Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Africa, Volume XIV

310. Telegram From the Consulate General at Dakar to the Department of State⁰

Dakar, October 23, 1958, 7 p.m.

150. My telegram 146¹Deptel 101² received Dakar too late.

Return evening October 22 from Conakry having spent three and one-half hours conversation with Sekou Toure and Minister of Interior Fodeba Keita. Upon arrival airport met Cassell and Fernanadez, Liberian visiting emissaries who showed great excitement over news Toure had given them that US Government had recognized government Guinea and said they had already cabled this to Tubman. I set Cassell straight immediately.

Toure said he regretted his people had incorrectly translated my telegram of October 18 and appeared glum when I told him it might be impossible avoid issue denial Washington if world press inquiries necessitated statement by Department. Said he thoroughly understood and appreciated American Government’s position of desire avoid misunderstanding with France but emphasized great importance his government attached to recognition by west in general and USA in particular. Spoke at great length of cordial conversations with Tubman’s emissaries and although he had taken no action yet he was prepared to enter dollar zone (or sterling) unless France made some gesture to help Guinea by removing doubts in realm of trade and commerce. I made special point of appealing to his realism by saying quite apart from sentimental feelings of friendship of American peoples towards his own, US Government wished Guinea success and hoped that conditions would permit extension its recognition soon. At this point our conversation interrupted by telephone call from Vice Consul Vanessen at Dakar which led me to infer recognition by US Government might be forthcoming soon. I conveyed this thought to Toure but nevertheless asked him to give as little publicity as possible to his own message of reply to me dated October 19 and to get in touch with me before sending an emissary to US. This he agreed to do (his message of October 19 was broadcast over Radio Conakry and printed in Guinea press but no publicity to date has appeared in Dakar news media) but without enthusiasm. He plans on sending Telli Diallo as Ambassador to US and still wants him to leave for Washington within the next week. Camara, he said, is now slated for Liberia and not London. Thus first diplomatic missions would be Washington, Paris, and Monrovia. Said diplomatic relations with Liberia important because of mutual interests in Nimba or exploitation plus diamonds and forest products. Said he was very impressed by Cassel and keen on establishing best possible relations with Liberians. I must admit atmosphere was one of Guinean-Liberian lovefest. Toure said small party had drunk champagne October 21 and had photos taken celebrating recognition by US Government.

Prime Minister made great point telling me Guinea’s basic interests lay with the west and that East German delegation was still cooling heels at Conakry. Said his first messages (of October 2) were addressed to West and those to satellites sent 48 hours later. In short he pled for US recognition. Although no specific request made he intimated Guinea later on would desire economic assistance from America (I avoided any comment on this subject).

View some of glib answers Toure had to problems of running post and telegraph services, secondary school system et cetera without French and naive idea he can jump into dollar or sterling zone overnight I stressed following three points:

1. France had not imposed severe sanctions on Guinea (had not withdrawn treasury advances, had not imposed French tariff on bananas or otherwise inflicted MFN treatment on Guinean products). Therefore Prime Minister should endeavor ignore certain unfriendly newspaper stories (e.g. Figaro) and patiently wait for acts of recognition from western countries which would certainly be forthcoming soon.

2. That US Government attached singular importance to continuation of mutually profitable economic relations and friendly political association between new African states and former mother countries and that in this case both Guinea and France as well as west as a whole had most to gain by creation and fostering best kind of post-independence relations this regard.

3. That in presenting his case to western countries Prime Minister, view his Marxist training, would hurt Guinea’s case by letting it appear he was trying to blackmail west by raising spectre of Communist take-over in Guinea.

Toure said he appreciated this candid counsel and in return for such frankness said he personally would prefer not having anything to do with East Germans for fear that after signing some kind of barter deal he might be left high and dry whereas with the west he knew that good faith was basic ingredient of any agreement. Nevertheless he felt in view of continued nonrecognition by any western power to date, question of international prestige his government was reacting a critical point and that slightest sign of troubles (e.g. Soussou–Foulah tribal incidents) would be pounced upon by certain elements French Government and elsewhere as proof his government was not stable and hence did not merit recognition.

As for this translation my telegram to him of October 18 I have not [now] seen text and am furnishing it to Department by despatch.³ Even admitting their inaccurate rendition of “is giving due consideration” by phrase “accordela consideration votlue”, the French translation could not properly be considered as constituting recognition. Therefore conclude that Toure thought there was enough warmth in message to qualify inaccurate conclusion he drew and subsequent issuance text his October 19 telegram to Guinee Matin and Radio Conakry. I told him that recognition, when it came, would be a message emanating from the President of the US. As for UN membership I intimated to Prime Minister that it might be technically difficult if not impossible to comply with UN procedures at this date so as to accomplish Guinea’s membership this session. Toure said he very much wanted it this session and smilingly hoped he could have US Government also as sponsor.

Conclusions: 1. Economic life city Conakry subnormal perhaps but not critical. Rumors of storage of rice and price soaring from 35 francs September 14 to 180–200 today entirely without foundation. Price is 40 francs. (Messmer had promptly arranged for Belgian deal to furnish 4,000 tons which Houpouet had “hijacked” from the Atlas at Abidjan.) Visited port and noticed three ships being loaded with bananas and palm kernels.

2. Politically, Guinean populace appears quite calm. Leaders including Toure acted rather tense, alternately between shy uncertainness to bitterness and frustration. For example, as Minister Interior Fodeba Keita, with whom I lunched, went into long explanation of how irritated and supersensitive Guineans now were on political developments in country and why he had felt obliged to expel a certain employee (named Letten) of Guinee Matin who left Conakry last night on same plane with me.

3. Liberian delegation which told me it was preparing the way for Guinea’s acceptance by the west certainly went overboard in effusive display of friendship. Believe this augurs well for future Liberian-Guinean relations and although Cassell may have pushed things too far this may be unique case in which Liberia has rendered signal service to US Government.

Dumont

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770B.02/10–2358. Secret; Niact. Also sent to Paris, London, Bonn, and USUN.
1. Telegram 146 from Dakar, October 21, reported that Dumont had met that day with Guinean emissary Telli Diallo and told him that his October 18 message to Touré did not constitute U.S. recognition. (Ibid., 770B.00/10–2158) Telegram 137 from Dakar, October 19, had reported an October 19 message from Touré acknowledging “United States recognition” and promising to send a good will emissary to the United States. (Ibid., 770B.02/10–2058)
2. Telegram 98 to Dakar, October 20, instructed Dumont to go to Conakry and explain orally that his message expressed U.S. friendly feelings toward Guinea but that the question of recognition was still under consideration. (Ibid., 770B.02/10–2058) Telegram 101, October 21, countermanded this instruction because of a report from London that the French had withdrawn their objections to recognition. (Ibid., 770B.02/10–2158)
3. Despatch 88 from Dakar, October 20. (Ibid., 770B.02/10–2058)