323. Memorandum of Conversation0

SUBJECT

  • Africa and Aid

PARTICIPANTS

  • Guinea
    • President Sekou Toure
    • Saifoulaye Diallo, President of National Assembly
    • Louis-Lansana Beavogui, Minister of National Economy
    • Ambassador Telli Diallo
    • Fodeba Keita, Minister of the Interior
    • Major Noumandian Keita, Chief of Staff
  • United States
    • Secretary of State Herter
    • Under Secretary Murphy
    • Assistant Secretary Satterthwaite
    • Ambassador John H. Morrow
    • John O. Bell, U/MSC
    • W. J. Handley, USIA
    • Marcus Gordon, ICA
    • C. Vaughan Ferguson, AFS
    • Thomas A. Cassilly, AFS
    • Marcel Van Essen, AFS

The Secretary welcomed President Toure and asked him to open the discussion.

President Toure began by describing the main purpose of his visit to the United States as “moral and political;” Guinea’s independence would constitute a springboard for the “achievement of the African peoples” personality and the rehabilitation of their culture.” Whatever our faults may be, our people have great moral integrity, he declared, and we are faithful to Africa.

There can be no quarrel, the President declared, between such advanced nations as the United States and the undeveloped countries of Africa. Moreover, the problems of Africa are interlocking and one problem cannot be considered in isolation from all the others. Since the United States is able to contribute a great deal to humanity, it has an equally great responsibility. Any plan for the economic development [Page 703] and emancipation of Africa must aim at giving the African people a sense of security and confidence. The sooner Africans realize that they can rightfully count on assistance, the more they will accept sacrifices on their own part since their future security would be assured.

Sekou Toure urged the United States to adapt its policies to the new realities in Africa. This did not mean that he wanted the United States to declare war on the colonial powers; he would, however, ask that our consideration of African problems not be subordinated to the views of colonial powers since colonialism is outdated.

As far as Guinea is concerned, President Toure declared that its regime is neutral. It might be argued that there is no such thing as neutrality and that everyone must belong to one bloc or the other. This, Toure judged, is both true and false at the same time. It is true if you consider Africans to be self-sufficient. But this is not the case; one-third of the continent is underfed and lacks basic, elementary needs such as medicine, tools or ploughs. On the human level, Africans are motivated by an irresistible force so that they do not stop to ask why they lack these basic needs; all they know is that they are relentlessly driven to satisfy such needs.

Guinea and the rest of Africa are in favor of fraternal cooperation with all nations. They want it understood that the present situation in Africa requires more than a piecemeal attack on isolated problems. Such developed countries as the United States should do more than just concentrate on a single school building in Conakry or a dam somewhere else. We ask for a dynamic American policy, Toure declared, affirming its determination to help all the undeveloped countries of the world and especially Africa. Security for invested capital and reasonable profits should go hand in hand with a sense of security and confidence in these investments on the part of the African people.

Sekou Toure concluded by referring to Guinea’s counter proposals to the draft technical cooperation agreement which were given to the United States Embassy in Conakry.1 Also, he declared that an agreement on cultural relations between the two countries should be concluded within the framework of Guinea’s position as outlined above.

In reply, Secretary Herter acknowledged the United States’ responsibility to the rest of the world and referred to President Eisenhower’s recent speech in Abilene, Texas [Kansas] where he had said [Page 704] that it was a privilege for us to assist undeveloped countries.2 The Secretary mentioned that Toure’s intimation that these talks might exceed the limits of U.S.-Guinean relations was somewhat beyond our scope. Nevertheless, he wanted to affirm that President Toure’s moral position on African problems was very similar to that of the United States.

With regard to the technical cooperation agreement with Guinea, the Secretary observed that it was broad in scope and covered the technical and economic fields in general terms. With regard to the cultural pact, the Secretary expressed hope that agreement on this matter would be reached that same day or the next, so that it could be signed while President Toure was still in Washington. Sekou Toure affirmed that his Government accepted the terms of the cultural agreement and was ready to sign.3

The Secretary then broached the subject of an economic agreement which would provide for the protection of private investments and assistance to be granted by the United States Government. He noted that the United States is required by law to operate on a project-by-project basis and cannot enter into a world-wide assistance program. The Secretary also reminded President Toure that our legislation prohibits the U.S. from committing itself to projects of more than one year’s duration and that, consequently, United States foreign assistance has to be implemented on a year-to-year basis. The Secretary then turned over the meeting to Mr. Murphy.

President Toure said he wished to clarify his previous statement, which he believed may not have been fully understood. Guinea is not seeking a written political agreement with the United States nor is it seeking a formal declaration of U.S. intentions with regard to Africa. The main points the President wished to convey were: (1) the African need for moral and diplomatic support from the United States, and (2) the need to situate the moral context of these talks so as to reach a firm agreement which would cover not merely the present but also problems likely to arise in the future. Sekou Toure gave a concrete example of the kind of support he had in mind: during the first difficult months after independence, the Government of Guinea had kept a close eye on any factors which might have curtailed its newly-acquired sovereignty. The Guineans were aware, for example, that France had discussed the problem of Guinea’s independence with its NATO partners and was considering occupying by force the islands of Los (situated just outside Conakry). The French would have tried to justify such a [Page 705] move on the grounds that these islands were not part of continental Guinea. According to Toure, his Government had been informed that, thanks to United States pressure on the French, this plan did not materialize. “This fact is known by every single Guinean,” the President asserted.

Mr. Murphy replied that President Toure’s remarks had been most useful in helping the United States to understand the general situation in Africa. Broaching specific matters, he asked President Toure for a clarification of Guinea’s economic position vis-à-vis France. Mr. Murphy said that he understood that this matter had been discussed generally with President Eisenhower that morning but that President Toure’s analysis and estimate of the future economic relations between Guinea and France would be helpful to the United States Government in evaluating its own program to assist Guinea.

President Toure replied that Guinea was going through a period of “creativity” which was made possible by the advent of independence. Important steps had been taken in many fields to exercise full national sovereignty. In the economic field, before independence, France had all the privileges and especially had held close to all functions connected with imports and exports, while Africans were excluded from most economic activities. Following independence, the Government of Guinea had created a National Office of Foreign Trade which was made a part of the Ministry of Economy. This Office is responsible for implementing trade agreements with other countries and insuring a balanced flow of imports and exports. Before independence, practically all of Guinea’s exports had been shipped to France; since then, France has refused to buy Guinea’s coffee and banana crop which are the country’s most important exports. Consequently, Guinea has made barter agreements with Czechoslovakia, East Germany (and West Germany), Bulgaria, Poland and the USSR. With the latter country only coffee and palm products are involved. Guinea also trades with Italy, the UK and the U.S. Although it may not appear to be sound economics, Guinea, in its early steps towards independence, preferred to resort to barter arrangements in order to tailor its imports to its exports. These barter arrangements can be either entirely or partially fulfilled or even cancelled. President Toure revealed that next year Guinea also plans to initiate its first three-year plan which is designed to develop all sectors of the economy. This plan will be established on the basis of thorough studies and sound statistics. Foreign investments are welcome either in a majority or in a minority participation, and security and profits will be insured.

Mr. Murphy thanked the President for this information and asked him the following specific questions: [Page 706]

1.
Are Guinea’s barter arrangements, presently in force, confined to a specific time limit? President Toure replied that these arrangements are limited only in quantity, not in duration.
2.
How does Guinea visualize the position of the United States vis-à-vis the National Office of Foreign Trade? Will this office authorize trade with the United States following a certain formula? Toure replied that it would. During the first eight months of 1959, Guinea’s exports to the United States had totalled approximately $185,000 and imports from the United States about $1.6 million.

Mr. Murphy pointed out that, while he understood Guinea’s need to barter, this posed a difficult problem for the United States since we were not authorized by law to enter into barter agreements. However, the U.S. is ready to discuss a trade agreement with Guinea at any time.

Mr. Satterthwaite at this point stated that in order to satisfy President Toure’s need for a concrete gesture on our part, the United States Government was prepared to offer Guinea 150 scholarships. These scholarships are to be part of the technical cooperation agreement now being negotiated and would be granted as soon as this agreement was signed.

Mr. Murphy invited President Toure’s attention to the facilities of the Export-Import Bank and the Development Loan Fund in considering Guinea’s need for loans for specific projects.

As President Toure had to leave for the National Press Club, the talks were suspended. Mr. Murphy and President Toure agreed to meet the following morning for the signing of the cultural agreement. It was further agreed that Mr. Ferguson and Ambassador Diallo would work out a joint press communiqué.

  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770B.11/10–2759. Confidential. Drafted by Van Essen and Cassilly.
  2. Telegram 124 from Conakry, October 19, reported a discussion with Guinean officials that day concerning a proposed technical cooperation agreement. The Guineans stated that they considered the terms of the U.S. proposal too restrictive and presented a counterproposal for a more general agreement including cultural and commercial relations. (Ibid., 870B.00–TA/10–1959)
  3. Reference is to the President’s address at the groundbreaking ceremonies for the Eisenhower Library on October 13; for text, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1959, pp. 719–725.
  4. For text of the agreement signed on October 28 by Herter and Béavogui, see 10 UST 1829.