that President Eisenhower receive his own President. He pointed out that Guinea had bought a new chancery and residence in Washington which the President had hoped to dedicate. Moreover, the other heads of state and important visitors had been received by the President and even the heads of delegations of all the newly-admitted nations in the U.N. Unfortunately Guinea was unable to arrange an appointment even with the Secretary of State.

The Secretary pointed out that he had done his best the day before and Mr. Satterthwaite pointed out that other chiefs of state had been quite willing to receive the Secretary at the U.N.

It was agreed in parting that the Ambassador would be informed before the end of the day which American official would call on Sekou Toure.7

  1. Source: Department of State, Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199. Confidential. Drafted by Cassilly.
  2. The conversation took place in the Waldorf Towers.
  3. The second memorandum of conversation, which concerned the Congo, is in Department of State, Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199.
  4. It expressed concern at “recent indications that Guinea is deviating from a neutral foreign policy in favor of close alignment with Soviet positions.” (Ibid., Central Files, 770B.00/10–1360)
  5. It reiterated the U.S. offer to update the existing survey, noted that the significant part of the July 19 aide-mémoire was its indication of U.S. interest in financing the dam, and declared that the United States could not promise action without adequate analysis of all the problems involved. (Telegram 986 from USUN, October 13; ibid., 870B.2614/ 10–1360)
  6. It stated that the $13 million figure mentioned by Touré did not reflect any definite U.S. plans or commitments but might have been given by a U.S. official to Guinean officials on an informal basis to suggest the approximate amount of U.S. aid over the next 2-3 years, if the necessary preliminary agreements were signed, and it stated that U.S. plans for aid to Guinea were set forth in the aide-mémoire given to Diallo on June 10 (see Document 327). (Telegram 982 from USUN, October 13; Department of State, Central Files, 770B.5–MSP/10–1360)
  7. Not printed. (Ibid., 770G.00/10–1260)
  8. Telegram 975 from USUN, October 13, summarized the conversation that day between Touré and Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs Francis O. Wilcox, and telegram 217 to Conakry, October 17, summarized discussion that day between Touré and Under Secretary Dillon concerning the Konkouré dam. Both indicated that Touré went over much the same ground as in his October 6 meeting with Satterthwaite. (Ibid., 870B.2614/10–1360 and 870B.2614/10–1760, respectively)