Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Africa, Volume XIV

318. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

April 28, 1959.

SUBJECT

• Sixth Tripartite Talk on Africa¹

PARTICIPANTS

• U.S.
  • Mr. Robert Murphy
  • Mr. J. C. Satterthwaite, AF
  • Mr. Dwight Porter, G
  • Mr. David Nes, AF
  • Mr. Lewis D. Brown, WE
  • William C. Canup, AFS
• France
  • M. Herve Alphand
  • M. Jacques Leprette
• U.K.
  • Sir Harold Caccia
  • Mr. Piers Carter
  • Mr. Charles Wiggin

Ambassador Alphand outlined French concern with regard to recent events in Guinea, including deliveries of arms, medicines and non-military supplies from the Communist Bloc. He indicated that the French were worried about the effects of these deliveries on one of the few remaining parts of the world still disarmed. The Ambassador pointed out that Ambassador Diallo had told him that Guinea did not request the Czech arms, does not need them, and cannot use them. Continuing by saying that this highly dangerous situation results from a design of the Communist Bloc to build a depot in Guinea, the Ambassador indicated that French legal experts were studying the possibility of stopping further arms shipments. However, in his opinion, the problem was more political than legal and required the sounding of a general alarm by Guinea’s African neighbors. Alphand suggested that if Liberia were to react publicly against the arms deliveries, the Community, Sierra Leone, the Portuguese and even the United States could join the outcry and this could be the beginning of an international convention preventing the flow of arms to Guinea.

Mr. Murphy expressed the opinion that Liberia would be unwilling to issue a public statement. He also indicated that the Department’s Legal Adviser had found no legal ground for preventing the arms deliveries. Mr. Murphy asked if we were certain that arms had arrived in considerable quantities. [2½ lines of source text not declassified]

Ambassador Caccia stated that British alarm was less over the size of the arms deliveries than over the presence of Czech instructors and technicians which the West should attempt at all cost to dislodge. He placed the presence of the Communist personnel ahead of the actual arms as the primary danger. Mr. Murphy voiced the fear that we may see the beginning of an arms race in Africa because of the peculiar appeal which armament has to newly independent nations.

There followed a discussion of Guinean charges that France had removed so much equipment from Guinea that the country was in urgent need of supplies from every source. Ambassador Alphand indicated that France had tried to help Guinea since its independence but that Guinea had refused all French offers. Mr. Murphy concluded that the first thing for the West to do in this situation was to send a competent ambassador or ambassadors to Conakry without delay in order to obtain badly needed information.

Mr. Alphand stated that France will not now send an ambassador and preferred that the U.S. also not send one. Mr. Murphy asked what the French reasoning was behind this decision adding that an ambassador is nothing more than a business representative and that the real decision concerning relations with Guinea was taken at the time the Western powers recognized that country. Mr. Alphand said that France did not like the attitude shown by the Guinea Government and that with or without Western ambassadors the problems with Guinea remain as acute. Mr. Murphy asked if this meant the French wished to leave Guinea to the Soviets, adding that Diallo and the Guinea Government have strong feelings that France is abandoning Guinea by refusing to implement the protocols of January 7. He asked Mr. Alphand what President Toure must think when the Communist Bloc is sending ambassadors and the Western nations not. He asked if the French attitude was calculated to improve President Toure’s attitude toward the West. Mr. Alphand replied that nothing the West does can improve the President’s attitude, and that France does not wish to honor the Guineans by sending an ambassador but desires only to stop the arms deliveries.

Ambassador Caccia stated that British legal experts doubted that the arms could legally be stopped, except under certain circumstances if aboard Western ships or in French Community territorial waters. Therefore, Britain could not support a seizure of the arms. The Ambassador went on to ask if anyone knew the real size or threat of the arms. He said that public statements by African Governments could be extremely damaging if the quantity of arms turned out to be small. Mr. Caccia added that, as for accrediting a British ambassador to Conakry, it has already proposed to President Toure that Ambassador Clarke in Monrovia be accredited to Conakry as well.

Mr. Murphy regretted that no Western power has yet discussed the arms matter with President Toure, adding that normally one would expect to discuss a matter of this importance with a friendly government before making a public outcry against that government. Mr. Murphy added that the latter course could lead to a damaging public debate, with President Toure making countercharges against his attackers.

Mr. Alphand pressed his request that the Department approach President Tubman and that the British approach Prime Minister Nkrumah. Mr. Murphy voiced his great concern over possible public statements from these statesmen. However, it was agreed that approaches would be made.² Mr. Murphy again stressed the necessity for sending ambassadors to Conakry to help Guinean Ambassador Diallo who is expected to advocate a pro-Western stand by President Toure. Ambassador Caccia repeated British uneasiness over the lack of precise information concerning the size of the arms deliveries.

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770.00/4–2859. Secret. Drafted by Canup.
1. Regarding the five tripartite discussions on Africa held April 16–21, see Document 13.
2. Telegram 295 to Monrovia, April 28, suggested that the Embassy discuss the reports of the build-up of Communist arms in Guinea with President Tubman and noted that it might be useful if he made inquiries of Sékou Touré. (Department of State, Central Files, 770B.00/4–2859)